


PER BR 1 .P625 v.16

The Princeton theological  
review







Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2016 with funding from  
Princeton Theological Seminary Library





# The Princeton Theological Review

---

EDITED FOR THE

## FACULTY

J. ROSS STEVENSON  
BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD  
JOHN DEWITT  
GEERHARDUS VOS  
WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG  
FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER  
CASPAR WISTAR HODGE  
HENRY W. SMITH

FRANCIS L. PATTON  
JOHN D. DAVIS  
WM. BRENTON GREENE, JR  
ROBERT DICK WILSON  
CHARLES R. ERDMAN  
J. RITCHIE SMITH  
J. GRESHAM MACHEN  
OSWALD T. ALLIS

JOSEPH H. DULLES

BY

OSWALD T. ALLIS

---

## VOLUME XVI

1918

---

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS  
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS



## ARTICLES

THE TERMINOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT I. By Benjamin B. Warfield .....	1
WHAT DOES "THE SUN STOOD STILL" MEAN? By Robert Dick Wilson .....	46
THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH. By William H. Roberts .....	55
ATHEISTIC CHRISTIANITY. By William Hallock Johnson.....	71
THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF WAR. By William Brenton Greene, Jr. 81	
THE TERMINOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT II. By Benjamin B. Warfield .....	153
THE SANCTUARY OF ISRAEL AT SHILOH. By John D. Davis .....	204
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMANITARIAN PATRIOTISM. By F. P. Ramsay 230	
LIFE WORTHY OF THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST. By Eugene C. Caldwell..	248
ECCLESIASTES. By J. Ritchie Smith .....	262
THE AUTHENTICITY OF JONAH—Article I. By Robert Dick Wilson. 280	
"THE VICTORIOUS LIFE." By Benjamin B. Warfield .....	321
THE PURPOSE OF THE AGES. By Eugene C. Caldwell .....	374
COMMUNION WITH GOD AND WITH CHRIST. By William A. Holliday .....	390
THE EPISTLE OF JAMES—To WHOM ADDRESSED? By Samuel T. Lowrie .....	416
THE AUTHENTICITY OF JONAH—Article II. By Robert Dick Wilson 430	
LUTHER AND THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION. By Frederick W. Loetscher .....	497
THE FULNESS OF CHRIST. By Eugene C. Caldwell .....	557
THE "HIGHER LIFE" MOVEMENT. By Benjamin B. Warfield .....	572
DR. DENNEY AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT. By C. Wistar Hodge .....	623

## NOTES AND NOTICES

THE STANDING STILL OF THE SUN (Joshua x. 12-14). By Henry N. Russell .....	103
THE FLOOD OF WATERS (Genesis vi. 17). By Oswald T. Allis ....	103
THE FEAR OF ISAAC (Genesis xxxi. 42). By Oswald T. Allis....	299
THE COMMON SERVICE BOOK AND HYMNAL OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH. By Louis F. Benson .....	457
SOME PACIFIST MISCONCEPTIONS. By Wm. Brenton Greene, Jr. ....	462
PROFESSOR CROSS ON, WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY? By C. W. Hodge..	466
WAR NEITHER ABSOLUTELY RIGHT NOR ABSOLUTELY WRONG IN ITSELF. By Wm. Brenton Greene Jr. ....	642
הנָּס, "TO APPOINT," IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. By R. D. Wilson..	645

## BOOKS REVIEWED

<i>A Book of Worship for Sailors and Soldiers</i> .....	132
ALLEN, <i>The First Year of Greek</i> .....	146
ALPHINE, <i>The Pulpit Committee</i> .....	483
<i>American Jewish Yearbook, 5678</i> .....	136
ANDERSON, <i>The Work of the Church on Behalf of Unity</i> .....	307
BAKER, <i>Higher Living</i> .....	671
BANG, <i>Hurrah and Hallelujah</i> .....	490
BATES, <i>The Kingdom of God, The Kingdom of Heaven, The Church</i> .....	481
BEARD, <i>Prayers for Use in Home, School, and Sunday School</i> ....	134
<i>The Common Service Book and Hymnal of the Lutheran Church</i> ..	484
BENSON, <i>For God and Country. Hymns for Use in War Time</i> ..	664
BIEDERWOLF, <i>Seventh Day Adventism</i> .....	124
BLACK, <i>The Adult Department, Its Scope and Opportunity</i> .....	132
BLACKWOOD, <i>The Prophets. Elijah to Christ</i> .....	310
BLAUVELT, <i>Ultimate Ideals</i> .....	137
BOREHAM, <i>The Other Side of the Hill and Home Again</i> .....	665
BRANDENBURG, <i>The Philosophy of Christian Being</i> .....	116
BRIGGS, <i>History of the Study of Theology</i> .....	660
BURRELL, <i>Why I Believe the Bible</i> .....	117
CARPENTER, <i>Phases of Early Christianity</i> .....	661
CARROLL, <i>Federal Council Year Book</i> .....	484
CARUS, <i>The Gospel of Buddha</i> .....	115
CHAPMAN, <i>An Old-Fashioned Home</i> .....	129

CHAPMAN, <i>When Home Is Heaven</i> .....	138
COCHRAN, <i>Heroes of the Campus</i> .....	135
COE, <i>A Social Theory of Religious Education</i> .....	142
CONDÉ, <i>The Human Element in the Making of a Christian</i> .....	129
CREELMAN, <i>An Introduction to the Old Testament, Chronologically Arranged</i> .....	305
CROSS, <i>What Is Christianity? A Study of Rival Interpretations</i> ..	480
CUNNINGHAM, <i>The Increase of True Religion</i> .....	139
CURTIN, <i>The Land of Deepening Shadow. Germany at War</i> .....	491
EAKELY, <i>The Kingdom of God</i> .....	305
EARP, <i>A Community Study; or, The Religious Social Survey</i> ..	484
ERDMAN, <i>The Gospel of Mark</i> .....	135
FIGGIS, <i>The Will to Freedom; or, the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ</i> .....	108
— <i>For the Boys at the Front</i> .....	132
FOSTER, <i>The Intermediate Department</i> .....	131
FOSTER, <i>The Problems of the Intermediate and Senior Teachers</i> ..	131
FOULKES, <i>Sunset by the Lakeside</i> .....	139
FOUNTAIN, <i>The Precious Truth Senior S. S. Lesson Quarterly</i> ..	132
<i>Game of Gospel Songs</i> .....	132
GARVIE, <i>The Master's Comfort and Hope</i> .....	480
GILBERT, <i>Jesus: For the Men of Today. When Science Aids Religion</i> .....	483
GRAY, <i>A Picture of the Resurrection</i> .....	481
GWATKIN, <i>The Sacrifice of Thankfulness</i> .....	481
HALDEMAN, <i>The Secret and Imminent Coming of Christ</i> .....	123
HALL, <i>Jesus, The Christ, in the Light of Psychology</i> .....	475
HARPER, <i>The New Layman for the New Time</i> .....	130
HASTINGS, <i>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</i> , ix .....	110
HOBART, <i>Pedagogy for Ministers, and Application of Pedagogical Principles to the Preaching and Other Work of the Pastor</i> ....	312
HOOKE, <i>Christ and the Kingdom of God</i> .....	130
HUIZINGA, <i>Theological Essays</i> .....	479
HUTCHINS, <i>The Preacher's Ideals and Inspirations</i> .....	139
<i>Il Nuovo Testamento ei Salmi</i> .....	120
— JOHNSTON, <i>Patriotism and Radicalism</i> .....	147
JOSEPH, <i>The Faith and the Fellowship</i> .....	482
KERR, <i>How to Teach the Life of Christ</i> .....	134
KERR, <i>The Highway of Life, and other Sermons</i> .....	308
KEYSER, <i>A System of Natural Theism</i> .....	116
KUHNIS, <i>The Peaceful Life: A Study of Spiritual Hygiene</i> ....	309
KUYPER, <i>Nadere Taelichting op het Program van de Anti-revolutionaire Partij</i> .....	666
LUTZ, <i>Early Babylonian Letters from Larsa</i> .....	485
McCONNELL, <i>Understanding the Scriptures</i> .....	481
McDOWELL, <i>Good Ministers of Jesus Christ</i> .....	136
MABIE, <i>The Unshaken Kingdom</i> .....	310
MACMILLAN, <i>Protestantism in Germany</i> .....	120

<i>Manual of Inter-Church Work</i> .....	307
MAYOR, <i>Q. Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Apologeticus</i> .....	122
MILLSPAUGH, <i>Party Organization and Machinery in Michigan Since 1890</i> .....	315
Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. .....	133
— <i>Missionary War Service</i> .....	308
MORIMOTO, <i>The Standard of Living in Japan</i> .....	315
MORRISON, <i>The Lord's Prayer and the Prayers of Our Lord</i> .....	311
MULLINS, <i>The Christian Religion in Its Doctrinal Expression</i> .....	124
MÜLLER, <i>Mythology of All Races, Vol. xii, Egypt</i> .....	484
— MURRAY, <i>Faith, War, and Policy</i> .....	147
NOIRÉ, <i>The Origin and Philosophy of Language</i> .....	655
PACE, <i>Bring Him to Me</i> .....	129
PATERSON, <i>In the Day of the Ordeal</i> .....	311
PELL, <i>What Did Jesus Really Teach About War?</i> .....	123
POWELL, <i>The Confessions of a Browning Lover</i> .....	313
POWERS, <i>Fundamentals of Expression</i> .....	314
POWERS, <i>Talks on Expression</i> .....	314
— <i>Presbyterian Church and the War</i> .....	308
REMENSNYDER, <i>What the World Owes Luther</i> .....	476
Reports of the Missionary and Benevolent Boards of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.....	134
ROBERTSON, <i>Paul's Joy in Christ. Studies in Philippians</i> .....	664
SCOTT, <i>Mythology of All Races, Vol. xii, Indo-Chinese</i> .....	485
SCOTT, <i>The Shorter Catechism and the Shorter Catechism in Full.</i> 133	
SEEBACH, <i>Missionary Milestones</i> .....	477
SNOWDEN, <i>Can We Believe in Immortality?</i> .....	478
SPALDING, <i>Swedenborg and the Evidence of the Truth of His Teaching</i> .....	124
SPEER, <i>The Stuff of Manhood</i> .....	131
תורה נבאים וכותבים. <i>A New Jewish Version of the Old Testament Scriptures</i> .....	118
UNDERWOOD, <i>Underwood of Korea: An Intimate Record of His Life and Work</i> .....	665
VEACH, <i>The Sunday School</i> .....	134
VERKUYL, <i>Children's Devotions</i> .....	134
<i>Victory in Christ</i> .....	132
WASHBURN, <i>The Holy Spirit. A Layman's Conception</i> .....	479
WELLS, <i>God the Invisible King</i> .....	473
WEYFORTH, <i>The Organizability of Labor</i> .....	315
WINCHESTER, <i>Religious Education and Democracy</i> .....	140
WOODHULL, <i>The Master Quest</i> .....	482
WORK, <i>The Bible in English Literature</i> .....	146
ZAHN, <i>Introduction to the New Testament</i> .....	475
ZOLLMANN, <i>American Civil Church Law</i> .....	313

## CONTRIBUTORS

ALLIS, O. T., *103-107, 299-304, 485-490, 655-660.*

ARMSTRONG, W. P., *122, 475-476.*

BENSON, L. F., *457-461.*

CALDWELL, E. C., *248-261, 374-389, 557-571*

DAVIS, J. D., *118-120, 204-229*

DEWITT, J., *120-122*

DULLES, J. H., *117, 146, 665-666*

ERDMAN, C. R., *120, 129-136, 307-309, 313, 481, 482-483, 483-484, 490-491, 664, 671-672*

GREENE, W. B., Jr., *81-102, 115-117, 123, 147, 315, 462-466, 472-475, 484-485, 642-645*

HODGE, C. W., *123-129, 466-472, 478-479, 623-641*

HOLLIDAY, W. A., *390-415*

HUIZINGA, A. V. C. P., *666-671*

HUNT, T. W., *313-314*

JOHNSON, G., *140-146.*

JOHNSON, W. H., *71-80, 108-109, 146-147*

LOETSCHER, F. W., *497-556*

LOWRIE, S. T., *416-429*

PAIST, B. F., Jr., *476-478, 491, 660-664*

RAMSAY, F. P., *230-247*

ROBERTS, W. H., *55-70*

RUSSELL, H. N., *103*

SMITH, H. W., *314-315*

SMITH, J.R., *136-140, 262-279, 305-307, 309-312, 480, 481-482, 483, 664-665*

WARFIELD, B. B., *1-45, 110-115, 153-203, 321-373, 572-622*

WILSON, R. D., *46-54, 280-298, 305, 430-456, 645-654*

Articles are indicated by black-faced type; Notes and Notices by italics.



# The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1918

---

## THE TERMINOLOGY OF LOVE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

### I

Considered as a monument of the Greek language at a particular stage of its development, the New Testament is a very interesting document; and not least so in the terminology which it employs to express the emotion of love. The end-terms of this development, so far as it is open to our observation, are found—we are speaking in broad categories—in the literature which we know as “classical” on the one side, and in the speech of the modern Greek world on the other. In passing from one of these end-terms to the other, a complete revolution has been wrought in the terminology of love; a revolution so radical that the ordinary verb for “to love” in classical Greek has lost that sense altogether in modern Greek, its place being taken by a verb in comparatively infrequent use in the classics; while the ordinary substantive for “love” in modern Greek, formed from this latter verb, does not occur even once in the whole range of classical Greek literature. Coming in somewhere between these two end-terms, the New Testament, flanked on the one side by the Septuagint version of the Old Testament and its accompanying Apocrypha, and on the other by the Apostolic Fathers, forms a compact body of literature in which alone we can observe the revolution in progress; or, we should better say, in which this revolution suddenly appears to sight already nearly completed. Without any heralding in the secular literature, all at once in this religious literature the change presents itself to our view as in principle already an accomplished fact.

All the terms expressing the idea of love current either in classical or in modern Greek are found in this body of religious literature. But they are found in it in such distribution as to make it evident that we are witnessing the dying of one usage while the other has already reached its vigorous youth. This phenomenon is the more impressive because this body of literature stands out in this respect in a certain isolation. Neither in the secular literature of the early Christian centuries, nor even in the immediately succeeding religious literature—in the Greek of the Apologists and the early Church Fathers—is the change in usage anything like so manifest. We have an odd feeling that, with respect to the expression of the idea of love at least, the Greek of the New Testament (along with that of the Septuagint and the Apostolic Fathers) has run ahead of its time, and reflects a stage in the development of the language not yet by some centuries generally attained. This is due doubtless in part to the extremely popular character of these writings. They tap for us the Greek language of their day as it was actually spoken; and enable us to see how far the spoken Greek was outstripping in its development the language of "the prigs who write books." In the Apologists at any rate we have a partial return to the more literary usage, with the effect that the language of the New Testament (with the Septuagint and Apostolic Fathers) seems more modern than that of even the Christian writers that came after them.

There are four verbs which, with their accompanying nouns (of course there are also various derivatives), are employed by the classical writers to express the idea of love. Of these *φιλεῖν* (*φιλία*) is in universal use as the general term for love, though naturally it has its specific implication which on occasion comes sharply into sight. By its side stand its synonyms, *ἐρᾶν*, *ἐρᾶσθαι* (*ἔρως*), *στέργει* (*στοργή*), *ἀγαπᾶν* (*ἀγάπησις*), each of which also is no doubt employed (with decreasing frequency in the order in which they are here set down) to express every kind of love, but

each with a specific implication which comes clearly into evidence whenever there is occasion for it to do so. What we mean to say is that, as synonyms, these terms do not so much cover a common ground over the edge of which each extends at a particular place to occupy an additional field all its own; as that they are so used that, within the common ground which they all alike cover, each has a particular quality or aspect which it alone emphasizes, and which it alone is fitted to bring into sight. If we should endeavor to hit off the special implication of each with a single word, we might perhaps say that with *στέργειν* it is nature, with *ἔραν* passion, with *φιλεῖν* pleasurableness, with *ἀγαπᾶν* preciousness. The idea of love includes all these things, and these terms come severally to mind, therefore, in speaking of love, whenever love is contemplated from the angle of the special implication of each. If it is a question of the constitutional efflux of natural affection *στέργειν* is the most expressive word to use. If, of the blind impulse of absorbing passion, *ἔραν*. If, of the glow of heart kindled by the perception of that in the object which affords us pleasure, *φιλεῖν*. If, of an awakened sense of value in the object which causes us to prize it, *ἀγαπᾶν*. It is probable that no one of the terms is ever used wholly without some sense in the speaker's mind of its specific implication. Nevertheless each of them is actually employed of every kind and degree of love—because there is no object which is fitted to call out the emotion of love at all which cannot be approached from numerous angles and envisaged from distinct points of view. Not merely differences in the objects on which the affection terminates, but also differences in the mental attitude of its subjects, determine the appropriateness of one or another of the terms, when love is spoken of.

We may take *στέργειν* as an illustration.<sup>1</sup> We have no

<sup>1</sup> *Στέργειν, στοργή* are not found in Homer, but are in good Attic use, and, though not of such common occurrence as, say, *φιλεῖν, φιλία*, yet remain in constant employment throughout the whole history of the language, and apparently survive in modern Greek. N. Conto-

doubt that the characterization of it by J. H. Heinrich Schmidt is substantially right. “Στέργειν,” he writes,<sup>2</sup> “does not denote a passionate love or disposition, not a longing after something that takes our heart captive and gives to our efforts a distinctive goal; it designates rather the quiet and abiding feeling within us, which resting on an object as near to us, recognizes that we are closely bound up with it and takes satisfaction in this recognition.” “Of this sort,” he adds, “is love to parents, to wife and children, to our close relations particularly, and then to our country and our king. There is revealed in στέργειν, accordingly, the inner life of the heart which belongs to man by nature; while φιλεῖν shows the inclination which springs out of commerce with a person or thing, or is called out by qualities in a thing which are agreeable to us; and ἐρᾶν expresses a passion pressing outward and seeking satisfaction.” Nevertheless we can understand that one who, rising from reading this characterization, should light upon a passage like Plutarch’s description of Pericles’ love for Aspasia, might feel some doubts of its adequacy. “The affection (ἀγάπησις) which Pericles had for Aspasia,” he explains,<sup>3</sup> “seems to have been rather of a passionate (ἐρωτική) kind.” Discarding his wife, “he took Aspasia and loved her exceedingly (ἐστερξε διαφερόντως). Twice a day, as they say, on going out and coming in from the market place, he would salute her with a loving kiss (καταφιλεῖν).” Στέργειν is used here of a distinctly erotic love, such as we might expect to be expressed rather by ἐρᾶν, and seems to be described, as distinguished from ἀγάπησις, precisely by its quality as passion. And certainly it is not of “natural affec-

poulos in his *Dictionary of Modern Greek*, at least, lists both, with the definitions, for στέργω, of “to consent, to agree, to comply, to answer; to embrace with natural affection; to love”; and for στοργή, “tenderness, affection.” Its etymology seems to be obscure. W. Prellwitz, *Etym. Wörterb.*,<sup>2</sup> 1905, records only Keltic analogies, with a reference to Stokes, *B. B.* 23. 58.

<sup>2</sup> *Synonymik der griechischen Sprache*, III, 1879, p. 480 (136. § 4).

<sup>3</sup> Plutarch, *Pericles*, 24 (ed. B. Perrin, pp. 70-71).

tion" in the ordinary sense of that phrase that Meleager expects us to think when he asks concerning Eros, "Is it not Ares that his mother loves (*στέργει*)?"<sup>4</sup> So little is it always conceived as independent of attractive qualities in its object, moreover, that Xenophon, in a discussion of the transitoriness of love (he is speaking of sexual love), uses it, when raising the question whether under the best circumstance—when namely the love is not only warm but mutual (*ἢν δὲ καὶ ἀμφότερα στέρξουσι*)—it can survive the fading of the charms of one or the other party.<sup>5</sup> Passages like these show how widely the application of *στέργειν*, *στοργή* is extended; and how nearly out of sight its specific implication of love as a natural movement of the soul—as something almost like gravitation or some other force of blind nature—may retire. Yet it probably never retires quite out of sight: the use of the word doubtless always suggests that in some way or other the love in question is natural, even if we must add that it has become natural only by the acquisition of a second nature. Even the love of sense may be conceived of, from this point of view, as a constitutional action of mere nature.<sup>6</sup>

Other and more numerous passages present themselves in which the native meaning of the word is thrown up strongly to observation. When Euripides wishes to reproach a father who has contracted a second marriage with neglect of the children of his dead wife, he naturally uses *στέργειν* of the love for them that he has lost. The passage contains a contrast between *φιλεῖ* and *στέργει* which puts a sharper point upon the specific meaning of the latter. "Hast learned

<sup>4</sup> *The Greek Anthology*, V. 180 (ed. W. R. Paton, I. p. 216). Other instances of the use of *στέργειν*, *στοργή* of illicit love are found in V. 8 (p. 132); V. 166 (p. 206); V. 191 (p. 222); VII. 476 (Vol. II, p. 258). In V. 180 (p. 216) we have also an instance of the use of *στέργει* with object of thing in the sense of yearning: "And yearns for anger like the waves."

<sup>5</sup> Xenophon, *Symposium*, viii, 14: cf. 21.

<sup>6</sup> *Στέργειν*, *στοργή* are comparatively rarely used of the love of mere sense.

this only now, That no man loves ( $\phiιλει$ ) his neighbor as himself? Good cause have some; with most 'tis greed of gain—As here: their sire for a bride's sake loves ( $στέργει$ ) not these."<sup>7</sup> The guilt and tragedy of the situation are greatly increased by the fact that it is a natural and constitutional movement of the human heart which is outraged. Accordingly  $ἀστοργος$ —it is worth while to note it in passing, for  $ἀστοργος$  is a New Testament word—is a word of terrible significance. "Especially, however," writes Schmidt,<sup>8</sup> "is the meaning of  $στέργειν$  and  $στοργή$  illustrated by  $ἀστοργος$ , 'loveless.' It designates the unfeeling and hard, whose heart is warmed by no noble sentiment; it is applied particularly to inhuman parents, but also to animals who do not love their young. . . . How sharply the meaning of the word is differentiated is shown by the fact that it is used of women who have many love-affairs and who therefore are very certainly not  $ἀνέρασται$ , but on the other hand lack the nobler love to their husbands."

It is this that is the natural use of  $στέργειν$ , and it occurs in it very frequently. An instructive instance is found in a passage in Plato's *Laws*.<sup>9</sup> "I maintain," he writes, "that this colony of ours has a father and mother, which is no other than the colonizing state. Well, I know that many colonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in early days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if there come a time later, when the tie is broken, still, while he is in want of education, he naturally loves his parents and is loved by them, and flies to them for protection, and finds in them his natural defence in time of need; and this parental feeling already exists in the Cnossians." Some other term for love could no doubt have been employed in this passage. But the employment of the phrase  $στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται$ , which, in an effort to convey

<sup>7</sup> Euripides, *Medea*, 80-88 (A. S. Way's translation).

<sup>8</sup> As cited, p. 489.

<sup>9</sup> Page 754 B. (Jowett's translation, Vol. IV. p. 276):  $καθάπε ταῖς . . . στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γεννησάντων.$

its implication, Jowett renders, “*naturally* loves his parents . . .”, gives particular force to the remark; this is precisely what children and parents feel to one another.

Another instructive passage is found in the Ninth Book of Aristotle's *Nicomachaeon Ethics*. It will repay us to run rapidly through it. Aristotle is remarking on the odd fact of experience that benefactors love (*φιλεῖν*) the benefited, rather than the other way round. The explanation is, he suggests, that the benefited stand to the benefactors in a relation somewhat like that of their product. It is to be noted, he says, that those who have conferred favors love and prize (*φιλοῦσι καὶ ἀγαπῶσι*, ‘feel affection for and value’) those who receive them quite irrespective of any hope they may cherish of a return. This is a feeling common to all artificers: each loves (*ἀγαπᾷ*) his own especial product much more than he could possibly be loved (*ἀγαπηθεῖν*, ‘prized’) by it, could life be conferred upon it. The poets supply the supreme illustration; their love for their poems is inordinate (*ὑπεραγαπῶσι*, ‘the value that they place upon them’), and has a truly parental quality (*στέργοντες ὥσπερ τέκνα*). It is a just simile: every workman lives in the product of his energy, for what is living but the expenditure of energy? We love (*στέργειν*) what we make, because what we make is the extension of ourselves, and to love it is to love our own being. It will be noted that in this passage *στέργειν* is raised so much above *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν* that it is called in to give the specific quality of a *ὑπεραγαπᾶν*. When our love becomes strong and tender like a parent's love for his children it is most naturally described by *στέργειν*.

It is not, however, precisely the strength or the tenderness of a love which qualifies it to be described by *στέργειν*. It is its obligatoriness—if we may use that term in a quasi-natural rather than an openly moral sense; its “necessity” under the circumstances; a necessity by virtue of which its absence becomes not merely distressing but also reprehensible.<sup>10</sup> This is the proper term for the love which consti-

<sup>10</sup> For the note of necessity in *στέργειν* see Schmidt, as cited, p.

tutes the cement by which any natural or social unit is bound together, and which is due from one member of every such unit to another. Of course such a unit may be mentally created out of any relation, natural or artificial, permanent or temporary; and the use of *στέργειν* of the sentiment existing between individuals is evidence that they are, for the moment at least, thought of as constituting such a unit,—as “bound together in some bundle of life.” Accordingly it is used of the love which binds friends together, and which a friend has the right to expect from his friend. “I do not love a friend who loves with words (*λόγοις δὲ ἐγὼ φιλοῦσαν οὐ στέργω φίλην*),” says Antigone:<sup>11</sup> and what she means is that she does not look upon one whose professed affection expresses itself only in words as bound up in one bundle of life with her and so worthy of the name of friend. Similarly when Lychas advises Deianeira to receive Iole, in the words *στέργε τὴν γυναῖκα*,<sup>12</sup> he means something more than is expressed in the several current renderings: “bear this woman with patience,” “suffer this maiden gladly,” “treat the girl kindly”: he means, take her into a recognized relation to yourself, involving a duty of affectionate treatment. The isolation of Menon the Thracian could not be more strongly expressed than by Xenophon’s description: “He evidently had no affection (*στέργεν*) for anyone”:<sup>13</sup> it is implied that he was lacking in all that goes to bind a man to his fellows and they to him. When the sausage-vender cries out to Demos in Aristot-

482. Schmidt even says that with *στέργειν* it is often not a matter of pleasure at all, and never a matter of sensuous pleasure: it often conveys the meaning of yielding quickly and with constant mind to the inevitable. He cites such passages as Sophocles, *Phil.* 538: I think that no other man would endure to look on such a sight, “but I have learned by hard necessity to *στέργειν* ills”—that is, to acquiesce in them, accept them, take them as belonging to me; so *Lys.* 33.4: it was necessary to *στέργειν* this fortune. This sense of toleration—“to put up with”—is shared by it with *ἀνένειν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*.

<sup>11</sup> Line 443.

<sup>12</sup> *Trach.*, line 486.

<sup>13</sup> *Anabasis*, II, 6. 23.

phanes' play:<sup>14</sup> May I be minced up into very small meat indeed, *εἰ μὴ σε φιλέω, καὶ μὴ στέργω*,—he quickly corrects the protestation of mere personal sentiment for Demos to an assertion of such a love for him as implied identification of himself with him. Demos here represents a whole people whom the sausage-vender describes as his friends, to whom he asserts himself to be bound by a—not merely class but organic—affection. It is just as easy to think of the whole world as such an organic unity, compacted together by mutual *φιλανθρωπία*. The Christian Apologists, rising to this conception, naturally give expression to it in the forms of speech long consecrated to such things. We are *φιλανθρωπότατοι* to such an extent, says Athenagoras,<sup>15</sup> that we do not love (*στέργειν*) merely our friends (*φίλους*), for 'if ye love (*ἀγαπῶται*) those that love you,' says He, 'what reward will ye have?' And Justin:<sup>16</sup> "But concerning our loving all (*περὶ δὲ τοῦ στέργειν ἀπαντας*), He taught us, 'If ye love those that love you (*ἀγαπᾶτε τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας ὑμᾶς*), what new thing do ye do?' It is exceedingly instructive to observe these writers, in the act of citing our Lord's great commandment of universal love, replacing His *ἀγαπᾶν* with *στέργειν* in the interests of their own feeling for the solidarity of the human race. *Στέργειν*, we see, is the love of solidarity.<sup>17</sup>

And if the Deity be solidary with men—as Plato and the Stoics taught? Why, then, of course, *στέργειν* could be used of the love that binds the Deity and men together. Even the gods many and lords many could be said so to love, each

<sup>14</sup> *Eq.*, line 769 (al. 715 or 748). <sup>15</sup> 12.3 (Otto, p. 56).

<sup>16</sup> *Apol.*, I. 27.

<sup>17</sup> Aristotle, *Nic. Ethics*, viii. 5, discusses what happens to the lover and his mistress (*έραστὴ καὶ ἐρωμένω*) when the grounds on which their love (*φιλία*) is built fall away. Sometimes the love (*φιλία*) passes away too. Sometimes—if the two are alike in their natures—custom has inspired them with an abiding affection and it holds (*εἰαν ἐκ τῆς συνηθείας τὰ ὥδη στέρεξονσιν ὁμόθεις ὄντες*). Their love is thought of as *στοργή* only when they are conceived as constituting together a unity by reason of their similar natures.

its votaries. "This is right, Mr. Busybody, right," we read in Aristophanes:<sup>18</sup> "for the Muses of the lyre love us well (ἐμὲ γὰρ ἔστερξαν εὐλυροί τε Μονοῖ.)." And on a higher plane Athene is made to declare that she loves (*στέργειν*), even as one that tends plants, the race that has taken graft from the righteous.<sup>19</sup> But gods many and lords many are divisive things. We must come at least to the recognition of *τὸ θεῖον* before we can effectively conceive the divine and the human as bound up in one bundle of life, the cement of which is love. It is not without its deep significance, therefore, that the Emperor Constantine begins the oration which he delivered to "the Assembly of the Saints" with an allusion to the love (*στοργή*) to the Deity implanted in men,<sup>20</sup> and closes it with an assertion of the love (*στοργή*) of God to man, which is manifested in His providence.<sup>21</sup>

What has been said of *στέργειν* may in substance be repeated of *ἔραν*, *mutatis mutandis*. What *ἔραν* conveys<sup>22</sup> is the idea of passion; and since all love is a passion *ἔραν* is applicable to all love; but since *ἔραν* emphasizes the passion of love it is above all applicable to especially passionate forms of love. It is naturally used, therefore, frequently to express the sexual appetite. This is not because it is a base word: it is no more intrinsically base than any other word for

<sup>18</sup> *Frogs*, line 229.

<sup>19</sup> Æschylus, *Eumenides*, line 912. The passage is a difficult one. We have followed Verrall. E. H. Plumtre renders thus: "For I, like gardener shepherding his plants, This race of just men, freed from sorrow, love."

<sup>20</sup> C. 2: *Eusebius Werke*, ed. I. A. Hernal, Vol. I. 1902. p. 155 (τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον στοργὴν ἔμφυτον).

<sup>21</sup> C. 25: as above, p. 192 (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρέμνουαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους στοργὴν).

<sup>22</sup> The derivation of the word is uncertain. It is ordinarily referred to the primitive Aryan root RA (see for example Skeat, *Etymolog. Dict. of the English Language*, no. 289; cf. LAS, no. 324 which is an expansion of RA), which is given the senses of "to rest, to be delighted, to love." W. Prellwitz connects with the Old-Indian *aris*, with the meaning of trustworthy; but notes that Uhlenbach, *Etym. Wörterb. d. altind. Sprachlehre* connects *aris* with Gothic *aljam*, Old High German *ellen*, with the sense of "ardor."

love. It is because its very heart is passion, and it therefore lends itself especially to express a love which is nothing but passion. But it just as readily lends itself to express a passion which is all love, and it accordingly is also used in the very strongest sense in which a term for love can be employed. Its characteristic uses thus lie at the two extremes of low and high, although of course it may be applied to any kind or degree of love lying between, if only it be for the moment thought of as passion. Schmidt<sup>23</sup> has persuaded himself that the fundamental idea of the word is absorbing preoccupation with its object, complete engrossment with it, the setting of the whole mind upon it—in accordance with a passage in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*<sup>24</sup> which tells us that people in love (*ἐρῶντες*), no matter what they are doing—talking or writing or acting—are always brooding with delight on the beloved one (*τὸν ἐρωμένον*). Aristotle, however, seems to be only noting here a familiar effect of the passion which *ἔραν* really expresses.

It is one of the most characteristic applications of *ἔραν* which is illustrated by a frequently quoted passage from Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia*.<sup>25</sup> This passage is a part of a disquisition designed to prove the voluntariness of love, and runs as follows. “‘Do you observe,’ said he, ‘how fire burns all alike? That is its nature. But of beautiful things, we love (*ἐρῶσι*) some and some we do not: and one [loves] one [person], another another; for it is a matter of free-will, and each loves (*ἔρει*) what he pleases. For example, a brother does not [fall in] love [with] (*ἔρει*) his sister, but

<sup>23</sup> Page 475 (136. 32).

<sup>24</sup> I. II. ii, ed. E. M. Cope, 1877, Vol. I, p. 209; Cope, however, explains the passage as saying that lovers take pleasure in busying themselves with the beloved object in his absence, talking about him and sketching his features, and doing everything they can think of to recall him to their memories.

<sup>25</sup> 5. I. 10. We use a version that lies at hand, but have enclosed in square brackets some of the words which have been inserted by the translator to give greater lucidity to the passage, in order that the reader may not be misled with respect to the frequency of the occurrence of *ἔραν*, or with respect to apparent variations in the term used.

somebody else [falls in love with] her; neither does a father [fall in love with] his daughter, but someone else does; for fear of God and the law of the land are sufficient to prevent [such] love (*ἔρωτα*): But,' he went on, 'if a law should be passed forbidding those who did not eat to be hungry, those who did not drink to be thirsty, forbidding people to be cold in the winter or hot in summer, no such law could ever bring men to obey its provisions, for they are so constituted by nature as to be subject to the control of such circumstances. But love (*ἔραν*) is a matter of free-will; at any rate every one loves (*ἔρα*) what suits his taste as he does his clothes and shoes'." And then the discussion proceeds to raise the question of slavery to the passion of this love, and deals with it lamely enough—on the theory that love is purely a matter of will. Here certainly it is said distinctly that "a brother *οὐκ* *ἔρα* a sister—nor a father a daughter," and that assuredly means that *ἔραν* designates distinctively sexual passion. So it does—in this passage: and this is one of the most characteristic applications of the term. It is not, however, its only application. In point of fact it may just as well be said of a given brother or father that he does *ἔρα* his sister or daughter as that he does not. We read for example in a fragment of Euripides:<sup>26</sup> "There is nothing dearer (*γδιον*) to children than their mother: love (*ἔρατε*) your mother, children. There is no other love (*ἔρως*) so sweet as this loving (*ἔραν*)."

When *ἔραν* is employed in this latter fashion, something much more, not less lofty than *φιλεῖν* is meant. Phrases in which it is brought into immediate contrast with *φιλεῖν* to express something better than it, occur not infrequently. Plutarch, for example, tells us<sup>27</sup> that Brutus was said to have been liked (*φιλεῖσθαι*) by the masses for his virtue, but loved (*ἔρασθαι*) by his friends; and Xenophon transmits<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Eur., *Frag. Erech.*, 19 (Dind.) ap. Stob. 77. p. 454. (Teubner's ed. of Euripides' Works, ed. by A. Nauch, 1892. vol. III. p. 90, fragment 360).

<sup>27</sup> *Brutus*, c. 29.

<sup>28</sup> *Hi.*, xi. 11.

an exhortation in identical terms—that we should seek not only to be liked (*φιλεῖν*) but loved (*έραν*) by men. Dio Chrysostom draws the same contrast in a passage<sup>29</sup> which we may quote more at length for the sake of its discriminating use of the several terms for love. Cattle, says he, love (*φιλεῖν*, 'are fond of') their herdsmen, and horses their drivers—they love and exalt them; dogs love (*ἀγαπᾶν*, 'prize') the huntsmen—love and guard them; all irrational things recognize and love (*φιλεῖν*, 'are fond of') those that take care of them: how shall a king, then who is gentle and benevolent (*ἡμέρον καὶ φιλάνθρωπον*), fail to be not only liked (*φιλεῖν*) but also loved (*έραν*) by men? In passages like these *έραν* is exalted above *φιλεῖν*, not *φιλεῖν* depressed below *έραν*. The contrasted renderings "like" and "love" do not do justice to either. Both words mean "love" and what is intended to be expressed by *έραν* is that high love of exalted devotion which, from this point of view, soars above all other love.

The same essential contrast between the two notions—the contrast between a love of liking and a love of passion—may occur, no doubt, with the balance of approbation tipped the other way. Thus Plato can tell us of some lovers really loving (*φιλεῖν*) the objects of their passion (*έραν*).<sup>30</sup> And Aristotle can speak similarly of lovers who really have affection for one another (*φιλοῦσιν οἱ ἔρωμενοι*).<sup>31</sup> It is possible also to draw quite a different contrast between the two words, a contrast turning on the fact that passion is blind while true affection can see.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile we are effectually warned off from conceiving *έρως* as essentially a base word

<sup>29</sup> i. p. 4M.

<sup>30</sup> *Phaedr.*, 231 C: *τούτους μαλιστά φασι φιλεῖν ὡς ἄν ἔρωσι*: "regard with affection those for whom they have a passion" (Liddell and Scott); "feel the highest (moral) affection for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion" (E. M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 1877, I. p. 293).

<sup>31</sup> *Anal. Ps.*, 2.27.1.

<sup>32</sup> Apollon., *De Constr.*, p. 292.1 cited by Stephens, p. 1966 b. at the bottom.

and confounding it with  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ <sup>33</sup> in order that we may escape confounding it with  $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ . We may observe the close affinity and real distinction of the three notions in a passage of Plato's which is, perhaps, the more instructive because in it  $\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$  is used in its lower application and still is separated from  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$  as sharply as from  $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\nu$ . "No one who desires ( $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\iota$ ) or loves ( $\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\acute{\iota}$ ) another," we read,<sup>34</sup> "could ever have desired ( $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\iota$ ) or loved ( $\eta\rho\alpha$ ) him or become his friend ( $\epsilon\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\iota$ ) had he not in some way been congenial to his beloved ( $\tau\bar{\omega}\epsilon\phi\omega\mu\acute{\iota}\nu\omega$ )."<sup>35</sup> In every stage of its progress, attraction implies inherent congeniality: but the stages of attraction—desire, love, abiding affection—are distinct. When this is true of  $\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$  at its lowest, what are we to say of it at its highest, when it passes above  $\phi\iota\lambda\acute{\iota}\nu$  itself and the series runs lust, affection, ardent love?

"Like our 'love' of which it is almost an exact equivalent," writes Charles Bigg,<sup>36</sup> " $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$  may be applied to base uses, but it is not, like  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ , a base word. From the time of Parmenides, it had been capable of the most exalted signification." . . . We need not stay, however, to refer to the elevated doctrine of the Platonic Eros in detail. Through it, if no otherwise, an association of high things with  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$  was formed, which penetrated wherever the influence of Platonic thought extended. It is not merely in Plotinus' great conception of the  $\nu\bar{\omega}\acute{\iota}\epsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu$  that this lofty usage is continued. That the word  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$  was not felt to be a term of evil suggestion is abundantly certified by the readiness with which Jew and Christian alike, touched by the same influences, employed it of their divine love. With Philo, it is precisely the  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}\omega\bar{\nu}\acute{\rho}\acute{\alpha}\acute{\nu}\acute{\iota}\oslash$  which leads to God,

<sup>33</sup> Cope, *op. cit.*, I. 293 describes  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$  shortly as "the sexual form of  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$  or natural appetite," supporting himself on Plato, *Phaedrus*, 237D: "It is evident to all that  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$  is an  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ," and *Timaeus*, 42A: "Love is a mixture of pleasure and pain," which, he adds, is "the characteristic of  $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\nu\mu\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ." This applies to  $\epsilon\rho\omega\acute{\iota}$ , however, only in one of its uses.

<sup>34</sup> *Lysis*, 221D, 221A (Jowett, I. p. 63).

<sup>35</sup> *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*<sup>2</sup>, 1913, p. 7.

and brings all the virtues to their perfection.<sup>36</sup> He often cites with deep feeling the great declaration of Deut. xxx. 20: "This is thy life, and thy length of days,—to love (ἀγαπᾶν) the Lord thy God"; and he does not scruple to define its ἀγαπᾶν in terms of ἐρωτική. "This is the most admirable definition of immortal life," he comments on one occasion:<sup>37</sup> "to be occupied by a love and affection (ἐρωτική φιλία) to God which has nothing to do with flesh and body." To Philo, thus, ἐρωτική (along with φιλία) is a constituent element of ἀγάπη (for Philo has ἀγάπη), when conceived in its highest stretches, as the very substance of immortal life. There is a famous passage in Ignatius' letter to the Romans<sup>38</sup> in which he gives, or has been misunderstood to give, Christ Himself the name of "Ἐρωτική": "My Love has been crucified," he says. We need not go into the vexed question of the real meaning which Ignatius intends to convey by this phrase.<sup>39</sup> It affords as striking evidence that ἐρωτική was not felt to be an intrinsically base term, that such a phrase should have been facilely misunderstood by Christian writers as referring to Christ, as that it should have been actually applied to Him by Ignatius. It does not appear that Origen was aware of the currency of any other interpretation of the words than his own, when he cites them in the prologue to his commentary on the Song of Songs in support of his contention that ἐρωτική and ἀγάπη may be used indifferently of love in its highest sense. "It makes then no difference in the Sacred Scriptures," Rufinus ren-

<sup>36</sup> E.g., Mangey, II, 421.

<sup>37</sup> *De Profugis*, § 11 (Mangey, I. 554-5). Cf. the remarks of W. Lütgert, *Die Liebe im Neuen Testament*, 1905, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Ch. vii.

<sup>39</sup> The two sides of the question have been well stated and argued respectively by J. B. Lightfoot in his comment on the passage ("My (earthly) passion has been crucified": he actually renders it in his version of the letter, "My lust has been crucified"), and by Charles Bigg in the preface to his Bampton Lectures on *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria* ("My (divine) Love has been crucified"). There is a third possible view: "My preference (for death) has been crucified."

ders him as writing,<sup>40</sup> "whether *caritas* is spoken of or *amor* or *dilectio*; except that the name of *caritas* is exalted so that God Himself is called *Caritas*. . . . Take accordingly whatever is written of *caritas* as said of *amor*, caring nothing for the names. For the same virtue is shared by each. . . . It makes no difference whether God is said *amari* or *diligi*. Neither do I think that, if any one should give God the name of *Amor*, as John does that of *Caritas*, he would be blameworthy. I remember, in fine, that one of the saints, Ignatius by name, said of Christ, 'My *Amor* is crucified,' and I do not think him reprehensible for this." Later writers, especially those of mystical tendencies, naturally follow Origen's reading of Ignatius. The Pseudo-Dionysius is even prepared to say that the name of *Ἐρως* was thought by some to be more divine than that of *Ἀγάπη*.<sup>41</sup> But instances of the employment of words of this stem in a high sense are of course not lacking in earlier Christian writers: Justin,<sup>42</sup> Clement,<sup>43</sup> and Origen himself<sup>44</sup> use *ἔρως* of divine love, and Clement calls our Lord ὁ ἔραστός.<sup>45</sup>

Clearly it is ardor not lasciviousness which gives its "form" to *ἔραν* (*ἔρως*) as a designation of love. Our senses may be inflamed by passion, but the love of the seraphs "who of all love Godhead most" also burns with pure flame. *Ἐρᾶν* (*ἔρως*) is not the exclusive possession either of the one or of the other; by virtue of its fundamental implication of passion it is the appropriate designation of both. The prominent employment of it of these two end-terms of the series of varieties of love may leave the impression that the middle region is left uninvaded by it. Schmidt, endeavoring to explain its general usage in a word,<sup>46</sup> even says formally that, when the object is a person, then either sensuous love is to be understood by *ἔραν* or the highest

<sup>40</sup> *Prologue to the Song of Songs*, Lommatzsch, XIV, pp. 299, 301, 302.

<sup>41</sup> Cited with other mystical writers by Lightfoot, as above.

<sup>42</sup> *Dial.*, viii. 1.

<sup>43</sup> *Cohort.*, 71.

<sup>44</sup> *In Joann.*, I. 14. (11): ed. Preuschen, p. 14, line 29.

<sup>45</sup> *Strom.*, vi. 9. (72).

<sup>46</sup> As cited, p. 475.

and more or less passionate love. The vacation of the middle space is, however, an illusion. Since *ἐρᾶν* imports passion, the most passionate love is prevailingly designated by it; but since all love is passion all love may be spoken of in its terms. Whether it is employed will be determined by whether the love spoken of is at the moment thought of as passion. *Ἐρᾶν*, says Aristotle,<sup>47</sup> is a kind of *φιλία*; when *φιλία* goes to excess, that is *ἐρᾶν*.

As it is over against *φιλεῖν* (*φιλία*) that *ἐρᾶν* (*ἔρως*) stands out as designating the love of passion, we are sometimes tempted to render *φιλεῖν* in contrast with it by "like"; and, indeed, because all love is passion, in doing so to define it below the concept of love altogether. But, although the words, because each has a specific implication, may be set in contrast with one another, they do not receive their specific implications as contrasts of one another, and they are not to be defined as contradictories. Because *ἐρᾶν* means passionate love, we are not to imagine that *φιλεῖν* expresses a love which is devoid of passion,—whatever kind of love that may be. It is true enough that *φιλεῖν* may be employed when no implication of passion is felt; and is the proper word to employ when relatively unimpassioned manifestations of love are described, as for example for what we may call "friendly love." But this is not because it excludes passion but because it describes love from a different angle and the presence or absence of passion is indifferent to it. It is just as appropriate for the strongest and most impassioned as it is for the quietest and least ardent love: no love lies outside its field. "Φιλεῖν," says T. D. Woolsey justly,<sup>48</sup> "we need not say, is as early as Greek literature itself, and as wide in its meaning as our verb to *love*, running through all kinds and degrees of that feeling, from the love of family and friend down to mere liking, and to

<sup>47</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, ix. 10; 1171A. 12: *ἐρᾶν . . . ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας*. But as he is thinking of *ἐρᾶν* in its sensual application, he adds: *τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἔνα*.

<sup>48</sup> *The Andover Review*, August, 1885, p. 167.

*being wont* to do a thing; and passing over from the sphere of innocent to that of licentious love, whether passionate or merely sensual."

The approach of *φιλεῖν* to the idea of love is made through the sense of the agreeable.<sup>49</sup> It is the eudaimonistic term for love. Whatever in an object is adapted to give pleasure when perceived, tends to call out affection; and this affection is what *φιλάν* expresses. It may be quiet or it may be passionate; it may be strong or it may be weak; it may be noble or it may be base: all this depends on the quality in the object which calls out the response and the nature of the subject which responds to the appeal. "Of *φιλεῖν*," says Schmidt,<sup>50</sup> "it is first of all to be said that it is the general designation for our 'love,' and has for its peculiarity that it designates an inner predilection (*Neigung*) for persons, and has for its contradictrories *μισεῖν* and *ἐχθαίρειν*; but, even when the presentation leaves no ambiguity, it can designate the love of sense. The notion of *φιλεῖν* can be traced back to the disposition which grows out of an inner community (*Gemeinschaft*). We find therefore in Homer the meaning of 'to be in a friendly way at one's side,' 'to interest oneself in him in a friendly manner.' This happens, for example, on the part of the gods when they assist men in battle, or qualify them for manifold things: on the part of men, when they offer hospitality. For these transactions Homer has exact expressions, and *φιλεῖν* is expressly distinguished from *ξενίζειν* or *δέξασθαι*. The word designates, therefore, only generally the treatment of another as one that is dear (*φίλος*) to me, or my friend (again *φίλος*), and the context must show what kind of action is meant."

When Liddell and Scott say that "the ancients carefully distinguished between *φιλεῖν* and *ἐρᾶν*," that is formally right,

<sup>49</sup> The etymology of *φιλεῖν* is not very clear. G. Heine, *Synonymik des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch*, 1898, p. 154, suggests for *φίλος* (after Vaniček): "one's own, that to which one is accustomed, and on which he depends, dear, worthy."

<sup>50</sup> Pages 476-7.

though we should prefer to say “instinctively” rather than “carefully.” When, however, they add: “But *φιλεῖν* sometimes comes very near in sense to *ἐρᾶν*,” citing passages in which *φιλεῖν* is used for the love of sense, a certain misunderstanding seems involved. *Φιλεῖν* is used from the earliest dawn of Greek literature as clearly of the love of sense as of any other kind of love. But this is not to “come very near the sense of *ἐρᾶν*”: it is only to describe the same love which *ἐρᾶν* describes as passion, from its own point of view as delight. Nor is it easy to understand what Schmidt means when he appears to suggest that *φιλεῖν* is applied to the love of sense only by a euphemism—“by way of insinuation”: nor how the passage from Plato to which he appeals for the purpose can be thought to lend support to this opinion. What we read in this passage<sup>51</sup> is merely that it is said of lovers (*τοὺς ἐρῶντας*) that they show a very special affection (*φιλεῖν*) for those they are in love with (*ἐρῶσι*), because they are prepared to do hateful things for the pleasing of their beloved ones (*τοῖς ἐρωμένοις*). *Φιλεῖν* here is certainly not used euphemistically for *ἐρᾶν*; it is simply the broad word for love used here in contrast with *ἐρᾶν* which is employed of a special variety of love. The employment of *φιλεῖν* for the love of sense is from the beginning perfectly frank and outspoken. Take, for example, these frequentative imperfects from Homer: “a concubine whom he *φιλεέσκειν*”;<sup>52</sup> “Melantho *μισγέκετο καὶ φιλεέσκεν* Eurymachus.”<sup>53</sup> They do not in any way differ from the frequentative imperfect in *Il.* vi, 15: “and he was loved (*φίλος ἦν*) by men, for, dwelling by the road, *φιλεέσκεν* all to his house,”—except in the nature of the acts to which they are applied. The son of Teuthras showed himself a *φίλος* to men by keeping open-house and welcoming all comers. The concubine of Amyrton and Melantho showed themselves *φίλαι* to their lovers by fulfilling the function of mistresses to them. The usage is as simple and direct in the one case as in the other. The constant use in Homer of

<sup>51</sup> *Phaedr.*, 251C.<sup>52</sup> *Il.*, ix. 450.<sup>53</sup> *Od.*, xviii, 325.

φιλότης with μίγνυμι should dispel all doubt on this point. And what could be franker than the use of φιλεῖν in Herodotus iv, 176?

The Greeks were very much preoccupied with the topic of Friendship: Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle discuss it endlessly: "in the circles of the philosophical schools interest in it far surpassed that of the family life."<sup>54</sup> Φιλεῖν was an ideal word for the expression of this form of affection, and this became one of its chief applications. Not, however, to the exclusion of other applications in which it gave expression to every variety of love which sentient beings could experience. Even, *pace* Hermann Cremer,<sup>55</sup> the love of God to men and of men to God. Cremer has permitted himself the sweeping statement: "To attribute love at all to the Deity was utterly impossible to the Greek." He supports himself on two passages from Aristotle, neither of which supports him. In both passages Aristotle is (of course) discussing Friendship,—not the term φιλία but the "friendship" which φιλία is in these discussions employed to express. What he is suggesting is not that God can neither love nor be loved in any sense, but that there is a certain incongruity in speaking of God and man as united in the specific bond which we call "friendship." "Friendship" is a form of love which more properly obtains between equals: between superiors and inferiors the assertion of some other tie would be more appropriate. The matter is not of large intrinsic importance; but it is worth while to transcribe the passages somewhat at length for their illustrative value.

In them, as elsewhere,<sup>56</sup> Aristotle divides friendship (φιλία) into three kinds, based respectively on virtue

<sup>54</sup> W. Lütgert, *Die Liebe im N.T.*, 1905, p. 37: he sends us to E. Curtius, *Alttertum und Gegenwart*, I. p. 183 ff. for the matter. Consult also the remarks of Paul Kleinert, *Th. S. K.* 86 (1913) i. pp. 16 f.

<sup>55</sup> *Supplement to Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek*, 1886, p. 503 (*sub voc.* Ἀγάπη).

<sup>56</sup> E.g., *Eth. Nic.*, viii, 2. 1: "For it appears that not everything is loved (φιλεῖσθαι) but [only] τὸ φιλητόν: this is good (ἀγαθόν) or pleasant (ἡδόν) or useful (χρήσιμον)."

(ἀρετή), utility (*χρήσιμον*) and pleasure (*ἡδύ*); and then he divides the whole again into the cases between equals and those between unequals. True friendship is mutual and is found among equals only; love between unequals is only in a modified sense "friendship." "First, then," he writes in the former of the two passages now before us,<sup>57</sup> "we must determine what kind of friendship (*φιλία*) we are in search of. For there is, people think, a friendship (*φιλία*) towards God (*πρὸς θεόν*) and towards things without life; but they are wrong. For friendship (*φιλία*), we maintain, exists only where there can be a return of affection (*ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι*: why not say, "return of the friendship"?), but friendship (*φιλία*) toward God (*πρὸς θεόν*) does not admit of love being returned (*ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι*: why not say, "of the friendship being returned"?), nor at all of loving (*τὸ φιλεῖν*: why not say "of friendly feeling"?). For it would be strange if one would say that he loved Zeus (*φιλεῖν τὸν Δία*: why not say "felt friendly to"?). Neither is it possible to have affection returned (*ἀντιφιλεῖσθαι*: why not say, "to have friendship returned"?)) by lifeless objects, though there is a love (*φιλία*) for such things, for instance wine, or something else of that sort. Therefore, it is not love (*φιλία*) towards God of which we are in search, nor (love) towards things without life, but (love) towards things with life, that is, where there can be a return (*ἀντιφιλεῖν*)."  
Aristotle is not arguing here that there can be no such thing as love on the part of God, or to God; or that this love may not be properly expressed in either case by *φιλεῖν*, *φιλία*. He is busying himself only with that mutual affection which we know as friendship; and it is this that he says is impossible between man and God because of the inequality between them. It is incongruous to say that Zeus and I are a pair of friends,—we might almost as well say we are a brace of good fellows or *par nobile fratrum*. He is speaking here, in a word, only of love based on mutual agreeability (*ἡδύ*)

<sup>57</sup> *Magna Moralia*, II. II: p. 1208 B. The translation of St. George Stock is used.

in which what is necessary is to be agreeable ( $\tauὸ\ \etaδέσιν\ ἔλει$ ).<sup>58</sup> If the love in question is based on utility or virtue, on the other hand, the case is different.<sup>59</sup>

The other passage<sup>60</sup> takes up the case when love is based on virtue. "There, then," writes Aristotle here, "are three kinds of friendship ( $\phiιλία$ ); and in all of them the word friendship ( $\phiιλία$ ) implies a kind of equality. For even those who are friends ( $\phiιλοι$ ) through virtue are mutually friends by a sort of equality of virtue. But another variety is [the friendship: say rather 'love'] of superiority to inferiority, e.g. as the virtue of a god is superior to that of a man (for this is another kind of friendship [ $\phiιλία$ ; say 'love']), and in general that of a ruler to a subject; just as justice in this case is different, for here it is a proportional equality—not numerical equality ( $κατ' \ \acute{α}ναλογίαν$ ;  $κατ' \ \acute{α}ριθμόν$ ). In this class falls the relation of a father to a son, and of a benefactor to a beneficiary; and there are varieties of these again, e.g. there is a difference between the relation of father to son and of husband to wife, the latter being that of ruler to subject, the former that of benefactor to beneficiary. In these varieties, there is not at all, at least not in equal degree, the return of love for love ( $\acute{α}ντιφιλεῖσθαι$ : say 'mutual loving'). For it would be ridiculous to accuse God, because the love we receive in return from Him is not equal to the love given Him ( $\tauὸ\ \acute{α}ντιφιλεῖσθαι\ \ddot{\omega}s\ \phiιλεῖτε$ ), or for the subject to make the same complaint against his ruler. For the part of the ruler is to receive, not to give, love ( $\phiιλεῖσθαι\ oὐ\ \phiιλεῖν$ ) or at least to give love ( $\phiιλεῖν$ ) in a different way. And the pleasure ( $\etaδονή$ ) is different, and that of a man who needs nothing over his own possession, or child, and that of him who lacks over what comes to him, are not the same. Similarly also with those who are friends [say rather 'who love one

<sup>58</sup> *Magna Moralia*, p. 1210 A.

<sup>59</sup> *Magna Moralia*, p. 1210 A: "It is evident that friendship ( $\phiιλία$ ) based on utility occurs among things the most opposite."

<sup>60</sup> *Ethica Eudemia*, vii, 3 (p. 1238b). J. Solomon's version is used.

another'] through use or pleasure. Some are on an equal footing with each other, in others there is the relation of superiority and inferiority. Therefore those who think themselves on the former footing find fault if the other is not equally useful to and a benefactor of them; and similarly with regard to pleasure. This is obvious in the case of lover and beloved (*ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς*); for this is frequently a cause of strife between them. The lover (*ὁ ἐρῶν*) does not perceive that the passion (*προθυμίαν*) in each has not the same reason; therefore Ænicus has said, 'a beloved (*ὁ ἐρώμενος*), not a lover (*ἐρῶν*), would say such things.' But they think that there is the same reason (for the passion) of each." We are here told that although friendship, properly so called—that is, mutual affection based on congeniality or reciprocal agreeability—can scarcely exist between beings so unequal as God and man, yet love can; as readily as it can exist between ruler and subject, or father and son. The term "love" (*φιλία*) is wide enough to describe all such cases, as it is wide enough also, as we learn at the end of the passage, to describe the mutual affection which binds "lovers" together: *ἐρᾶν* is a species of *φιλεῖν*, because, no matter with what passion, it also rests on something agreeable perceived in its object.

We have seen that from the beginning there was a natural tendency to carry *φιλεῖν* over from the sentiment of love itself to its expression in outward act. Thus in a passage from the Iliad already quoted,<sup>61</sup> Teuthramides is represented as habitually showing himself friendly by keeping open-house—*πάντας γὰρ φιλεέκεν*, "he made all welcome." Similarly Penelope is described in the Odyssey as receiving all visitors well and giving them welcome (*φιλέει*):<sup>62</sup> a phrase matched by a similar one in the Iliad: "I entertained (*φιλησα*) them."<sup>63</sup> Along this line of development *φιλεῖν* early began to acquire the specialized sense of "to kiss." "*Φιλεῖν*," writes Schmidt,<sup>64</sup> "means directly, with or with-

<sup>61</sup> *Il.*, vi, 15.

<sup>62</sup> *Od.*, ix, 128.

<sup>63</sup> *Il.*, iii, 207.

<sup>64</sup> As cited, p. 477.

out the addition of *τῷ στόματi*, *to kiss*, therefore that act which sensibly and externally brings to expression the fellowship of lovers or friends and, in general of those connected by a close bond (also of parents and children)." This usage does not yet occur in Homer: he employs *κυνέω*, *κύσαι* for kissing. But it made its appearance soon afterwards,<sup>65</sup> and ultimately completely superseded the richer and higher uses of the word. In Modern Greek *φιλῶ* means nothing else but "to kiss."<sup>66</sup> In odd contrast with this development, *ἀγαπᾶν*, the great rival of *φιλεῖν* in the expression of the general idea of love—a rival which finally drove it entirely from the field,—appears from the first in an analogous usage and is thought by many to have begun as a term to express the external manifestations of affection and only afterward to have come to be applied to the emotion itself. At least the external sense is predominant in Homer, both for *ἀγαπᾶν* and for its more frequently occurring doublet *ἀγαπάζειν*;<sup>67</sup> and it remained in occasional use throughout the whole history of Greek letters. The range of suggestion of the word in this external sense is rather wide. The instances in Homer may ordinarily be brought under the broad category of "welcoming," with suggestions of "embracing," or other signs of hearty welcome. Thus Penelope asks forgiveness for not "welcoming" her husband properly on his first appearing,<sup>68</sup> "or," explains T. D. Woolsey,<sup>69</sup> "treating him with affection," remarking that Eustathius glosses with *ἔφιλοφρονησάμην*. Again we read:<sup>70</sup> "As a father, feeling kindly, welcomes his son (*φίλα φρονέων ἀγαπάζει*)."<sup>71</sup> And yet again,<sup>71</sup> bringing *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν* to-

<sup>65</sup> Herodotus, Xenophon and Attic writers generally.

<sup>66</sup> E. A. Sophocles writes (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, July 1889, p. 528): "As to the modern *φιλῶ*, it retains only the meaning, *to kiss*."

<sup>67</sup> It is the sense of all the instances in which *ἀγαπᾶν* or *ἀγαπάζειν* occurs in Homer, except one—*Odyss.*, xxi, 289, where it means "to acquiesce in," "be content with." Cf. Cope, as cited, p. 295.

<sup>68</sup> *Odyss.*, xxiii, 214.

<sup>69</sup> *Andover Review*, August 1885, p. 167.

<sup>70</sup> *Odyss.*, xvi, 17.

<sup>71</sup> *Odyss.*, vii, 33.

gether in this external sense: “Our people do not φιλοῦσι a stranger ἀγαπαζόμενοι—“do not receive him with signs of regard,” as Liddell and Scott gloss it. In a very similar passage,<sup>72</sup> we read of the swine-herd kissing (*κύνεον*) Odysseus’ head and shoulders ἀγαπαζόμενος, that is to say with a display of affection. And we find in Pindar<sup>73</sup> a passage like this: “And with mild words they welcomed him,” where the action through which the affection is shown is defined as kind speech. In Euripides, in whom ἀγαπᾶν. ἀγαπάζειν occur only three times (they do not occur at all in Æschylus or Sophocles), they “are used only in the sense of tender offices to the dead”:<sup>74</sup> as, for example, *Phoeniss.*, 1332: “You would have said so had you seen when he *treated lovingly* (Woolsey glosses: “made much of”) the dead.” In the light of such passages it is probable that when Xenophon, speaking of the transports of delight with which the Greeks at first welcomed the Hyrcanians as friends, says<sup>75</sup> that they almost carried them about in their bosoms ἀγαπῶντες, the ἀγαπῶντες means something more definite than “affectionately”—say “fondly.” In an interesting passage in Plutarch<sup>76</sup> the sense is certainly “fondle.” “On seeing certain wealthy foreigners in Rome carrying puppies and young monkeys about in their bosoms and fondling them (ἀγαπάντων), Caesar asked,” we are told, “if the women in their country did not bear children. Thus in right princely fashion he rebuked those who squandor on animals that proneness to love (φιλητικόν) and loving affection (φιλόστοργον) which is ours by nature and which is due only to our fellow men.” In this passage the native sentiment of “fondness” and the stirrings of “natural affection” are given expression through other forms of speech;

<sup>72</sup> *Odyss.*, xxi, 224.

<sup>73</sup> *Pyth.*, IV, 241.

<sup>74</sup> John U. Powell in his edition of the *Phoenissae*, 1911, p. 206. The passages are *Phoeniss.*, 1332; *Suppl.*, 764; *Helen.*, 937. Cf. also Woolsey, as cited, p. 167.

<sup>75</sup> *Cyrop.*, vii, v. 50: ed. Holden, 1890, p. 74.

<sup>76</sup> *Pericles*, 1.

ἀγαπᾶν is employed of the external acts in which these movements of soul are manifested.

The persistence of this external use of ἀγαπᾶν is illustrated by its appearance in the letters of Ignatius. A probable instance occurs in *Smyrn.* 9: "In my absence and in my presence ye ἡγαπήσατε me," where Lightfoot renders "cherished." The instance in *Magn.* 6 can scarcely be doubted. E. A. Abbott fills out the passage thus:<sup>77</sup> "Since then I beheld in faith and *embraced* (in the spirit) the whole multitude (of the Magnesian church) in the above-mentioned persons (of their deputation)."<sup>78</sup> But the most interesting passage is *Polyc.* 2: "In all things I am devoted to thee—I, and my bonds which you ἡγάπησας." "Kissing the chains" of the prisoners of Christ, it seems, was a current figure by which the early Christians expressed their ardent sympathy for their martyrs.<sup>79</sup> Bunsen, followed by Th. Zahn, therefore, translates here, "which thou didst kiss."<sup>80</sup> Lightfoot demurs to this as too specific, and points out that the precise sense of "kissing" is not elsewhere verifiable for ἀγαπᾶν,—although he is very willing to allow that the actual thing referred to by the broader term may well have been in this instance kissing the chains. He proposes the synonyms, "didst welcome, caress, fondle," and somewhat infelicitously translates in his version, "cherished." Interest in this discussion is increased by the suggestion that, when we read in *Mk.* x. 21 of the rich young ruler that "Jesus looked on him and ἡγάπησεν αὐτόν," we are to understand the ἡγάπησεν not of the sentiment of loving but of the act of caressing: Jesus, in a word, kissed the young man in greeting him. This suggestion was made by Frederick Field a

<sup>77</sup> *Johannine Vocabulary*, 1905, p. 261, note (1744, iv, b.).

<sup>78</sup> Lightfoot in *loc. comments*: "'welcomed, embraced.' The word here refers to external tokens of affection, according to its original meaning."

<sup>79</sup> *Acta Pauli et Thec.*, 18: καταφιλοῦσης his chains: Tertullian, *Ad. Uxor.*, II, 4, osculanda the martyr's chains.

<sup>80</sup> See Zahn, *Ignatius von Antiochien*, 1873, p. 415, and also his comment on the passage itself.

third of a century ago,<sup>81</sup> and has often since been repeated.<sup>82</sup> It does not commend itself particularly from an exegetical point of view:<sup>83</sup> but the fact that, as Abbott points out, the phrase is rendered in one Latin MS. "osculatus est eum" supports the supposition that *ἀγαπᾶν* was in use in the sense of kissing during the early Christian centuries. The collocation of the words in the comment of Clement of Alexandria, likewise adduced by Abbott, suggests that he also may have understood *ἰγάπησεν* here in the sense of an external manifestation. "Accordingly Jesus," he writes, "does not convict him as one that had failed to fulfil all the words of the Law; on the contrary He"—so Abbott paraphrases—"loves and greets him with unusual courtesy." The Greek words are *ἀγαπᾷ καὶ ἵπερασπάζεται*; and it would not be unnatural to give them both an external meaning.<sup>84</sup>

This usage of *ἀγαπᾶν* of the manifestation of love in act, although possibly (we can scarcely say very probably) original,<sup>85</sup> and certainly real, is yet, in any case too infrequent to be of large importance for the explanation of the word. Unlike the corresponding usage of *φιλεῖν* it was a

<sup>81</sup> *Otium Novicense*, Pars Tertia, 1881. *ad loc.*

<sup>82</sup> See [J. Hastings], *Expository Times*, ix, 99b (Hastings generalizes: "In any case the word is that word for loving which means manifesting love in action"); Edwin A. Abbott, *Johannine Vocabulary*, 1905, pp. 257 ff; J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan, *The Vocabulary of the New Testament*, I. 1914, p. 12, *sub voc.* *ἀγαπᾶν*.

<sup>83</sup> Swete, for example, rejects it decisively.

<sup>84</sup> It would be easy to reply, it is true, that both might be given an internal meaning, and perhaps the usage of *ἵπερασπάζεται* encourages this view.

<sup>85</sup> J. B. Lightfoot argues for the originality of the external sense in an article published in the *Cambridge Journal of Classical Philology*, vol. III (1857), no. 7, p. 92; and again in his note on Ignatius *ad Polyc.* 2, where he states the case with his accustomed compressed force. "The word," he says, "seems originally to have referred to the *outward demonstration of affection*. . . . This original sense appears still more strongly in *ἀγαπᾶσθαι*. The application of the term to the *inward feeling* of love is a later development, and the earlier meaning still appears occasionally." But after all it is difficult to believe that the word began with this external sense, and Homer does not record an absolutely primitive usage. E. M. Cope, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-6 properly

waning instead of a waxing usage; and therefore it exercised less and less influence on the general usage of the word. After all said, the word stands in Greek literature as a term for loving itself, not for external manifestations of love, more or fewer. And like other terms for love, it is applied to all kinds and degrees of love. This includes also the love of sense. It is true it seems to have acquired this application only slowly, and, one would think, with some difficulty. There is nothing in the native implication of the word to suggest such an application; and the conjecture lies close that it was not until it had become the general term for love in common use for the whole notion that it was applied to this variety of love also,—at first doubtless by way of pure euphemism. Such euphemistic applications to the sexual impulse of all words denoting love are inevitable;<sup>86</sup> and unhappily many good words, euphemistically applied to lower uses, end by losing their native senses and sinking permanently to the level to which they have thus stooped,—as, for example, our English words “libertine,” “harlot.”<sup>87</sup> Fortunately this did not happen to *ἀγαπᾶν*, although its extension to cover the love of sense also became a fixed part of its ordinary usage. Liddell and Scott remark that it is “used of sexual love like *ἐρᾶν*, only in late writers, as Lucian *Jup. Trag. 2*,”<sup>88</sup> for in Xenophon, *Mem.*

therefore rejects this reading of the history of the word. Liddell and Scott’s article on *ἀγαπᾶν* exaggerates the externality of the term and might even give the impression that the internal affection of love scarcely falls within its range at all.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. *The Oxford Dictionary of the English Language, sub voc. “Love, subst.”* no. 6 (p. 464 med.): “the animal instinct between the sexes and its gratification.” Maurice Hewlett, *The Fool Errant*, 1905, p. 247: “he ate frugally, drank a little wine and water, loved temperately, and slept profoundly.”

<sup>87</sup> Cf. on this subject the excellent remarks of R. C. Trench, *On the Study of Words*, ed. N. Y. 1858 pp. 59 ff.

<sup>88</sup> Lucian, *Jup. Trag. 2*: Hera accused Zeus of having a love-affair (*ἐρωτικόν*) on hand and, plagued by love (*ἐρωτός*), of thinking of falling through some roof into the lap of his *ἀγαπωμένης*. So, *De Vera Hist.* ii, 25: Cinyres had fallen in love (*ῆρα*) with Helen, and she was plainly also enamoured (*ἀγαπῶσα*) with him; so, driven by love and

I. 5.4. *πόρνας ἀγαπᾶν* is not  $\equiv$  *ἐρᾶν*, but *to be content*, or *satisfied* with such gratifications.<sup>89</sup> This explanation of the passage in Xenophon is certainly right. But it is not quite exact to speak of the appearance of this usage in Lucian, say, as marking its beginning. It already occurs in Plato.<sup>90</sup> And in any event the Septuagint is three or four hundred years older than Lucian, and not only is *ἀγαπᾶν*—and also its substantive (not found in the classical writers) *ἀγάπη*—used in it of the love of sense, but so used of it as to make it plain that they had long been used of it, and had become the current terms for the expression of this form of love also. To be convinced of this we have only to read the thirteenth chapter of II Samuel,—the story of Amnon and Thamar—the whole shocking narrative of which is carried on with *ἀγαπᾶν* and *ἀγάπη*, culminating in verse 15: “And Amnon hated her with exceeding great hatred, because the hatred with which he hated her was greater than the love (*ἀγάπην*) wherewith he loved (*ἡγάπησεν*) her.” This love was mere lust: and it is very apparent that *ἀγαπᾶν* and *ἀγάπη* are used of it with perfect simplicity, undisturbed by any intruding consciousness of incongruity. This phenomenon means, of course, that in the Greek of the Septuagint we tap a stratum of the language of more popular character than that which meets us in the literary monuments of the times; and we see changes not only preparing but already accomplished in it which the recognized literary mode of the times had not yet accepted. Meanwhile, despair (*ἵπ' ἔρωτος καὶ ἀμηχανίας*), they ran off. A hundred years before Lucian, Plutarch has the usage: cf. the passages cited by Thayer under *φιλέω*.

<sup>89</sup> J. S. Watson translates: “Who should find pleasure in the company of such a man, who, he would be aware, felt more delight in eating and drinking than in intercourse with his friends, and preferred the company of harlots to that of his fellows?” This sense of “to be satisfied with,” is a not infrequent one for *ἀγαπᾶν*.

<sup>90</sup> Cope, as cited, p. 296: “In Plato’s *Symposium* 180 B, it takes the place of *ἐρᾶν* in the representation of the lowest and the most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, *ὅταν ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ, η̄ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά.*”

for literary Greek, it remains generally true that *ἀγαπᾶν* had not yet acquired the breadth of usage which led to its frequent application to the love of sense also; and so far as appears it did not acquire it for two or three centuries to come.

In the monuments of classical literature, *ἀγαπᾶν*, although in use from the beginning and occupying a distinctive place of its own, is never a very common word. It, and its doublet *ἀγαπάζειν*, occur in Homer but ten times, in Euripides but three times, and not at all in Æschylus or Sophocles.<sup>91</sup> The substantive *ἀγάπητος* is rare before, say, Plutarch;<sup>92</sup> while *ἀγάπη* appears first in the Septuagint, and has not as yet turned up with certainty in any secular writing.<sup>93</sup> *Ἀγαπᾶν* owes its peculiarity to its etymological associations, which could not fail to suggest themselves to every Greek ear. Connected with *ἀγαπαῖ*, it conveyed the ideas of astonishment, wonder, admiration, approbation.<sup>94</sup> It expresses thus, distinctively, the love of approbation, or, we might say, the love of esteem, as over against the love of pure delight which lies rather in the sphere of *φιλεῖν*. It is from the apprehension of the preciousness rather than of the pleasantness of its object that it derives its impulse, and its

<sup>91</sup> According to T. D. Woolsey, as cited, the indexes record *ἀγαπᾶν*, *ἀγαπητός*, *ἀγαπητώς* for Demosthenes twenty-two times; for Plato eighteen; for Lysias and Isocrates, each three times. These figures are, however, misleading: in Isocrates, for example, the words are of much more frequent occurrence.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Lobeck on Phrynicus, p. 352, and Stephens *sub voc.* Thayer *sub voc.* *ἀγάπη*, seems to intimate that the word appears first in Aristotle: Liddell and Scott in Plato.

<sup>93</sup> The facts are carefully stated by Moulton and Milligan, as cited, *sub voc.*

<sup>94</sup> On this etymology see Cope, as cited, p. 294, also p. 296. Other etymological suggestions are made. Cremer, in his third edition, finds the fundamental notion to be, "to find one's satisfaction in something"; but in his tenth edition reverts to the simple suggestion of a connection with *ἀγαπαῖ* in the sense of admiring. W. Prellwitz traces the word back to an Old-Aryan root *Pō* (Old-Indian *Pā*) bearing the sense of "protecting"; hence *ἀγαπός*, "protecting," and the denominative *ἀγαπᾶν*, "entertain," or, as in Homer, "welcome." This view of the etymology favors the external sense of the word as original.

content thus lies closer to the notion of *prizing* than to that of *liking*.<sup>95</sup> It is beside the mark to speak of it as a "weaker,"<sup>96</sup> or as a "colder"<sup>97</sup> word than *φιλāν*: the distinction between the two lies in a different plane from these things. A love rooted in the perception in its object of something pleasing (that is, of the order of *φιλēν*), or of something valuable (that is, of the order of *ἀγαπāν*), may alike be very weak or very strong, very cold or very warm: these things are quite indifferent to the distinction and will be determined by other circumstances, which may be present or absent in either case.

It is even more wide of the mark to speak of *ἀγαπāν* as distinctively voluntary love, or reasonable love. The former is the position taken with great emphasis by Cremer (it is also the view of Cope); the latter is strongly argued for by Schmidt. "We shall make no mistake," says Cremer,<sup>98</sup> "if we define the distinction thus—that *φιλēν* designates the love of the natural inclination, of the emotion (*Affects*), the so-to-say originally involuntary love—*amare*,—while *ἀγαπāν* designates love as an effect (*Richtung*) of the will, *diligere*." It may be suspected that those who speak thus have in part misled themselves by the Latin analogy. The parallel is, it is true, very close with respect

<sup>95</sup> Cope, as cited, p. 293, remarks that, whatever be the true derivation of the word, "this notion of selection or affection, conceived on the ground of admiration, respect and esteem, certainly enters its meaning. Xen. *Mem.* ii. 7.9 is decisive on this point." On p. 295 he surveys the copious material in Aristotle's *Nicomachaean Ethics* and concludes that "in every instance the word may, and in many instances it must, carry the implication of esteem." It is the *worth* of the object of preference which underlies the affection expressed by it.

<sup>96</sup> So e.g. Schmidt.

<sup>97</sup> So e.g. Gildersleeve. Woolsey, as cited, p. 182, with Trench in his mind, says very appositely: "We naturally avoid or distrust attaching this quality of coldness to *ἀγαπāω* or *ἀγάπη*; and while we ascribe to these words the consent of the will and benevolent regard, we do not strip them of feeling."

<sup>98</sup> These sentences stand in all the editions from the third (1883) to the tenth (1915). Under *ἀγάπη* he says (ed. 10, p. 14): "It designates the *love which chooses its object with decisive will*."

to the usage of the two pairs of words; but it does not extend to the etymological implications on which in each case the usage rests.<sup>99</sup> The conception underlying *diligere* is that of selection; the word bears an implication of choice in it. There is no such underlying suggestion in *ἀγαπᾶν*, its place being taken by the emotion of admiration.<sup>100</sup> In point of fact, the rise in the heart of love for an object perceived to be precious, is just as "originally involuntary," just as much a matter of pure feeling, as the rise in it of love for an object perceived to be delightful. The distinction between these two varieties of love rests on the differing qualities of the object to which they are the reactions, not on the presence or absence of volition in their production. "There can but two things create love," says Jeremy Taylor:<sup>101</sup> "perfection and usefulness; to which answer on our part, first, admiration, and secondly desire; and both these are centered in love." This is a piece of good psychology.

The form of statement which Schmidt prefers is that *ἀγαπᾶν* designates the love which arises by "rational reflection."<sup>102</sup> Citing a passage from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*<sup>103</sup> where he speaks of *φιλεῖσθαι* as being "*ἀγαπᾶσθαι* for one's

<sup>99</sup> It may be worth noting that Liddell and Scott, in explaining the distinction between *ἐρᾶν* and *φιλεῖν*, say it is that between *amare* and *diligere*; and in explaining the distinction between *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*, say that *this* is that between *amare* and *diligere*. That is to say, *φιλεῖν* appears now as *diligere* and now as *amare* to meet the needs of the case.

<sup>100</sup> There is no philological reason for supposing that the peculiarity of *ἀγαπᾶν* among the terms for loving was that it suggested that love is a voluntary emotion. There is also no trace of such a distinction having been made in usage by the Greeks. In arguing for it we are arguing without regard to the Greek consciousness. We have had occasion to observe Xenophon insisting that *ἐρᾶν* expresses a voluntary act. But it was not *ἐρᾶν* distinctively that he had in mind: what he was really arguing was that love as such, under any designation, is a voluntary act. It was a psychological, not a philological, question in which he was interested.

<sup>101</sup> *The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living*, ch. IV, sec. 3 (p. 21 of vol. ii, of the Temple Classics edition).

<sup>102</sup> As cited, p. 482.

<sup>103</sup> I. II. 17.

own sake," Schmidt argues that "it follows from this passage that *ἀγαπᾶν* is not, like *φιλεῖν*, an inclination attached to the person himself, as called into being by close companionship and fellowship in many things, but a love for which we can give ourselves an account with our understanding; less sentiment than reflection."<sup>104</sup> As a result, he concludes that "the *ἀγαπᾶν* holds the qualities of a person in view, the *φιλῶν* the person himself; the former gives itself a justification of its inclination, while to the latter it arises immediately out of an intercourse which is agreeable to oneself." This reasoning rests on a confusion between the production of an emotion by rational considerations, and the justification of it on rational grounds. Of course the love of *ἀγαπᾶν* is more capable of justification on rational grounds than the love of *φιλεῖν*. It is the product of the apprehension of valuable qualities in the object, and may be defended by the exhibition of the value of these qualities. The love of *φιλεῖν*, on the other hand, as the product of the apprehension of agreeable qualities in the object, may be able to give no better defence of itself than the traditional dislike of Dr. Fell: "I do not like you, Dr. Fell; the reason why I cannot tell." But this subsequent justification to reason of the love of *ἀγαπᾶν* affords no warrant for declaring it the product of will acting on rational considerations. The perception of those qualities constituting the object admirable is an act the same in kind as the perception of those qualities constituting it agreeable; and the reaction of the subject in the emotion of love is an act of the same nature in both cases. The reaction of the subject in the love of the order which is expressed by *ἀγαπᾶν* is just as instinctive and just as immediate an affectional movement of the soul, as in the order of love expressed by *φιλεῖν*. The two differ not in their psychological nature but in the character of the apprehended qualities to which they are emotional responses. It is meaningless to say that the one term-

<sup>104</sup> Trench and Cope hold much the same view.

inates on the person himself and the other only on certain of his qualities: both terminate, of course, on the person whose quality as precious or agreeable as apprehended has called them into being.

It is only by an artificial explanation of it, furthermore, that Aristotle's phrase,—that "*φιλεῖσθαι* is *ἀγαπᾶσθαι* for our own sake"—can be made to suggest that *ἀγαπᾶν* expresses a love based on rational considerations. It only suggests that Aristotle saw in *φιλεῖν* a love which found its account in the agreeableness of the object. What Aristotle is saying in this passage is that it is pleasant alike to love and to be loved; for one loves only because he enjoys it; and if he is loved—that makes him happy because he fancies there must be something fine in him to call out the passion. He explains this by adding that *φιλεῖσθαι* is *ἀγαπᾶσθαι* for one's own sake. Here is a quasi-definition of *φιλεῖν*: *φιλεῖν* is a love founded on nothing outside the object. But the most that can be inferred about *ἀγαπᾶν* is that it is a love which has cognizable ground. To conclude that that ground is or may be outside the object, or must be of the nature of a rational consideration operating through acts of reflection, and judgment, and will, is sufficiently illegitimate to be absurd. The actual ground of the particular act of *ἀγαπᾶν* here spoken of is the total personality of the object conceived as good, and as therefore justifying his becoming the object of *φιλεῖν*. *Φιλεῖν* is subsumed under *ἀγαπᾶν* taken for the moment as a wider category; and the *ἀγαπᾶν* which includes the *φιλεῖν* in itself cannot have as such a ground of essentially different nature.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Cope, as cited, vol. I, p. 214, paraphrases Aristotle's phrase thus: "And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else." He remarks: "It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν*, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by esteem." We probably get Aristotle's whole meaning when we say that when we are loved, there is implied in that that we are valued for our own sake.

We are not left by the ancients, however, without very clear intimation of how they conceived *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν* in relation to one another. There is, for example, what amounts to a direct definition of the two words in their distinctive meanings in an interesting passage in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon, with which the commentators have rather fumbled.<sup>106</sup> B. L. Gildersleeve, in that unfortunate edition of Justin Martyr (1877) which brought only grief to his admirers, goes the length of saying,<sup>107</sup> with his eye on this passage, that "Xenophon uses *ἀγαπᾶν* and *φιλεῖν* as absolute synonyms"; and, what is even stranger, Moulton and Milligan repeat this judgment—for this special passage at least with the added emphasis of pronouncing it "undeniable."<sup>108</sup> These, however, are eccentric opinions. That a distinction is made between the two words lies on the face of the passage and is, of course, universally recognized.<sup>109</sup> The only question that is open is what precisely

<sup>106</sup> *Memorabilia*, II, vii. 9 and 12. We give the text of the passage in the translation of J. A. Watson. Fourteen free women—his relatives—had been introduced into Aristarchus' house as dependents. Socrates' comment and advice was this: "Under present circumstances, as I should suppose, you neither feel attached (*φιλεῖν*) to your relatives nor they to you, for you find them burdensome to you, and they see that you are annoyed at their company. From such feelings there is danger that dislike may grow stronger and stronger, and that previous friendly inclination may be diminished. But if you take them under your direction so that they may be employed, you will love (*φιλήσεις*) them when you see that they are serviceable to you, and they will grow attached to you (*ἀγαπήσονσιν*) when they find that you feel satisfaction in their society; and remembering past services with greater pleasure, you will increase the friendly feeling resulting from them, and consequently grow more attached and better disposed toward each other." Aristarchus took this advice and the result was: "they loved (*ἐφίλον*) Aristarchus as their protector, and he loved (*ἠγάπα*) them as being of use to him."

<sup>107</sup> Page 135.

<sup>108</sup> As cited, p. 12, *sub voc.* *ἀγαπᾶν*.

<sup>109</sup> J. H. H. Schmidt, as cited, p. 483, has a full and excellent discussion of the passage, which leaves no doubt of the general distinction that is drawn. Edward M. Cope, as cited, p. 294, pronounces it "decisive" in the matter. Cf. also T. D. Woolsey, as cited, p. 168; and E. A. Abbott, as cited, p. 240.

that distinction is. What has often been overlooked is that Xenophon actually defines the two terms in the clauses, which, because their relations to one another have not been accurately caught, have given the commentators all their trouble. Socrates, we are told, found Aristarchus peevish, because, owing to the civil disturbances of the time, he had had fourteen female relatives—sisters, nieces, cousins—dumped on him, and he did not see why he should be held responsible for their support. He did not like it; and the women, on their part, did not like the condition of affairs either. “Neither do you *φιλεῖς* them,” says Socrates in diagnosing the situation, “nor they you”: a settled mutual dislike threatened to be the outcome. The remedy which Socrates proposed was that Aristarchus should put the women to work at useful employment; and he promised that, on that being done, their indifference to each other would pass away: Aristarchus would acquire an affection for them arising out of a sense of their value to him; and they would come to prize him on perceiving his pleasure in them. “You will *φιλήσεις* them,” says Socrates, “when you see that they are profitable to you; and they will *ἀγαπήσουσιν* you, when they perceive that you take pleasure in them.” What is to be observed is that the clauses here are so balanced that the participial adjunct in each defines the verb in the other; so that what is said is equivalent to saying: “You will *φιλήσεις* them when you see that they *ἀγάπουσιν* you; and they will *ἀγαπήσουσιν* you when thy perceive that you *φιλεῖς* them.” Instead of mutual dislike, a mutual liking and esteem will supervene. To the *φιλεῖν*, then, in the first clause the “take pleasure in” of the other corresponds: and to the *ἀγαπᾶν* of the second clause the “being profitable to you” of the first corresponds: and thus we have in effect definitions of the two verbs—*φιλεῖν* is taking pleasure in, *ἀγαπᾶν* is ascribing value to. Now, Xenophon continues, Aristarchus tried it and it worked. He put the women to work and at once there was a change: “They *έφιλον* him as

a protector, and he ἡγάπα them as profitable." They came to take pleasure in his protection, and he came to value them for their profitable labor. The relation of protector of useless women, as barely tolerated dependants, with their natural resentment of a grudging bounty, passed, by the simple expedient of the introduction of productive employment, into a relation of mutual affection and esteem. They came to like the man who gave them back their self-respect; he came to prize the women whose labor brought him profit. The words in this last clause, so far from reversing their positions as compared with the former (this is the chief source of the difficulty the commentators find in the passage) are in their right places according to their definitions there. *Φιλεῖν*, defined there as delighting in, is properly used here to describe the attitude of the women towards their protector: *ἀγαπᾶν*, defined there as attaching value to, is properly employed here of the attitude of an employer to profitable workers.

The definition of *ἀγαπᾶν* which Xenophon here gives us—by which it expresses the love of prizing as over against the love of simple liking—verifies itself in a survey of the general usage of the word. This may be illustrated by attending to the other passages in which *φιλεῖν* and *ἀγαπᾶν* are brought together, that are cited by Abbott in connection with his discussion of this one. We see at once that it is Xenophon's distinction which is in the mind of Dio Cassius,<sup>110</sup> when he tells us that it was said to the Roman people at the death of Julius Caesar: Ye ἐφιλήσατε him as a father, and ἡγαπήσατε him as a benefactor—that is to say, they both felt true affection for him and greatly valued him. The case is equally simple with the passage from Plato's *Lysis*<sup>111</sup> with which Abbott deals with somewhat clumsy fingers, ascribing to *ἀγαπᾶν* the sense of "being drawn towards," and to *φιλεῖν* that of "drawing towards oneself." The passage is taken from a long discussion on friendship which is con-

<sup>110</sup> xliv, 48, p. 175.

<sup>111</sup> Page 215B (cf. Jowett, p. 54).

ducted throughout with *φιλεῖν*, *φιλία*, *φιλοί*, until, it having been concluded that only the good can be friends, the question is raised, How can those be valued (*ἀγαπηθεῖν*) by each other who can be of no use to one another, and how can one who is not valued (*ἀγαπῶτο*) be a friend? The good man being sufficient to himself—so far as he is good—stands in need of nothing; and therefore would not attach value (*ἀγαπῶν*) to anything; and because he cannot attach value (*ἀγαπῶν*) to anything, he cannot be fond (*φιλοί*) of anything. And yet they who do not make much of one another (*μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἔαντον*) cannot be friends. These last words, “make much of” define for us the sense in which *ἀγαπᾶν* has been used throughout; and we perhaps can hardly do better than render the crucial sentences: “He who lacks nothing will attach value to nothing (*οὐδὲ τὶ ἀγαπῶν ἄν*)”: “what he does not attach value to, he cannot be fond of (*οὐδὲ μὴ ἀγαπῶν, οὐδὲ ἄν φιλοί*).” A little later in the discussion<sup>112</sup> the two words are coupled in the reverse order from that in which they occur in Dio Cassius. We read: “For if there is nothing to hurt us any longer we should have no need of anything that would do us good. Thus would it be clearly seen that we did but ἤγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν the good on account of the evil, and as the remedy of the evil which was the disease; but if there had been no disease there would have been no need of a remedy.” Jowett renders the pair of verbs by “love and desire” which certainly is wrong. Woolsey renders much better by “highly judge and love”; adding the comment: “The latter contains something more of feeling, while the former contains more of regard, and a higher degree of respect.” We can scarcely do better than render: “And thus it would be clear that we attached value to the good and looked with affection on it, only on account of the evil.” Abbott’s last example is drawn from Ælian’s description of Hiero’s love for his brothers.<sup>113</sup> He lived on terms of

<sup>112</sup> Page 220D (cf. Jowett, p. 61).

<sup>113</sup> *Var. Hist.*, ix, 1. (Tauchnitz ed. p. 124).

great intimacy with them, we are told, “holding them in very high regard (*πάντα σφόδρα ἀγάπησις*), and being loved (*φιληθεῖς*) by them in return.” The meaning seems to be what we might express by saying that he valued his brothers and they repaid him by true affection.

It is not intended to suggest that the content of *ἀγαπᾶν* is exhausted by the concepts esteem, value, prize. The word expresses the notion of love. What is contended for is that the particular manner of love which the word is adapted to express, is the love which is the product of the apprehension of value in its object, and which is therefore informed by a feeling of its preciousness, so that it moves in a region closely akin to that of esteeming, valuing, prizeing. The region in which it moves is, indeed, so closely akin to that of these conceptions, that there are occasions when the idea it expresses is scarcely distinguishable from them. Take for example these two instances from Isocrates.<sup>114</sup> “The same opinion is also held concerning the Lacedemonians; for in their case their defeat at Thermopylae is more admired (*ἀγωνται*) than their other victories, and the trophy erected over them by the barbarians is an object of esteem (*ἀγαπώσι*) and frequent visits (*θεωροῦσι*), while those set up by the Lacedemonians over others, far from being commended (*ἐπαινοῦσι*), are regarded with displeasure; for the former is considered to be a sign of valor, the latter of a desire for self-aggrandizement” (V. 148). “Now, I am surprised that those who consider it impossible that any such policy should be effected do not know from their own experience, or have not heard from others, that there have been indeed many terrible wars the parties to which have been reconciled and done each other great service. What could exceed the enmity between Xerxes and the Hellenes? Yet every one knows that both we and the Lacedemonians were more pleased (*ἀγαπήσαντες*) with the friendship (*φιλία*)

<sup>114</sup> V. 148; V. 42. We draw these passages from Schmidt (p. 485), who presents them as involving no question of real love, but only of an esteeming or valuing.

of Xerxes than with that of those who helped us to found our respective empires" (V. 42). In the former passage ἀγαπώσι καὶ θεωροῦσι are put in a sort of parallel with οὐκ ἐπαινούσιν ἀλλ' ἀηδῶς ὄρωσιν, and may perhaps be not inadequately represented by "prized and gazed at," as over against "not praised but looked askance at." The idea conveyed by ἀγαπήσαντες in the latter passage lies very close to that of "prized more," "valued more" "set more store by." Nevertheless Isocrates preferred to employ a word which said these things with a slight difference; a slight difference which enhanced the effect. He preferred to say that the trophy at Thermopylae was loved, and that the Greeks loved the friendship of Xerxes more than that of their allies—employing, however, for "loved" a term through which sounded the notions of esteeming, valuing, prizing, rather than that of enjoying.

We see the same implications shining through the word when we read in Demosthenes such phrases as these: "Neither did I love (*ἀγαπήσα*) Philip's gifts," for which Woolsey suggests, "neither did I value"; "These he loves (*ἀγαπᾷ*) and keeps around him," which Woolsey renders "these he makes much of."<sup>115</sup> Examples, however, need not be multiplied. The word designates love—"without reference to sensuousness, close-intercourse, or heart-inwardness"—from the distinct point of view of the recognition of worthiness in its object. It is, therefore, intrinsically a noble word for love; or, let us give to it its rights and say definitely it is the noble word for love. It is in its right company when Plutarch<sup>116</sup> joins it with *τιμᾶν* and *σέβεσθαι* in the declaration that "the people ought to love and honor and revere the gods according to righteousness." But like other noble words it was possible for it to lose the sharpness and force of its higher suggestions. It became ultimately, in the development of the language, the general

<sup>115</sup> *De Corona*, p. 263, 7 Reiske.

<sup>116</sup> *De Olynth.*, ii, p. 23.

<sup>117</sup> *Aristides*, 6.6.

word for love. And in proportion as it became the general word for love and was applied without thought to all kinds of love, it naturally lost more or less of the power to suggest its own specific implications. The time came when it could be applied to the basest forms of love without consciousness of incongruity. Its lofty implications remained, however, embedded in its very form, and could always be recalled to consciousness and observation by a simple emphasis. And as long as any other term for love was current, sharing the field with it, it was always possible to throw the high implications intrinsic to it up to sight by merely setting the two in contrast.

This, then, is the equipment of the Greek language for the expression of the idea of love, which is revealed to us in the monuments of classical Greek. There were, we see, four terms which served as vehicles of it. *Φιλεῖν* held the general field, though not without its distinctive implications which were on occasion thrown into clear emphasis, and which were always more or less felt coloring the conception of love as it expressed itself by its means in current speech. These implications represented love as the response of the human spirit to what appealed to it as pleasurable; therefore at bottom as a delight. *Φιλεῖν* was supported on both sides, however, by other terms of other implications. There was *στέργειν* in which love was presented as a natural outflow of the heart to objects conceived as in one way or another bound up very closely with it and making, therefore, a claim upon it for affection. There was *ἐρᾶν* which conceived love as an overmastering passion, seizing upon and absorbing into itself the whole mind. And there was, on the other side, *ἀγαπᾶν* which presented love as the soul's sense of the value and preciousness of its object and its response to its recognized worth in admiring affection.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>118</sup> How fully these synonyms covered the idea of love in its complete range is illustrated by the opening words of Deutsch's article on "Love (Jewish)" in Hastings' *ERE*. viii. p. 173b. In transcribing what he says we insert the Greek terms at appropriate places. "The dic-

During the classical period these terms did not so much encroach on the dominance of *φιλεῖν* in the literary expression of love as rather come to its aid, bringing into fuller expression the several sides and aspects of love. A change, however, was preparing beneath the surface, in the broad region of popular speech. How this change was inaugurated, though what stages it passed, what were the forces which drove it forward, we are left to conjecture to suggest. There is no direct evidence available. We only know that in that body of literature constituted by the New Testament, along with the Septuagint version of the Old Testament and the Apostolic Fathers, a body of literature the peculiarity of which is that it dips into the popular speech, we suddenly see the change well on its way. The most outstanding feature of it is the retirement of *φιλεῖν* into the background and the substitution for it of *ἀγαπᾶν* as the general term for love. We must not permit to fall out of sight that this means the general adoption of the noblest word for love the language possessed as its common designation in every-day speech. One may well suppose that an ethical force was working in such a change.<sup>119</sup> Such a supposition would find support in the general deepening of the ethi-

---

tionaries define love as 'a feeling of strong personal attachment induced by that which delights (*φιλεῖν*) or commands admiration (*ἀγαπᾶν*).' The subdivisions of this sentiment comprise the impulses of attachment due to sexual instinct or the mutual affections of man and woman (*?ερᾶν*); the impulses which direct the mutual affections of members of one family, parents and children, brothers and other relatives (*στέργειν*); the attachment which springs from sympathetic sentiments of people with harmonious character, friendship (*φιλία*); and finally, the various metaphorical usages of the word, as the love for moral and intellectual needs." He adds: "To the last class belongs the religious concept of love for God, while the particular Biblical conception of God's love for Israel is closely related to the idea of paternal affection." As we shall see when we come to speak of the usage of the Septuagint, these higher religious conceptions were brought under *ἀγαπᾶν*.

<sup>119</sup> Woolsey's remark (as cited, p. 169): "Such a change . . . must have come from a higher condition of moral feeling," is sound in itself although made in a connection not easily justified.

cal life which, as we know, was taking place during the closing centuries of the old era. We may readily suppose that in the increasing seriousness of the times the current conception of love too may have grown more grave; and that it may have, therefore, seemed less and less appropriate to speak of it in any lighter than the highest available terms. Whatever may have been the cause, however, it is plain matter of fact that *ἀγάπāν*, a word of essential nobility in its native implications, did gradually through the years become the ordinary term for the expression of love in the most general sense. And this necessarily wrought a distinct ennoblement of the common speech with respect to love.

The effect of the change on *ἀγάπāν* itself naturally was not so happy. The application of it indiscriminately to every form and quality of love unavoidably reduced its current acceptation to the level of every form and quality of love. The native implications of the word could not, to be sure, be entirely eradicated. But they could be covered up and hidden so as not to be noted in the ordinary use of it, and only now and again brought back into view, when in one way or another they were thrown into emphasis. How thoroughly they were thus obscured we should not have been able to guess had we the witness of the New Testament alone in our hands. The Septuagint, however, reveals it to us. There *ἀγάπāν* appears as in such a sense the general term for love that it is readily applied to every form and quality of love, apparently in the case of the lower forms without any consciousness whatever of its higher connotations. This phenomenon occurs, it is true, occasionally also in classical Greek. It is incidental to the free use of any word that it should get its edges worn off in the process, and become more or less a mere symbol for the general idea connected with it, without regard to any specific modifications of that general idea which it may embody. But it becomes much more marked in the Septuagint. Because *ἀγάπāν* has become the general word for love,

what was exceptional in the classics has here become the rule. In the Septuagint the word has lost the precision of its specific notion and become merely a general term to express a general idea. A much nobler term for love has come into general use for the expression of the broad idea of love; and this ennobles the whole speech concerning love. But the word itself has suffered loss in thus permitting itself to be applied indifferently to all kinds and conditions of love.

On another side, however, the employment of *ἀγαπᾶν* as the general term for love brought it a great elevation in its Septuagint usage. If there was no love too low to be spoken of in its terms, there was equally no love too high for its use of it. And the application of it to describe the higher aspects of love as presented in the Old Testament revelation added great stretches to its range upwards. We are in the presence here of a double movement through which *ἀγαπᾶν* was prepared for its use in the New Testament. By the obscure linguistic revolution wrought among the peoples of Greek speech, as a result of which *ἀγαπᾶν* superseded *φιλεῖν* as the general Greek term for the expression of the idea of love, intrinsically the noblest word for love the Greek language afforded, came naturally to the hands of the Septuagint translators for rendering the idea of love as it appeared in the pages of the Old Testament. By the rendering of the idea of love throughout the Old Testament by *ἀγαπᾶν*, the whole content of the Old Testament idea of love was poured into that term, expanding it in its suggestions upwards, and training it to speak in tones indefinitely exalted. The total effect of this double change was immensely to extend the range of the word. As it was the noblest word for love in Greek speech, its range could be extended, on its becoming the general word for love, only downward. It was extended also upwards only by becoming the vehicle for the deepened conception of love which has been given to the world by the self-revelation of

God in the Scriptures. When we open the Septuagint, therefore, and see *ἀγάπην* lying on its pages as the general term for love, we are in the presence of some very notable phenomena in the preparation of the terminology of love in the New Testament.<sup>120</sup>

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

---

<sup>120</sup> The conclusion of this article will appear in the next number of this REVIEW.

## WHAT DOES "THE SUN STOOD STILL" MEAN?

In the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for April, 1902, I published an article on "Lost Meanings of Hebrew Roots," in which I attempted to show that the signification of certain roots, which are more or less common in Assyrio-Babylonian, and whose meaning is perfectly clear from the inscriptions, was still known at the time when the Greek translation was made, but that in later times this signification ceased to be recognized by the Hebrews themselves; so that already in the Targums and in the Syriac and Latin primary versions it is no longer to be found. I believe that I can now go a step further and say that I have found in the Babylonian a new meaning for a whole passage;—a meaning whose existence seems to have passed out of the knowledge of the Hebrews even before the time that the Greek version was made.

While reading through the lists of synonyms in a syllabary contained in the Cuneiform Texts, volume XIX, 19,<sup>1</sup> I found one in which the words *atalû*, *adiru*, and *da'amu*, are given. Now, it is well known that *atalû* is the ordinary word in the astronomical tablets for "eclipse" and that the verb *adâru* means "to be dark." Recalling that the radicals *dm* are the root of the verbs occurring in Joshua X. 12, 13, I immediately turned up the passage and at once recognized that it would make good sense to render the form *dôm* in Joshua's prayer by "become dark," or "be eclipsed." This led me to a further study of the works of Epping, Kugler, Thompson, Weidner, and Virolleaud, on the astronomy of the Babylonians, and I was delighted to find not only that the root *dm* is of not infrequent occurrence, but also that two other significant words of the Joshua passage are technical terms in the astronomical science of the Babylonians. The most important of these terms, next to *dm*, is the technical use of 'âmad "to stand." It occurs fre-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. p. 50, I, 1 (4).

quently on the tablets to denote the point, or place, in the heavens at which a star ceases to go in one direction and begins its return journey to its starting-point. To the naked eye, a star seems to "stand still" for a time before starting on its return passage, just as a runner in a race up and down a lane would stand still as he was turning to run back to the starting-point. In a second sense, the verb is used for the "staying" of a star in a constellation, or house, of the zodiac. The other technical word is the *h̄sî* (Bab. *isî*) of verse 13, translated "midst" in the English version. While not denying that this word may and often does mean "midst," in Hebrew, as, for example, in "midnight (*h̄sî hallaylā*)," it seems that in Babylonian in the two places where it is used in the astronomical tablets, it has the sense more usual in Hebrew of "half," being employed in the one case to denote the half of a cloud and in the other the half of the moon. According to this interpretation, it would mean in Joshua the period from midday to sunset, or ninety degrees.

I further found that in many places in Viroleaud's tablets treating especially of the sun and moon, both are said to be darkened together, the word for darkening being *dm*. Proceeding from these data, I translated the passage in Joshua and saw that the whole situation was cleared up, except where it states, according to the common version, that the sun did not go in for "about a whole day." Having long ago come to the conclusion that this phrase does not mean what the English version implies, I made a new investigation of all the places where the preposition *kaf* (here rendered "about") and the word *tāmîm* "whole," as well as its root *tāmam*, are employed in the Old Testament. The result of the investigation<sup>2</sup> was to confirm my opinion that the phrase should be translated "as on a completed (or ordinary) day." It must be borne in mind by those who read my translation, that the verb *bô'* is used in Hebrew

<sup>2</sup> Cf. p. 53 V.

for the "going in" of the sun, in the evening, and the verb *yāṣā* for its "coming out," in the morning. The Babylonian uses the same word for the "coming out" of the sun, but uses *erēbu* (from which the Hebrew derives *'ereb*, its term for evening) to denote the "going in," at sunset. With this in mind, we can understand what Ben Sira means when he says that through Joshua the sun stood, one day becoming like two. He means apparently that the day of the battle had two *comings out* of the sun, one at sunrise and the other at midday, when it came out from behind the moon; and that it had two *goings-in*, one when it went in behind the moon and the other at sunset.

This translation shows us, moreover, how Jehovah fought for Israel. It was not merely with storm and hail that the enemy was discomfited, but his very gods were compelled to hide their faces at noonday. At the prayer of Israel's leader, both of their chief deities, the sun and the moon, were darkened, or eclipsed. So, as we can well imagine would be the case, they were terrified beyond measure, thinking that the end of all things had come; and they were discomfited and smitten and turned and fled.

Herodotus tells of an eclipse of the sun which occurred during a battle between the Lydians and the Medes, that scared both of the combatants so much that they stopped fighting and made an immediate peace.<sup>3</sup> Later, after Xerxes had assembled his army for the invasion of Greece, an eclipse took place while he was still at Sardis which terrified him to such an extent, that only after a favorable interpretation of the eclipse by the Magi, who affirmed that it meant the destruction of the Greeks, would he proceed with his undertaking.<sup>4</sup> So, also, our best modern observers tell us how all nature seems terrified by an eclipse, and how they, in spite of themselves, could not suppress a feeling of dread in the presence of this appalling phenomenon.

It will be perceived that the translation suggested does

<sup>3</sup> Bk. I. 74, 103.

<sup>4</sup> Bk. VII. 37.

away with the miraculous character of the event in so far as it involves the solar system and the law of gravitation. It is true, also, that it runs counter to Jewish exegesis and to all the ancient versions, except perhaps the Greek, which is somewhat ambiguous and difficult of explanation. Notwithstanding this, I confess to a feeling of relief, as far as I myself am concerned, that I shall no longer feel myself forced by a strict exegesis to believe that the Scriptures teach that there actually occurred a miracle involving so tremendous a reversal of all the laws of gravitation. It can readily be understood how the Jewish interpreters of later times, either through ignorance, or because of their overwhelming desire to magnify their own importance in the scheme of the universe, should have embraced the opportunity that the ambiguous terms of this purely scientific account afforded them to enhance the magnitude of the divine interference in their behalf. But for us today there lies in this passage the more useful lesson of faith in God as the answerer of prayer. How stupendous was the faith of Joshua as shown in his prayer! How immediate and complete was God's answer to that prayer! He who knew beforehand what Joshua would ask, had made all preparations to grant his request. For His are hearts and stars, and darkness and light, and faith and love and victory, excelling in their lasting glory all the transient miracles of standing suns. Lastly, mark that the inspired writer says that it was the extraordinary answer to the prayer of a man that made that day at Gibeon to be unlike every other day before or since. In following his interpretation of its significance, let us rest content.

I would suggest the following translation:

"Be eclipsed, O sun, in Gibeon,  
And thou moon in the valley of Ajalon!"

And the sun was eclipsed and the moon turned back, while the nation was avenged on its enemies. Is it not written upon the book of Jashar?

And the sun stayed in the half of the heavens,  
And set not hastily as when a day is done.

And there never was a day like that day before or since, in respect to Jehovah's hearing the voice of a man."

#### NOTES

I. On the root *dm* "to be dark."

1. The signs employed.

- (1). The sign *mud* is equivalent to *da-a-mu* and to *da'-mu* (Brünnow, 1553, 2276, 2277).
- (2). The sign *dara* = *da'-mu* and *da'-ma-a-tu* (Br. 10798, 10799).
- (3). The signs *mi-mi*, called *kukki* and *gigig*, = *da'-mu*, *du'-u-mu*, and *da-um-ma-tu*. The sign *gig* alone = *mu-šu* "night" and *šal-mu* "shadow, dark" (Br. 8911-8943).
- (4). In the Cuneiform Texts, vol. XIX, plate 19, we find the following:

*BAR. GIŠ. NĀ* = *at-ta-lu-ú*.

*AN. TA. LŪ* = *a-da-ru šá Sin*.

*Ū. MUD. NUN. NA. KI* = *ū-mu da'-mu ša rubî*.

*Attalū* is the frequently occurring word for eclipse;<sup>5</sup> the second and third lines give its definitions, or synonyms. The first of these means "the darkening of Sin"; and the second "a day darkened by Sin."

2. Examples of the use of the word *da'-mu* on the astronomical tablets are:

- (1). In Virolleaud's *L'Astrologie Chaldéenne*.
  - a. *uddat Sin du'-u-mat*, the light of Sin is darkened. *Fascicule XIII. 7. IX. 39.*
  - b. *uddat Sin eli ša ginaa da'-mat*, Sin's light was unbelievably dark. *id. X. 9.*
  - c. *Sin u Šamas uddasunu du'-u-mat*, the light of Sin and Shamash was darkened, *id.*, and also *XIII. 8. 36, 54, V. 4. 39, X. 9, VIII. 36 (du'-mat)*.
  - d. *uddat Sin Ma-Gal du'-mat*, the light of Sin was very dark. *X. 9.*

<sup>5</sup> E. g., it is found fourteen times in the first inscription given in Virolleaud's Second Supplement to his great work on Chaldean astrology, *L'Astrologie Chaldéenne*, pages 1-5.

- e. *uddat Sin eli ša ginaa du'-mat*, the light of Sin was unbelievably darkened. IX. 40.
- f. *Sin ina aṣi-šu da-mu*, Sin at its coming out was dark. VIII. 22.
- g. *Sin ina aṣi-šu salmu mimma la da'amu*. Sin at its coming out was shadowy, but not altogether dark. VIII. 24.
- h. *Šamaš du'um*. Shamash was darkened. VI. 27.
- i. *Šamšu ippuhma du'-um-ma*, the sun arose and was dark. VI. 28. 11, 12.
- k. *Šamšu ippuhma Si-bar -ma udda-su da'um-meš ibši*, the sun arose and was visible (?) and its light became dark. VI. 28. 13.
- l. *Šamšu ina urri Si-bar-ma umu u udda-su da'um-meš ibši*, the sun at dawn was visible, day and its light became dark. VI. 28. 4.
- m. *Šamšu ina urri Si-bar-ma udda-su da'um-meš ibši*, the sun at dawn was visible and its light became dark. VI. 28. 6.
- n. *Šamšu ina mišli umi usurtu ilmi u nipihi-šu da'um-meš ibši*, in the middle of the day, the contour of the sun was surrounded and its splendor became dark. VI. 28. 8.
- o. *Šamšu ina umi mišli Si-bar-ma udda-su da'um-meš ibši*, at mid-day the sun was visible and its light became dark. VI. 28. 7.
- p. *Šamšu Si-bar-ma udda-su da'um-meš ibši*, the sun was visible and its light became dark. VI. 28. 15.
- q. *Šamšu ina GAL-su i-su-za-šu da'um-meš ibši*, the sun disappears in GAL-su and becomes dark (?). VI. 29. 3.
- r. *Šamšu . . . da'amtu-ma ina erêbi-šu ina urpati*, the sun became dark when it entered into the cloud. VI. 2. 30.
- s. *Šamšu ina niphî-šu da'um-meš ibši atali Sin u Shamši iššakan*, the sun at its zenith became dark. The sun and moon were eclipsed. VIII. 32.
- t. *atalû šitkun-ma atalû šuâtu du'um*, an eclipse took place and that eclipse was dark. V. 29. 5.
- u. *agu da'amu ibši LUL ihallik atalu da'amu*, the crown became dark, LUL disappeared, a dark eclipse (occurred). X. 3. 35.

w. *kakkabu ana libbišu erub-ma atalū da'amat*, a star entered into its heart and there was a dark eclipse. X. 6. 11.

x. For other examples with clouds, stars, crowns (coronas), etc., see V.4.8, VII.28.55, 35.39, 41, VIII.14, 15, 8, 17, 29, 32.39, 40, 42, 43, X.2, 6.11, 34, 57, 59, XIII.45, 47.15, 16, 56, XIV.85, 116; and *Cuneiform Texts*, pl. i, WEIDNER, *Handbuch der babylonischen Astronomie*, 36, KUGLER, *Sternkunde und Sterndienst in Babel*, I. 12, and *Ergänzung*, I. 52, and THOMPSON, *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers of Nineveh and Babylon*, 235, 255, 257, 258.

z. *Ana ili Šamšu ud-da-su-nu du'-u-mat, šarru itti mati-šu u niši-šu zi-ni i-na-kap-par, ili Šamšu atalū išakanu*, as to the moon and the sun their light was darkened. The king with his land and people were destroyed (?). The sun and the moon were eclipsed. THOMPSON, *Reports*, 82, Obv. 7-9.

II. The word *isi* is found in a Babylonian astronomical tablet published by STRASSMEIER (*Inschriften von Cambyses*, no. 400, 46). It reads: *Sin atalū gamru iššakin i-si i-ri-hi iltanu izziz*, a total eclipse of the moon took place, extending over the northern half of the moon. The half of the heavens would thus be 90 degrees, or from noon to sunset. It is found, also, in THOMPSON, *Reports*, 155, Rev. 2-4, *Urpatu . . . ina lib-bi ūmu i-su it-ta-ṣa-a*, half of the cloud disappeared at midday.

III. The word 'āmad occurs scores of times in the tablets to denote the apparent standing still of the stars in their courses from east to west and from west to east. The noun from the root denotes the place where the star seems to turn back on its course. See Kugler's S. und S., Teil I, pages 40, 70, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 92, 96, 98, 100, 102°, 106. It is used also for the "staying" of a star in a sign, or house, of the zodiac. See KUGLER, *id.* 82, 88. In this sense, it might be rendered in English by "delayed," or "remained for a time," or "continued to shine." Jupiter appears to stand still for two days. (KUGLER, S & S, 82, note.)

IV. The word *bô'* is the usual one in Hebrew to denote the "going in" of the sun at the close of the day. Thus Deuteronomy XXIV. 13, "in the evening, at the going in of the sun." The verb *erêbu*, from which the Hebrew word *'ereb* "evening" is derived, is the common term in Babylonian to denote the "going in," or setting, of the sun. For the "coming out" in the morning, both Hebrew and Babylonian use the word *yâṣā*, (Bab. *âṣû*).

V. The preposition *Kaf* might possibly be translated "about," but the fact is, that it is never found with the word for day in this sense elsewhere in the Old Testament. In two places it means simply "as." Thus in Psalm XC. 4, "as yesterday when it is past," and in Amos VIII. 10, "and the end thereof as a bitter day." In all other places the phrase means "as on a (or the) day." So in I Sam. XVIII. 10, Hosea II. 5, 17, Lam. II. 7, 22, Zech. XIV. 3; and compare especially "as on the day of Midian," Isaiah IX. 3, "as on the day of Egypt," Ezek. XXX. 9, and "as on the day of temptation in the wilderness," Psalm XCV. 8.

VI. The word *tâmîm* usually means "without blemish." If so used here, it would suggest that an eclipse was looked upon as a blemish to a perfect day, just as mists and blizzards are by us. It is more probable, however, that it means ended, or completed, or "done" in the sense in which Longfellow employs it in the lines

"The day is done, and the darkness  
Falls from the wing of night."

This sense is supported by the use of the verb in a number of passages. Thus it is said in Jeremiah I. 3 that the word of the Lord came to him unto the end (or ending, Heb. *tôm*) of the thirteenth year of Zedekiah; in Genesis XLVII. 18, it is said that "that year was ended"; in Deuteronomy XXXIV. 8, we read that "the days of the weeping for Moses were ended." Applied to the passage before us the whole statement would mean that the sun kept on shining in the half of the heavens and hasted not to go in as when a day is done.

VII. The verb *yâṣā'*, is rendered here in the Septuagint by

*προπορεύω* “to go forward,” thus corresponding to the Babylonian *etēku* which Kugler renders by “*fortriicken*” (S & S, 22). This *etēku* occurs a number of times in THOMPSON’s *Reports*. Thus 187, Obv. 1, (*Ana mul*) *SAG-MI-GAR a-na erib Šamši i-ti-ik*, when Jupiter passes on at sunset. 194, Obv. 1-2, *Ana mul SAG-MI-GAR a-na imitti mul Dil-bat i-ti-ik*, when Jupiter goes to the right of Venus. 244A, Rev. 1, 2, (*šarru*) *lu la-ti-ik a-di uš-šu-u*, the king shall not hasten to go out. 245, Rev. 3-6, *šarru a-na šu-u-ku la uš-ša-a a-di a-dan-šu ša it-ti it-ti-ku it-ti ša a-di arah ume-meš*, let not the king go out into the street, until the time set by the omen be passed, i.e., the omen of the star for a month of days. 272, Rev. 4, 5, *Ana mul SAG-MI-GAR ik-šad-am-ma mul šarru etik(ik)-ma ib-ni-šu arka-nu mul šarru ša mul SAG-MI-GAR etik-šu-ma ib-nu-šu ikaššada-ma mul SAG-MI-GAR etik*, when Jupiter has culminated and has passed and illuminated Regulus, then Regulus, whom Jupiter had passed and illuminated, culminates.

ROBERT DICK WILSON.

## THE GENERAL SYNOD OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH\*

The Presbyterian Church in America is a growth whose germs, as a rule, were particular churches composed of immigrants from Europe. Some of these churches located in several colonies were organized into a Presbytery at Philadelphia, Pa., in March 1706. The denomination grew so rapidly that in 1716 the Presbytery constituted itself into a Synod.

This Synod met first at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in September, 1717, and was, in a positive sense, the Synod of the American Presbyterian Church, for no other distinctively Presbyterian Church then existed in the territory now included within the United States of America. All other Churches of the Presbyterian faith and order in America are later developments.

The Synod was known at first simply as a "Synod." In 1745 the division in the Church brought about the use of geographical names for each of the two synodical bodies which came into being, and when, in 1758, the Church was reunited, the governing body was known during its entire existence, as the Synod of New York and Philadelphia. For purposes of convenience it is called by the writer the General Synod.

As the governing body of the Church, the General Synod was, in many particulars, unique, and it is upon these special features that emphasis will be laid in this article. The principal facts of the history are discussed in quite a number of volumes, have been dealt with recently in various publications, both in newspaper and book form, and familiarity with them on the part of readers is taken for granted.

---

\* This paper is substantially the address delivered by the writer at the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., Dallas, Texas, May 1917, on the occasion of the celebration of the Two-hundredth Anniversary of the General Synod.

The first feature to be emphasized in connection with the history of the General Synod is that it was the product of a Christian Church born on American soil. It was constituted by a Presbytery which was self-organized. Its ministers, it is true, had been ordained to their high calling by various church bodies in Scotland, in Ireland, and in New England (there were two graduates of Harvard), but no permission or authority for the organization of the Presbytery was requested from any existing ecclesiastical body. Ordinarily speaking, it is true that the Reformed Churches of Europe, notably the Church of Scotland, are to be regarded as the sources of the influences which produced the American Presbyterian Church. In a vital sense, the historic Church of Scotland is a mother to all the Presbyterian Churches of the United States, and other Churches, such as the Reformed Churches of Holland, France, Germany, and England, may also be regarded as standing in a parental relation to them. But it is to be emphasized that the one centrally organized body of believers which has had the longest continuous existence on American soil was self-organized, ministers and ruling elders of different particular churches coming together for the purpose, filled with the desire to do their duty as Christian men. The Synod, therefore, represented in a distinct manner those tendencies in modern life, both ecclesiastical and civil, which have come to be designated by the word "Americanism." That word, used frequently by John Witherspoon, stands for one thing—for the liberty of Christians to organize for coöperative work upon their own initiative.

A second feature connected with the history of the Synod is the fact that at its first meeting it proceeded to organize the work of the Church with a view to the future. The men who constituted of their own volition both the General Presbytery and the General Synod were men of vision. They were mentally of the folk who believe that where there is no vision the people perish, and they therefore be-

gan to lay foundations for a growing Church in the midst of a people with a future. They established in 1717 a fund for pious uses and took steps to further the work of missions. They also appointed every year an Executive Commission with power. These acts were the initial steps in organized benevolence. In many other ways, as the records show, from year to year, they evidenced by their acts that they realized the importance of the trust which had been committed to them of God. They were men equal to the varying situations of their lives, ready for any work which commended itself to them and having the foresight which is indispensable in connection with all human affairs, if success is to crown earnest and systematic effort. Above all other things, they were men who relied upon the divine guidance, believing that God is, and that faith in God, whatever the outward conditions, is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

A third feature of the history shows that the Synod realized that the strength of a Christian church is its possession of a distinctive type of Christian doctrine. From the beginning of the organization of the American Presbyterian Church, insistence was placed upon the fact that the persons associated therein were in full sympathy with the creeds of the Reformed Churches throughout the world. The Synod did not attempt to frame new standards of doctrine, for they realized that they were part of English-speaking Christendom, and that evangelical Christians generally had reached a practically unanimous conclusion as to the systematic form of Bible doctrine, in the Standards framed in the Jerusalem Chamber, Westminster Abbey, London, England, by the Assembly of Divines in 1643-1648. The Westminster Standards were not only Biblical but also ecumenical in a true sense, and as such were formally adopted at the meeting of the Synod in 1729, and subscription thereto was required from that year by all ministers and licentiates. The members of Synod

did this of their own free will, and they did it to make clear that in doctrine as well as in practice the American Presbyterian Church was a part of that great divine force known as the Protestant Reformation, which steadily had been reorganizing upon New Testament lines both the thought and life of the Christian world. The Synod established at Philadelphia in 1717 was one result of Luther's work at Wittenberg in 1517. The central thought of the Reformation was and is the great doctrine of the sovereignty of God's Word over human thought and life. Creed and life are inseparable. Every intelligent life is invariably the expression of some sort of creed. And that creed is truest and that life strongest which rests upon a sovereign God, is instinct as a result with the divine life, and is guided by the Word of God.

The General Synod in the year 1729 took action in favor of the independence of the Church, by the denial of the authority of the State over the Church. Chapter xxiii of the Westminster Confession of Faith deals with the power of the civil magistrate, and the Synod denied to the civil magistrate what the Westminster Assembly permitted—a controlling power over Synods with respect to "the exercise of their ministerial authority." It also denied to the civil magistrate the "power to persecute any for their religion." These were notable acts on the part of the Synod, appearing to be the first declaration, by an organized Church on American soil, of the freedom of the Church from control by the State. In several colonies the Anglican Episcopal Church was the establishment. Even in New England at this time Church and State were united. Puritanism, as first established in the colonies, was a chain whose links were steel. An organization of so-called Independent churches, its ministers were held to orthodoxy and its members to right living, by the strong arm of the civil law. It was the civil magistrate, at the call of the Church, who drove out from Massachusetts, Roger Williams the Baptist, and Francis Doughty the Presbyterian.

This union between Church and State was brought to New England by the first colonists whether Presbyterians or Independents. Indeed it is to be noted that a majority of the early Puritans were Presbyterians in church polity as well as Calvinists in doctrine. Many of their churches had ruling elders, following the example of the Pilgrim Church which landed at Plymouth, Mass., in 1620. The ruling elder of that church named William Brewster was for two years its only officer, the pastor John Robinson having remained in Holland. Further, the New England Churches organized themselves under a synodical government, by the adoption of the Cambridge Platform, in 1648. But the mistake they made in that platform was in placing the power to call a Synod in the hands of the civil magistrate. Had the New England Puritan Churches organized a synodical government under the control of the churches themselves, the opinion is held that the oldest Presbyterian Church in the United States would have been the one whose Synod met at the call of the Governor of the Massachusetts Colony in 1646, for it had ruling elders in the congregations, as well as Synodical government.

It is interesting to note that the tendency in New England towards a centralized church government was checked in a curious manner. In 1725, Cotton Mather and other New England ministers, under a feeling of need as to greater care in discipline, petitioned the Governor of Massachusetts for the calling of a Synod, no such church-governing body having met since 1680. The Episcopalians in the colony, however, interfered, prevented the calling of a Synod, and the New England control of churches by synods was thus terminated abruptly. As Prof. Walker of Yale Divinity School states in his History of the Congregational Churches: "What gave promise in Massachusetts for an ecclesiasticism with something of denominational authority thus came to an untimely end."

The Congregational was the established Church in Con-

necticut until 1818, and in Massachusetts until 1834, and even to-day in three New England States there are legal provisions for the support of Congregational Churches by taxation. To the Presbyterian Church must the honor be given of the first definite statement, by an organized religious body on American soil, of what to-day is recognized as the distinctively American and true doctrine of the right relation between Church and State. That relation is expressed in the clear-cut statement, "A free Church in a free State."

It is natural, in connection with the Presbyterian Church, to pass from the thought of religious liberty to that of evangelistic and missionary work. The General Synod of the Church, like the General Presbytery, was full of an aggressive evangelistic spirit. It provided for missionary work in destitute places at its first meeting, and in 1719 indicated its definite realization of the value of missions in cities, by voting the larger part of a sum of money received from Scotland to the First Presbyterian Church in New York City. Knowing that the great test of a Church's loyalty to Christ is its earnestness in the work of the salvation of souls, the Synod gave its warm support to revival movements. George Whitefield had no better friends in the American Colonies than the ministers and members of the Presbyterian Church, and the first division in the Church was brought about by differences of opinion as to the need and value of revivals of religion. An additional cause of the division was the question as to whether in the extraordinary circumstances which had arisen, through the blessing of God upon the labors of Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, persons might be ordained to the ministry who had not received a full education. The division lasted, however, only a short time, 1743-1758, and the revival and missionary spirit, instead of being lessened by the controversy, was deepened and intensified. As Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, well said

of the Church, "Though it has made no boast or shout, it has yet been an aggressive Church; it has been a missionary Church from the beginning."

The American Presbyterian Church was in a strong sense a patriotic Church. The opening of the Revolutionary struggle found the Presbyterian ministers and churches, to a man, on the side of the colonies. In 1775 the General Synod issued a pastoral letter, an extract from which indicates the spirit prevailing in the Church, and reads: "Be careful to maintain the union which at present subsists through all the Colonies. In particular, as the Continental Congress, now sitting at Philadelphia, consists of delegates chosen by the body of the people, let them not only be treated with respect and encouraged in their difficult service, not only let your prayers be offered up to God for his direction in their proceedings, but adhere firmly to their resolutions, and let it be seen that they are able to bring out the whole strength of this vast country to carry them into execution." Contemporary with this letter of the Synod was the famous Mecklenburgh Declaration of Independence, renouncing all allegiance to Great Britain, passed by a convention in western North Carolina composed of delegates who were mostly Presbyterians, thus forestalling the action of the Colonial Congress in the same line by more than a year. Further, in the sessions of the Colonial Congress, the influence of no delegate exceeded that wielded by Rev. John Witherspoon, president of Princeton College, the only clerical signer of the Declaration of Independence, "a man Scotch in accent and strength of conviction, but American at heart." The American Presbyterian Church never faltered in its devotion to the cause of the independence of these United States; its ministers and members periled all in its support, being ready, with Witherspoon, to die, if need be, in defense of civil and religious liberty.

The close relation between the Presbyterian Church and the nation is shown by the fact that the Constitution of

the Church was adopted in the same year in which the Constitution of the United States was framed. The influence which the Presbyterian Church exercised for the securing of unity between the colonies was zealously employed, at the close of the war for independence, to bring them into a closer union. The main hindrance to the formation of the Federal Union, as it now exists, lay in the reluctance of many of the States to yield to a general government any of the powers which they possessed. The Federal party, in its advocacy of closer union, had no more earnest and eloquent supporters than John Witherspoon, Elias Boudinot, and other Presbyterian members of the Continental Congress. Sanderson, in his "Lives of the Signers of the Declaration of Independence," states that "Witherspoon strongly combated the opinion expressed in Congress that a lasting federation among the States was impracticable, and he warmly maintained the absolute necessity of union to impart vigor and success to the measures of government." In this he was aided by many who had come to the views which he, as a Presbyterian, had always maintained. Slowly but surely, ideas of civil government in harmony with those of the Westminster Standards were accepted as formative principles for the government of the United States, and that by many persons not connected with the Presbyterian Church. Among these were the great leaders in the Constitutional Convention: James Madison, a graduate of Princeton, who sat as a student under John Witherspoon; Alexander Hamilton, of Scotch parentage, whose familiarity with Presbyterian government is fully attested; and above all George Washington, who, though an Episcopalian, had so great a regard for the Presbyterian Church and its services to the country that he not only partook of Holy Communion with its members, but also gave public expression to his high esteem. It is not that the claim is made that the principles of Presbyterian government were the sole source from which sprang the govern-

ment of the Republic, but it is asserted that mightiest among the forces which made the colonies a nation were the governmental principles found in the Westminster Standards, and that the Presbyterian Church taught, practiced, and maintained in fullness first in this land, that form of government in accordance with which the Republic has been organized. The historian Bancroft says, "The Revolution of 1776, so far as it was affected by religion, was a Presbyterian measure. It was the natural outgrowth of the principles which the Presbyterianism of the Old World planted in her sons, the English Puritans, the Scotch Covenanters, the French Huguenots, the Dutch Calvinists, and the Presbyterians of Ulster."

The General Synod, further, sought to put into practice the doctrine of the unity of the Church Universal as set forth in the Westminster Standards. There is a formal and there is a spiritual unity, and one difficulty in the way of the visible realization by practical methods of the spiritual unity of the Church, has been the fact that the Protestant Reformation emphasized in a distinctive manner the right of private judgment. While rendering inestimable benefit thereby to the world of mankind, it developed in a marked way individuality in the thinking of Christian persons, and thus stimulated controversy over the theology and government of the Church. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were periods of at times violent controversies in religion. As the rights of conscience and independence of the individual, however, became increasingly acknowledged, Christians began to confer about the things upon which they were agreed rather than upon the things upon which they differed. There arose as a result efforts for the expression of Christian fellowship, and from the first beginnings of its organization the American Presbyterian Church has endeavored to make manifest its readiness to coöperate with all persons and all bodies who were evangelically Christian. Prior to American independence

the Church entered into relations of fellowship with the Presbyterian Churches in Great Britain and Holland, and with the Dutch Reformed, the German Reformed and the Congregational Churches in the American Colonies. The most notable movement during the Colonial period was that which was known as "The General Convention of the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, of the Consociated Churches of Connecticut, and the Associations of the Congregational Churches," of the other New England Colonies. The purposes of this convention were to promote the Kingdom of Christ in North America, and to preserve the religious liberties of the Colonies. The convention met regularly from 1766 to 1775, and the aid it rendered to the cause of American independence was notable. Its effectiveness in church coöperation was yet more notable, for out of the Synod's work grew as a "living root" all movements involving active Christian fellowship in later general church life. The American Presbyterian Church unchurches no other body of Christians, but fellowships with all who accept Jesus Christ as God and Saviour, and stand for evangelical principles.

Another feature of the history of the Synod was its deep interest in education. Of the seven ministers of the original Presbytery, six were graduates of universities and colleges. The interest of the Presbyterian Church in education, however, was not solely because of its belief in an educated ministry. Presbyterians taught by the Holy Scriptures make religion a personal matter, not between a man and the Church, but between the individual soul and God, and this necessitates personal knowledge on the part of human beings of God's Word, God's law for human life. Education in religious truth is therefore a cardinal principle for Presbyterians, and the steps are easy and swift to secular and popular education. This logical connection between Calvinism and education is recognized by Bancroft, who says Calvin was the first founder of the public-school

system. It is also shown by the history of academic and popular education. Presbyterian Scotland established the first schools for popular education. Harvard and Yale universities were founded by men who believed in the Westminster Confession. The Presbyterian Church itself founded the Log College and its successor, Princeton University. Education is one of the foundation stones of both Church and nation. Then honor to whom honor is due: honor to the men who believed in the Westminster Confession, who under its influence built colleges rather than cathedrals, and who believed both in educated ministers and an educated people!

The peculiar and distinctive feature of the history of the General Synod, above all other features, was that it stood out as the leading champion of true popular government. Several other important Churches held to Calvinistic doctrine, but the Synod was the chief representative, during its entire existence, of the government of the Church by authoritative representative assemblies. The American Presbyterian Church was the first federal republic on the Western continent, and it is to be emphasized that Presbyterianism is a form of church government by representative assemblies composed of Presbyters, and so arranged as to realize the visible unity of the whole Church. It is a government by representatives with authority, as over against Congregationalism on the one hand, and, on the other hand, against prelacy. Independency, as a form of church polity, vests government in the congregation or the brotherhood of each particular church, and prelacy centers control in single men. There is in this matter of representative government an exact parallel between the government of the United States and that of the Presbyterian Church.

The Congress of the United States is an assembly of representatives of the people, and they are responsible to the people, not in the sense of the local constituency that elected them, but in the sense of the entire sovereign people

who established the Constitution. The Constitution of the nation opens with the words, "We, the people of the United States." In the Church the General Assembly is the supreme governing body and represents, as the Constitution of the Church states, "in one body all the particular churches of the denomination." This idea is not modern. John Owen, the great commentator, in his "True Nature of a Gospel Church," states that a single congregation is to be governed by an eldership or Presbytery, that is, a bench or college of Presbyters, chosen by the people as their representatives, not as their deputies, chosen not to govern according to the will of the people but according to the will of Christ, who ordained the constitution of the Church, created its officers, and defined their functions. The poet statesman, John Milton, in his work, "The Reason of Church Government Urged Against Prelacy," uses the following language concerning the General Assembly: "Of this General Assembly every parochial Consistory is a right homogeneous and constituting part, being in itself a little Synod and moving towards a General Assembly upon a higher basis, in an even and firm progression, as those small squares in battle unite in one great cube, the main phalanx, an emblem of truth and steadfastness."

Presbyterianism is not a government by Presbyters as presbyters, but by presbyters assembled in presbyteries. All the courts of the Church are substantially presbyteries. The same elements are found in all of them, from the lowest to the highest. Representatives of the whole Church govern the representatives of each part, and that not by a direct control of the part but by controlling the power of the part, and all the local presbyteries are combined by representatives into one great Presbytery, called as a rule the General Assembly.

The American Presbyterian Church organized itself upon the principles just stated, and constituted first a General Presbytery, then a General Synod having under it four local

Presbyteries, and reached the consummation of its organization in 1788 in the General Assembly, which "represents in one body all the particular churches of the denomination." The General Assembly is a nation-wide Presbytery, as truly a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, as the Congress of the United States.

It is important further to remember in this connection that the modern founder of representative government was John Calvin. That great theologian was also great as a statesman. In his "Institutes of the Christian Religion," Book IV, Head iii, he teaches the principles of representative government, and bases them upon the teachings of the Bible.

Calvin's "Institutes," containing his theory of constitutional resistance to tyrants through representative magistrates, was for centuries a standard book among all Protestants. Probably no other theological work was so widely read and so influential as the "Institutes," from the time of the Reformation to the American Revolution. "At least seventy-four editions in nine languages, besides fourteen abridgments, appeared before the Puritan exodus to America, an average of one edition annually for three generations. Huguenots, Scots, Dutchmen, Walloons, and Germans, and an overwhelming majority of the American colonists of the seventeenth century, were nurtured on its political theories as well as on the strong meat of its theology."

Calvin's teachings as to popular government were based upon his fundamental premises of the absolute sovereignty of God, and of the resulting sovereignty of the Bible as the Word of God. This absolute divine authority "limited all earthly princes," and made both king and representative magistrate responsible to both God and men. Calvin moreover pictured that "singular and truly sovereign power of God" not as "idly beholding from heaven," "but as holding the helm of the universe."

Before his death Calvin had combined the theory of constitutional resistance to tyrants, through ordained representatives of the people, with another far-reaching idea, that of a fundamental written law. He emphasized to the modern world the distinct conception of a written constitution as an essential feature of the government of a state.

Consider what God has accomplished through these modern times for representative constitutional government! Think concisely upon the advance made.

In 1788 the only actual political federated republics in existence were the Swiss Confederation, the States of Holland, and the United States of America—about seven million persons in all, and lacking all resources except faith in God, faith in the people, and a firm courage.

If we spread out a map of the world to-day, for the purpose of comparing the territorial extent of the different kinds of governments existing at the present, we find that the area covered by republics occupies approximately 30,-250,000 square miles, or considerably more than one half the habitable surface of the globe.

If we add the area of the British Empire, the spirit of whose government is largely democratic, and whose “autonomous colonies,” as the Dominions are now called, are virtually republics, the area of free government reaches the enormous total of about 41,500,000 square miles, or about four fifths of the inhabited earth.

Turning now to the proportions of the population of the globe under the republics and under other forms of government, we find that of the total inhabitants of the earth, estimated at 1,600,000,000, more than 850,000,000 are living under nominal republics; and if we add the population of the British Empire, which is called a commonwealth of popular governments, the total would be about 1,250,000,000, or more than three fourths of the human race. If to these areas and populations we add those under substantially constitutional governments, excluding all those under

avowedly autocratic rule, we find only a small fraction of the globe still adhering to an autocratic system which only a century and a quarter ago was practically universal. Calvin's ideas of representative government are winning out all over the world. And it is most significant that God has placed at the head of the American Republic, at this time of stress, in this hour of sharp conflict between democracy and autocracy, a man who believes in Calvin's principles. President Woodrow Wilson is a Presbyterian ruling elder.

The record which we have considered is one that is remarkable for the clearness of vision and the breadth of spirit which characterized the founders of the American Presbyterian Church. From the beginning they appeared to realize that theirs was an unequaled opportunity in relation to the political, moral, and spiritual welfare of mankind. In no particular were they narrow, short-sighted, or biased by mere material considerations. They evidently grasped the things which are unseen and eternal, and applied their spirit in the conduct of the things which are seen and temporal. The purposes which animated them are shown in a letter written by John Witherspoon in 1772 to the Committee of Dissenters in England. The extract reads: "We beg leave also to inform you that we are collecting the state of religious liberty in the several Colonies on this continent and its progress in each of them from their first settlement, which may be capable of important uses in the grand struggle we or our posterity may be called to make in this glorious cause, in which the happiness of thousands yet unborn is so deeply interested."

One would almost think that Witherspoon had in vision conditions which prevail to-day throughout the world, and we may rest assured that he had a clear conception of what the struggle for American independence meant both for Americans and for humanity. His associates were men of like spirit and character. They united loyalty to country

with loyalty to the Church, and read into their conception of Christianity elevated ideas and purposes which gave them to act, not for a day, but for all time. They looked forward to an hour when the Church of God should have attained to its rightful authority over human thought and conduct, and when everywhere men should have been enfranchised with the liberty which is through Christ Jesus. All hail to the men who were founders of the American Presbyterian Church, and through it promoters of true liberty both in Church and State, and whose endeavors along moral and religious lines gave an impetus to their influence which has increased through the passing years, so that to-day, for all lovers of humanity, faith is the substance of things hoped for, and ours is the assurance that "government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth."

*Philadelphia.*

WILLIAM H. ROBERTS.

## ATHEISTIC CHRISTIANITY

The study of Church History has made us familiar with varying types of religious thought and life all laying claim to the Christian name. There has even arisen in late years the strange phenomenon of a "Christless" Christianity, but it remained for a distinguished American psychologist and educator to become sponsor for an anomaly even more startling—atheistic Christianity.

It is refreshing to turn aside from the dry bones of theology with its scholastic and verbal discussions and to be invited by President G. Stanley Hall in his two-volume work, *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* (1917), into the more fruitful fields of a psychological study of Jesus. We soon discover, however, that Dr. Hall has erected a vocabulary of his own, and even in the Introduction we meet with such terms as "mythopheme," "erethic," "ambivalent," "dysphoria," "thumic," "hebamic," etc. Under these terms, it is true, a wealth of insight may lie, and we await with eagerness the unveiling of mysteries in the life and consciousness of Jesus hidden from ages and generations; but it is soon apparent that Dr. Hall permits himself to use even the ordinary language of religious expression in strange and unusual meanings. While rejecting the Virgin Birth and broadly hinting that we may have to accept its natural alternative, he is ready to say, "with a fulness of conviction that criticism can never give, and that the old faith never knew, that Jesus was veritably 'conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary'" (I, 259). While contending that "the post-mortem Jesus" has no vestige of historicity, and that there is no personal life beyond the grave, since "the only valid immortality is of two kinds, influential and eugenic" (I, xv), he declares that the subject of his analysis is "the true and living Christ," "the spiritual Christ of the Resurrection" (I, vii). While claiming by a sort of inverted pragmatism that the

less true the Gospels are the more useful they may be, he insists that he ought to be called an orthodox Christian (I, 34).

The difficulties of the reader increase when he tries to discover just what Jesus it is whose life Dr. Hall is studying by the psychological method. It is not the historical Jesus, for Dr. Hall's proudest boast is that he has emancipated the figure of Jesus from the crass realism of history. The Jesus of Dr. Hall is a psychological product, the product of the folk-soul, made of soul-stuff, made out of the warp and woof of human wishes. He is in fact the Freudian Jesus, for Dr. Hall is an enthusiastic disciple of Freud, and uses to the limit the Freudian method of psychoanalysis.

The Freudian method, as we all now understand, consists in drawing large inferences from seemingly insignificant hints such as gestures, slips of the tongue, or the details of a dream. The Freudian finds the controlling forces of life in the repressed wishes which lie below the threshold of consciousness. The problem of psychoanalysis is "to get beneath the consciousness of Jesus to the deeper strata of his unconscious soul" (II, 361). It is clear that the obligations of the historian may sit but lightly upon the psychoanalyst, and that the Freudian psychologist unless restrained by his historic sense or his common sense can manipulate the Gospel material with extraordinary freedom. As a matter of fact our interest in Dr. Hall's study of the psychology of Jesus soon is lost in our interest in the study of the mental processes of Dr. Hall himself.

But what new insights does psychoanalysis supply in its interpretation of the consciousness of Jesus? It is a relief to be told that Jesus' aversion to his putative father was "not because of any envious Freudian wish to take his place in his mother's affection" (I, 252). Dr. Hall finds in the parables a psychoanalytic key to Jesus' idea of the Kingdom. The largest group of parables deals with the rela-

tions of masters and servants, and Jesus, he surmises, dreamed in youth of being the lord of a manor and commanding a retinue of servants. When this dream seemed unattainable, the result on the one hand was hatred of the sordid rich, and on the other an aggrandizement of the dream of being a country lord into being the head of a far greater Kingdom extending over Israel, and even taking the features ultimately "of a terrestrial if not a cosmic and heavenly Kingdom, partly realized on earth under his leadership" (II, 589).

Adopting Schweitzer's eschatology, Dr. Hall seeks to make it more intelligible with the aid of the Freudian method. Why was Jesus so quickly disappointed, between the first and second periods in his career which Schweitzer postulates, in his expectation of the sudden and miraculous coming of the kingdom during his lifetime? To fill the gap and explain the resolution of Jesus to go to his death in Jerusalem, Dr. Hall suggests that somehow at this period Jesus came to know of the pagan doctrine of a dying and rising god. But in going to Jerusalem Jesus enacted a far deeper tragedy than he anticipated. At the end he felt himself deserted not merely by man but by God. "His ideals of his Messianity, Sonship, and of the Kingdom must have been abandoned as delusions of a megalomaniac," and he must die feeling that his place was with Satan in the lowest hell (I, xi). Dr. Hall's work here seems crude and reckless to an extreme. It is insisted that Jesus was not insane and he is repeatedly called the world's greatest psychologist, but in the two periods of his career he was the victim first of megalomania and then of melancholia. Knowledge of the pagan doctrine of a dying and rising god is given as the key to make the life of Jesus intelligible, but this led him on to believe that he died the death of a criminal, "as bad as he had thought himself good," and with no hope of resurrection.

The final despair of Jesus, feeling that he was the worst

of lost souls, becomes, singularly enough in Dr. Hall's construction, the cause in some mysterious way of the triumphant faith of the disciples that he had risen from the dead. This despair of Jesus, we are told, was necessary "to generate and release all the energy of reaction" (I, xiii). "Reaction" is here the magical word, the psychological miracle which takes the place of the historical miracle. Katabasis, we are told, was followed by anabasis, and the extreme depression of the disciples "had to react toward the opposite extreme of euthymia" (II, 450). This reaction which, it is acknowledged, revolutionized not only the lives of the disciples but their view of the life of Jesus, and became "the pivot of history for Christendom," is baldly asserted rather than explained. Men with disappointed hopes or broken hearts do not always "react" toward a triumphant optimism or a world-conquering faith. The natural end of these things is drink, or suicide, or to use Dr. Hall's expression "miserablism." All that Dr. Hall can do is to reiterate that "the folk-soul being what it is, he had to rise" (II, 732, 733). Psychological dogmatism takes the place of the traditional faith.

Superior to history as Dr. Hall is, will he allow his humble fellow Christians to go on accepting so much of the Gospel story as they can believe? By no means. It makes no difference to Dr. Hall whether or not Jesus lived in Judea or was an antique reality of two thousand years ago, but it makes all the difference in the world whether he was born of a virgin, or performed real miracles, or rose from the dead. Upon those who would still believe these things, Dr. Hall pours out the vials of his wrath. He anathematizes them with an *odium anti-theologicum* and in a vocabulary peculiarly modern. Suppose that in my innocence I venture to believe that Jesus opened the eyes of the blind. Dr. Hall would take my breath away with a sentence of excommunication. Such a miracle is "preposterous" to anyone who has studied the eye. "True miracles

are things which are absolutely false. They never happen." In fact—this is the finishing touch—"it is the literal believer who is blind and in need of this cure" (II, 608-610). Or suppose again that I confess to a lingering belief that Jesus healed the lepers. Dr. Hall's indignation again flashes forth, and I find that I am banished from respectable society. "To credit the complete, literal, instant, and wholesale cure of this dread disease is impossible save for those whose minds are leprous with ignorance and superstition" (II, 626). After this I should be afraid to mention the raising of Lazarus, for fear of being struck dead by Dr. Hall's thunderbolts. But here he is unusually mild, contenting himself with saying in Scriptural language that this miracle "has become a stone of stumbling and a rock of offense and should be sloughed off as a *caput mortuum* or death's head at every symposium of Christian experience" (II, 637, 638). To believe in the Resurrection is a "suicidal materialization of religious faith," and shows that one scarcely knows "what intellectual honesty means" (II, 704, 706).

Why this wrath, we naturally ask, in a mind usually so catholic in its sympathies? Dr. Hall can endure Nietzsche, and admit "some degree of truth in about all of Nietzsche's charges" against Christianity (I, 180). He can hail with joy the coming of the mythicists, Drews and W. B. Smith, as perhaps the "morning stars of a new dispensation of Christian faith" (I, 214). With open arms he would welcome pagan elements into his syncretic "new Christianity." Why then is he so intolerant of belief in miracle and the Resurrection? We reach here a deeper stratum of Dr. Hall's thought. He is more positivist than pragmatist; he is, in his fundamental and controlling convictions, more Comte's than Freudian. Than man spiritualized, "there is no other God." "The antithesis between God and man is then really that between the individual and the genus homo, Comte's '*Le grand être*,' Hobbes' '*Leviathan*' at its best, purified,

sublimated, made free and invested with all the worthy attributes of the race. His goodness, justice, love, etc., are really man's and valid only to and in man. He is the truth, virtue, beauty of man. The real atheist is only he who denies these attributes to man" (I, 285, 286). It is Dr. Hall's positivism, we discover, which really sets limitations and gives direction to his psychoanalysis, his pragmatism, his genetic psychology and his application of all of these to the interpretation of Christianity. It is his positivism which determines the Jesus who shall be analyzed, whether ideal, historical or mythical, and prescribes in advance the outcome of the analysis.

It is edifying to watch Dr. Hall interpret the Gospels in the interest of his humanistic creed. You can give him any passage in the New Testament, and he can preach from it with unction the gospel of positivism. God is the creation of man, or is Humanity itself. The commands of the Bible are "exhortations from out of the depths of the soul of the race to the individual to better himself and his estate" (I, 235). The Incarnation is the incarnation of the race in the individual. The "Messiah" is the soul of the Hebrew or of the human race. Jesus is the Son of Man in a literal sense, as the product of human wishes or of Mansoul. He is the Son of God because in the story of his birth "the folk-soul completed the apotheosis of man" (I, 282). The Kingdom of God is the kingdom of man. Prayer is communion with the "deeper racial self within us" (II, 504). Miracles teach the lesson of a "more evolved superman state" (II, 610). Jesus' death was the "death of the Ur-Father," for Yahveh was near his "ethical dotage" (II, 731, 732); it was Mansoul that raised Jesus from the dead (II, 733): salvation is an "autosoteriological process," and Calvary a "symbolization of an inner process of self-katharsis which Mansoul has achieved" (II, 727); the hope of immortality is only hope in the future of humanity, for "man's future on this earth is the only real,

glorious, and sufficient fulfilment of this hope in the prolonged and rich life of posterity here" (II, 692). The parable of the Prodigal Son, one might think, would not lend itself readily to the requirements of Dr. Hall's positivistic creed, but here again he is equal to the emergency. The Nativity might be called "the return of the not so much prodigal as ostracized God to his father, man. He had wandered into a far country and lived there long in splendor, but the lure of the fairest of earth's daughters only typifies his home-sickness for his fatherland, Mansoul, etc." (I, 286, 287).

All this is "going some," but the peculiar thing about it is that it is going in a crab-like fashion. The farther Dr. Hall goes away from Christianity, the more earnest are his professions of orthodoxy. When denying the Virgin Birth and not obscurely suggesting the natural alternative, we hear him repeating in a tone of pious conviction, "Conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary." When discarding miracles as "baby-talk," "infantilism," and belief in them as even a grievous sin against the true spirit of Jesus, he is shocked at the lack of insight of those who would rationalize them away. When denying not only the Resurrection of Jesus but apparently all personal life beyond the grave, he uses the language of mystical piety and protests his faith in the "living" and "risen" Christ. When declaring that man created God in his own image, that there is no incarnation but that of racial life-forces in the individual and that there is no proper worship but the dependence of the individual on the race, and when excoriating and excommunicating all believers in supernatural Christianity, he folds his hands in pious complacency and declares, "I believe I can now repeat almost every clause of the Apostles' Creed with a fervent sentiment of conviction" (I, xviii). When most eloquent in preaching the negations of positivism, he is loudest in his assertion that he is an orthodox Christian.

All this, of course, is the height of absurdity, if not an outrage on common sense. As well might Dr. Hall claim to be an orthodox Mohammedan because his creed could be reduced to the formula, "There is no God but Humanity, and Dr. Hall is its prophet." What we are now interested in is the reason for this peculiar lack of coherence in Dr. Hall's thought and speech, this approach to the nonsensical and the maudlin in an eminent scholar and educator who should be perfectly able to express himself clearly when he wants to. To the psychoanalyst, we venture to think, the explanation is not far to seek. It lies in the repressed consciousness of Dr. Hall himself. The cure for Freud is more Freud.

When, for example, Dr. Hall's pages fairly bristle with invective against believers in miracle, this to the Freudian is an indubitable evidence of a repressed fear that they may be true after all, and that the fabric of positivism, so flimsily erected in these volumes, will crumble in ruins. Dr. Hall, it is plain, is whistling to keep his courage up. When in spite of his sweeping denials he repeats the old formulas, recites the creed and protests that he is an orthodox Christian, if not *the* orthodox Christian, this is not due to deliberate deception, nor even to that respect for the opinion of one's forebears which Dr. Hall sees in the ritual of the Church. No; psychoanalysis finds the key to the anomaly in repressed desire, in the unconscious longing for the "old-time religion" in which he was reared, suppressed by the "censor," which in this case is the naturalistic metaphysics to which he stands committed. The desire thus repressed can only find expression through indirect channels. When Dr. Hall, finally, merging all departments of theology into anthropology, sings his most inspired strains to the glory of man and raises his loudest hallelujahs to the glory of Humanity, the Freudian sees that this very over-emphasis and iteration is symptomatic of a deep though repressed consciousness that a "eugenic," "influential" or "plasmal"

immortality is after all a pitiable substitute for the immortal hope which can say with Browning,

"My sun sets to rise again,"

or with Paul, "As we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."

It will occur to many readers that this glorification of man is a little ill-timed while the shadows of the Great War are deepening over the world. While the best blood of the nations is being shed in Europe, Dr. Hall's message, "Believe in the gospel of eugenics and euthenics, for the kingdom of Man is at hand," will scarcely carry conviction. We remember that Mr. Edison declared several years ago that "invention will abolish poverty"; but invention applied for destructive purposes has stripped multitudes of all that they had, brought Europe to the verge of starvation and saddled the world with a crushing load of debt. For once Dr. Hall parts company with Freud, who is quoted as insisting that "the present war has stripped from man all the thin disguises of religion and morality, so that he now stands revealed as what he is, a beast whose chief passion is to kill and take all he can" (I, 180).

It is interesting to note that two books, both appearing within the year and both written by educators and psychologists, have reached the same results. Professor J. H. Leuba, in his *Belief in God and Immortality*, attempts to show that such belief has a weakening hold upon college students, scientists and psychologists. He boldly proclaims the downfall of Christianity, because Christianity in his judgment has been discredited in its two most fundamental dogmas. Dr. Hall reaches results which are precisely the same. Both hold the positivistic creed (with hints of a vague pantheism behind it), but Dr. Hall prefers to clothe his naturalistic negations in the drapery of a pious rhetoric.

The advantage in the way of intellectual candor may be thought to lie with Professor Leuba, but the significant thing for every educator and every patriot is that there is

a strong current of influence in our educational institutions which is not only anti-Christian but anti-theistic. As go the colleges so will go the country.

All heresies are said to be the outcome of defective views of sin. Dr. Hall admires Jesus. Jesus is for him "the world's master pragmatic psychologist," "the master craftsman in psychodynamics," the greatest of moral teachers, although he failed to heed the maxim, "Know thyself," and was deceived in his central teaching about God and the future life. Jesus is one who can beat him at his own trade; and yet Dr. Hall does not, like Peter in similar circumstances, say "Depart, I am a sinful man, O Lord." "If in some respects," he admits, "we seem abreast of Jesus in our insights, here in the psychology of sin we have a vast deal yet to learn, and the best of us can only dimly feel that in this direction Jesus far transcends us" (II, 584). If Dr. Hall could attain to this insight, we venture to believe, he would see in Jesus more than the perfect totemic man, more than the most precious product of Mansoul, and more even than the master psychologist and educator of the race.

WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

## THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF WAR

It is the doctrine of many that Christianity and war are mutually exclusive. This doctrine they base on three fallacies; that Christianity contemplates the speedy cessation of war; that such cessation is to be accomplished through her ethics; and that her ethics leaves no place for war. Let us take up these propositions one by one.

1. Christianity contemplates the speedy cessation of war. That she looks forward to its cessation may not be disputed. She could not but do so. Does she not conceive of God as "the God of all peace" (Rom. xv. 33)? Does she not delight to sing of him as "making wars to cease unto the end of the earth; as breaking the bow and cutting the spear in sunder; as burning the chariot in the fire" (Ps. xlvi. 9)? Was not her divine Founder foretold as the "Prince of Peace" (Isa. ix. 6)? Was not his birth announced by the angels as ushering in the era of peace? Did not the great Apostle describe the effect of Christ's reign as "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17)? Do not both Testaments glow with the vision of the day when he shall "judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many peoples: and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa. ii. 4)?

Yet while all this is so, we must remember that our Lord himself did not expect the speedy cessation of war. On the contrary, he told his disciples that when they should hear of wars and rumors of wars, they should not be troubled; for such things (St. Mk. xiii. 7), said he, "must needs be, but the end shall not be yet." That is, wars and rumors of wars are not only no sign of the end of the world; they must in the nature of things occur. "The prince of the power of this world, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience," being who and what he is, it

could not be otherwise. Indeed, our Lord's programme for the development of the world before the certain triumph of peace and righteousness might well be understood as allowing for commotions and wars on a scale that would make even the terrific struggle of today appear insignificant. To think differently is to misunderstand both the devil's relation to war and the awfulness of his power.

Moreover, our Lord expressly says of himself, "I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. x. 34). Though himself the author and giver of peace, the Prince of Peace, a result of his mission would be contentions among individuals and wars between states. Not that he would cause these—that is impossible, he being the incarnation of love; but that he would necessarily become their occasion—that is what is meant. The devil hates nothing so much, and, being what he is, must resist nothing so strongly, as divine love: it is the opposite of his nature; it is the sure destroyer of his power.

Wars, therefore, in general, and such wars as the present one in particular, do not have the significance that we have seen to be commonly attached to them. Their existence and continuance do not in themselves prove anything against Christianity. Least of all do they indicate her failure, for she made no claim as to how soon she could do away with them, and she did intimate that they should be with us indefinitely and with increasing horror. The war, consequently, while it may disappoint the optimism of many, must at least vindicate the consistency of Christianity. It is just what her own teaching as to the devil and as to his power as prince of the world would lead us to expect.

2. The second of the fallacies referred to above is that the cessation of war, or universal peace, is to be effected through the teaching of Christian ethics. That Christianity attaches great importance to her ethics; that in a true sense she exists in order to its realization; that her own power resides largely in her matchless moral sys-

tem,—all this cannot be asserted too positively or too frequently. “The force of truth” is the greatest of natural powers, and the moral principles and precepts of our religion are the very truth of God. The fallacy, however, in this position is that Christianity appeals to her ethics as the means by which the evils of war are to be mitigated and it itself at last prevented, and that, therefore, the alleged powerlessness of her ethics in these respects must be fatal to herself. The fact is that our religion does not make, and never has made, any such appeal. On the contrary, one of her fundamental doctrines is that all men are “by nature” “dead through trespasses and sins” (Eph. ii. 1), and, consequently, incapable of responding to or even of appreciating “the force of truth.” As Dr. Charles Hodge puts it, “the truth is compared to light, which is absolutely necessary to vision; but if the eye be closed or blind, it must be opened or restored before the light can produce its proper impression.” The Psalmist, therefore, prays, “Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law” (Psalm cxix. 18); and our Lord himself says, “No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him” (St. John vi. 44). Thus even truth incarnate is represented as in itself powerless to influence us. Though Christ in his character and life and teaching is “the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely,” the carnal or natural heart “can see no beauty in him that it should desire him.” Himself “the Truth,” even he, simply as truth, has no power to attract, not to say to move us. Hence, it is that nowhere is Christian ethics as such appealed to. Its own truth and its own power are admitted, but the appeal is always to him who alone can open the blind eyes and re-create the dead heart and so make us able to discern and to understand and to love and to keep the law.

This is just what most men fail to grasp. They hold that a perfect system of ethics is all that is needed, and that because Christian ethics evidently is not all that is needed, it

cannot be perfect, that, consequently, it must have "failed." This is as unreasonable as though we were to claim that light is useless because it cannot help a blind man. In either case, our appeal must be to one who can make the blind to see and the dead to feel, that is, to a supernatural and so divine Saviour. Only in vital connection with such an one may Christian ethics be expected to do its work.

But it is precisely this condition which has not been fulfilled and which, as things are, cannot be fulfilled. It has from the first been characteristic of those who have put their hope only in the purity and sublimity of the moral teaching of Christ that they have denied his deity. If they have made him the greatest of teachers, they have insisted that he was simply a teacher. Widely though they have differed among themselves as to the explanation of the uniqueness of his teaching, they have agreed in repudiating him as "God manifest in the flesh." That distinguished scholar, professor, pastor and missionary, the Rev. Dr. S. H. Kellogg, in an article in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for 1890, pointed out that a tendency, indeed the tendency of the times, is to dethrone and undeify our Lord and Saviour. He shows how the various influences of our day—social, scientific, theological and even and specially political—all converge toward this one result; and he finds this movement not only so general, but so consummately organized, as to indicate a deliberate concentration of this form of evil, of the powers of Satan, on this one end. Now if Dr. Kellogg could write this a quarter of a century ago, what may we not say of today? As never before the tendency of the age is to desupernaturalize Jesus.

Yet there is a further difference. The former attack was at least honest. It denied our Lord's deity squarely: it made him only a man. The attack today is essentially dishonest. It regards Christ at best as only man at his highest. He was not supernaturally conceived. He did no supernatural work. What is left of his body still lies in a Syrian

grave. But then man at his highest, it claims, is really God. Could there be a more subtle, a more dangerous ruse? A divine Saviour is not in terms denied, but it is only because it has been found that man is God. The result is the same, but it is all the more dangerous since its meaning is concealed. The supernatural Saviour required, if the truth of Christian ethics is to exert its force, is rejected as before, and all the more effectually because he is in pretence retained. The Church is so hoodwinked that she joins her foes in denying her Head. Now is it not significant that this dishonest theology, which not only keeps men from trusting first of all in a supernatural Saviour, but prevents them from realizing that they have ceased to do so—that this dishonest theology, while widely held, is specially influential among some of the nations at war and, indeed, may be said to trace its origin to their philosophical lecture halls? Could any other result, then, have been expected? The one condition of the efficacy of Christian ethics being the attending “demonstration and power of the Spirit” of Christ, how could this condition have been met by those who denied his deity? If this condition were not realized, could anything else have been anticipated than “the failure of Christian ethics” which is alleged to have occurred? May it, however, be spoken of as a failure? The Church has never taught, Christ never intended, that even his ethics should realize itself apart from him. The fact is that, as regards preventing the war, Christian ethics has not failed: it has not been tried. The condition essential to its power has been necessarily disregarded. Ritschlianism and the New Theology in general do not and cannot realize the ethics of Christ, for they undermine his deity: and Christian ethics can be fairly tested solely by those who look beyond its truth to the Son of God, only whose omnipotent Spirit can cause its truth to be “quick and powerful.”

3. The third of the three fallacies mentioned at the be-

ginning is that Christian ethics leaves no place for war. It is clear at once that Christianity leaves comparatively little place for war. This is so even of the Old Testament. This, it is true, regarded war as a "religious activity." It was to be entered into at Jehovah's word. He was to be inquired of with regard to its continuance, and he answered through the Urim and Thummim or by the prophets. He endowed the warrior with special qualifications for battle, and it was he who gave to him the victory. It was David, "the man after God's own heart," who sang: "God is my strength and power: and he maketh my way perfect. He maketh my feet like hind's feet: and setteth me upon my high places. He teacheth my hands to war; so that a bow of steel is broken by my arm. Thou hast also given me the shield of thy salvation: and thy gentleness hath made me great. Thou hast enlarged my steps under me; so that my feet did not slip. I have pursued my enemies, and destroyed them; and turned not again until I had consumed them. And I have consumed them and wounded them that they could not arise: yea, they are fallen under my feet. For thou has girded me with strength to battle: them that rose up against me hast thou subdued under me" (II Sam. xxii. 33-39).

But there is another side, and it is the significant one. It is one in respect to which the Old Testament differs radically from the scriptures of all contemporary religions. While it does regard war as a religious activity, it greatly restricts it. This is so even of war considered as the divinely appointed means for the conquest of Canaan. With regard to it the Israelites were not left to their own discretion or caprice in interpreting their commission. They were to do what God commanded and just what he commanded and because he commanded it, and this under the severest penalties. Thus were they kept from carrying on even these "wars of extermination," as they are called, for the gratification of personal feeling. Again, the Israelites

were never permitted to regard these wars as precedents. Together with the command to drive out and to exterminate the Canaanites, they were given for their permanent rule: "If a stranger sojourn with you in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God" (Lev. xix. 33-34). Thus were they taught the extraordinary nature of their commission. They were not to expect that even God would call on them again for this work of judgment. Once more, in the performance of it they were limited. Aggressive war was permitted only at certain specified points and for certain specified objects. Otherwise, war was to be merely defensive. Under no circumstance was war for war's sake encouraged. Because David had been a man of war he was denied the honor of building the temple. In these and in other ways was war restricted under the Old Testament and the people guarded against the indulgence of a fierce spirit and even against the development of a warlike disposition. It was kept impressed on them that always and in all respects, even in war and specially in war, they were to be the executors of the will of the Lord. Just because war was "an activity of religion" must its sphere have been thus limited by the absolute righteousness of Jehovah.

As might have been expected, the position of the New Testament with regard to war is not essentially different. As Canon J. B. Mozley says in his great sermon on "War," "we may observe in the New Testament an absence of all disparagement of the military life." For example, there is presented no precept against war which is "mandatory in term, and in range universal." This is so, though the cases of the centurians at Capernaum and Caesarea, both of whom are spoken of with approbation, would have afforded occasion for such, if such had laid in the intent of our Lord

or of his ministers. Of the same significance is the fact that the frequent references made by the Apostles to the armor, weapons, and discipline of soldiers are unaccompanied by any denunciation of the military service in its own nature. As Dr. Storrs remarks in this connection, "The saying of our Lord to Pilate, 'if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight,' may imply that the forcible defence of secular rights was not regarded by him as otherwise than appropriate, as it certainly was usual." Indeed, most of the earlier, as many of the later, expositors of Christianity agree with Augustine in the main, that to fight is not necessarily a sin, though the object of war should always be the recovery of peace! That is, the New Testament adopts the Old Testament's position with regard to war. It does not say, as in the case of loose divorce, that war was permitted to the Hebrews because of "the hardness of their hearts," but that under the Gospel a new law was to prevail. On the contrary, it leaves the Old Testament position still in force. As Dr. Charles Hodge observes, "the lawfulness of war in itself it quietly assumes. Nay, it affirms it, at least by implication. "If magistrates," as we learn from the thirteenth of Romans, are armed with a power of life and death over their own citizens, they certainly have the right to declare war in self-defense." Hence, in order further to illustrate the position of the New Testament on this question, Dr. Hodge remarks: "No historical Christian church has pronounced all war to be unlawful. The Augsburg Confession expressly says that it is proper for Christians to act as magistrates, and among other things *bellare, militare*, etc. And Presbyterians especially have shown that it is not against their conscience to contend to the death for their rights and liberties (Sys. Theol. Vol. III. p. 367).

Yet while all this is so, one cannot read the New Testament and not feel that, even more than is true of the Old Testament, its spirit is against war. It presents Christ, its

great subject, as the "Prince of Peace": and if he does say of himself, "I came not to send peace but a sword," this as we have seen, does not mean that he is the cause of war or even that he approves it; it means only that the proclamation of the doctrine of peace must become the occasion for renewed antagonism on the part of that great spirit of evil from whom all wars ultimately proceed. It is an antagonism and consequent warfare for which the "Prince of peace" is no more responsible than medicine is to blame for the pain which often results on its application. The medicine is the occasion of the pain: it does not produce it; it is the disease that does that. So, too, the New Testament, no more really than the Old Testament, but more strikingly, emphasizes God's love for men. It tells us that he "is love" (1 Ep. John iv. 8). It presents him to us in Christ as love incarnate. It points to the cross as both the proof and the illustration of God's love for us. All this it does as the basis of a command that we men should love each other as he has loved us. What, then, must be the New Testament's attitude toward war, which many tell us has its only root in hate, the opposite of love?

Nay, the New Testament takes its stand against war yet more explicitly and emphatically. As Mozley says, "Christianity does not admit, indeed, but utterly denounces and condemns the motives which lead to war—selfish ambition, rapacity, tyranny and vanity." The hate whence they spring and which they further develop is always and entirely contradictory of the Christian spirit. How, then, in view of all this, it is asked, can the New Testament or Christianity leave any place for war? Surely we must conclude with James (iv. 1), that wars, whether between persons or between nations, come of our lusts that war in our members" and ultimately of the devil himself; and, consequently that war exists, only by God's permission, never with his approval. This, however, is not saying that Christianity and war are mutually exclusive. May it not be necessary to go

to war, if, as the context in James commands, we are "to resist the devil"? In a word, may not defensive war be a Christian obligation?

The negative of this position is seriously taken by the Society of Friends; and it is taken so seriously by them and is appropriated by so many individuals not claiming fellowship with them, as, for example, Count Leo Tolstoi, that we must pause briefly to consider it. What, then, is the issue between those who admit the obligation of defensive war and those who deny its lawfulness? The question is not as to the right and duty of resistance to evil. As to this there is no question. The weapons of truth, "the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God," the Friend would use as vigorously as the Presbyterian. Both agree that the truth should assail error and must prevail over it. Nor does the question concern the powerlessness of the sword in the sphere of the truth. The kingdom of God cannot be established by the weapons of carnal warfare. As Lactantius said, "Religion cannot be forced, and it should be defended, not by killing, but by dying" (*Inst.*). As to this, too, there is no difference between the Friend and the rest of Christendom. All agree that truth is the only power appropriate to the realm of the spirit. In it the use of physical force is always wrong, for it is always useless. It can decide which of two men or of two nations is the stronger; it can decide nothing as to which is right. The question, however, is, whether in the kingdom of this world, even as taken up and embraced by the Kingdom of Christ, physical force may not and should not be employed against physical force, whether the man whose life is threatened by the knife of the assassin or the nation whose rights and liberties are assailed by the armies of her neighbor may not and ought not to put up a defense of the same kind?

That they should is the position of the Christian Church as a whole; and that this position is true to Christianity herself is established, at least so it seems to us, by the following considerations:

First: The untenableness of the contrary position. This appears in its presuppositions. These are well presented in a paper on "Christian Non-Resistance" published, together with other essays, in 1912, in Edinburgh, by Hector Waylen. The first of these presuppositions is that our Lord himself never resorted to physical force, and, therefore, that his disciples never should do so. The premise in this reasoning need not detain us, though we must ask in passing, if Jesus did not use physical force when he made a whip of small cords and drove the traders from the temple, what did he use? and were not his miracles called "mighty works" because of the physical force which they exhibited? It is our author's conclusion which specially challenges attention. If Christ did not stand up against the evil man, does it follow that we should not? As we may not affirm that we should do or even may do all that he did, so neither may we infer from all he did not what we ought not to do. He is our infallible example, but he is not our example so far as his powers and situation and mission transcended or even differed from ours. As the divine Redeemer of the world, or even as the perfect Man, he could not be an example in all respects for sinners. Nor is it to the point that the New Testament nowhere explicitly affirms the right and the duty even of defensive war. It was with reference to Church order and ceremonial that Hooker said that Scripture by leaving out did not condemn, but only sent us back to the ground of reason and natural law; but this applies to the ethics of the Bible as well. By the absence of precepts requiring war we are debarred from claiming for it the absolute authority of Scripture, but we certainly are not justified in inferring that it is forbidden by it. The Scriptures recognize every truth of reason, every requirement of natural law. Our question, then, continues unanswered, and it can be answered only by an appeal to reason and natural law.

A second presupposition of the view that we are criticiz-

ing is that the early Church condemned military service; and that the early Church, because so near to the Apostolic age, reflects its spirit as the Church of no later day could do. Neither of these claims may be admitted unreservedly. A distant view is often juster as well as more comprehensive than a narrower view. We are only beginning to understand the Napoleonic wars. No one who is not a fool presumes to understand the causes of the present struggle. The authority of the early Church has been considerably overworked. Moreover, in this case there is a conflict of testimony. In the early church there would appear to have been two parties with regard to the lawfulness of military service. One affirmed its compatibility with the Christian calling; the other, probably at first the more influential, denied this. Thus, on the one hand, we have a powerful party which counted among its leaders Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Lactantius and Basil, who maintained that all warfare was unlawful for one who had been converted; and this opinion had its martyr in Maximilianus, who suffered death under Diocletian solely because, having been enrolled as a soldier, he declared that he was a Christian, and that, therefore, he could not fight.

On the other hand, there can be no question that many Christians from a very early date did enlist in the army, and that they were not cut off from the Church. The legend of the "Thundering Legion" attests the fact, and it is no other than Tertullian who asserts it. Indeed, he says expressly with reference to the Christian soldiers in the army under Marcus Aurelius, "We sail with you, we fight with you, we till the ground with you"; though he gives it as a reason why the Christians, though not fearing the sword, did not assail the persecuting empire, that in their religion it was counted better to be slain than to slay (Apol. 1, 42, 37). So, too, Augustine, perhaps the most prominent representative of this second position, writes as follows: "Do not think it impossible for any one to please God when en-

gaged in active military service." Then he brings up as examples David, the two centurions, and the soldiers who came to John for baptism, adding that John did not prohibit them to serve as soldiers when he commanded them to be content with their wages. Having said this, he proceeds, "Peace should be the object of your desire; war should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity, and preserve them in peace. Therefore, we in waging war should cherish the spirit of a peace-maker, that by conquering those whom you attack you may lead them back to the advantages of peace" (Ep. 189, 4, 6). That is, according to the greatest theologian of the early Church, defensive war is not wrong in itself.

This may have been, and we are inclined to believe was the real view of the opposite party. At all events, there is great weight in the remark of Dr. Charles Hodge that the reason of the early opposition of Christians to entering the army was that they thereby gave themselves up to the service of a power which persecuted their religion; and that idolatrous usages were inseparably connected with military duties. When the Roman empire became Christian, and the cross was substituted for the eagle on the standards of the army, this opposition died away (Sys. Theol. III, p. 367).

A further presupposition of the champion of non-resistance is that the resort to physical force destroys reliance on God. But why should this be true of physical force any more than of moral force or of intellectual force? Does not the power of the former depend on God as much as that of the latter? As a matter of fact, have not those who were most careful to keep their powder dry often been, as Cromwell's "Ironsides", those who based all their confidence on the Lord of Hosts? Again, we are told that the use of force means the exaltation of the physical above the spiritual. But need it mean this? Does the employment of a servant imply that he is set over his employer?

Once more, it is assumed that man is spirit only and therefore, that, as physical force cannot enter the realm of the spirit, there is no sufficient reason why it should be resisted. It cannot touch the man himself. But this is to take a view as unscriptural as it is unnatural. The Bible and nature both teach that a man is a created spirit in vital union with a physical organized body.

Finally, we are told, as by Prof. Bertrand Russell of Trinity College, Cambridge, that non-resistance is really the most effective resistance; that, for example, if the Allies had not resisted Germany, the latter would have withdrawn her demands and recalled her armies. This, however, is to attribute far too much, I do not say to depraved German nature, but to depraved human nature. It is, moreover, contrary to experience. The spirit of aggression has been stimulated, it has not been subdued, by submission. If you tell a robber he may take half your property, he will try to take the whole. We conclude, then, that the doctrine of non-resistance is untenable in its presuppositions.

It is, however, even more untenable in its consequences. Only two may be mentioned. One is that force should have no place in human affairs except when its use would be good for those on whom it would be brought to bear. Logically, this condemns all punishment, divine as well as human.

The other is that the doctrine of non-resistance must issue logically in submission to and even in co-operation with evil. To let the robber strip you of the property of which God has appointed you his trustee, to let the murderer destroy the life for which God holds you yourself responsible, to let him kill your brother whose keeper God has made you, to let other nations crush the nation of which God has constituted you a citizen, all of which the doctrine of non-resistance under consideration requires whenever, to prevent any of them, an appeal to force becomes necessary—what is this but to assist at the triumph of evil? It is not to suffer wrong patiently; it is to acquiesce in wrong, and so

to do wrong basely. Surely “resist not evil” cannot mean this, unless no other honest interpretation is in sight.

But one is in sight, even at hand. Our Lord in St. Matt. v. 39, *et seq.*, is referring, as the context indicates, to a common perversion of the *lex talionis*. What he would forbid in these verses is not the forcible punishment of the offender by the state, but the taking of the law by the individual into his own hands; not public justice but private revenge. Wrong under both dispensations, this is specially forbidden under the law of love which Christ is emphasizing and illustrating. From the standpoint of his own interest, therefore, the Christian is not to resist the evil man. So far as he himself is concerned, in his individual capacity, he is to love his enemy so much as to be ready to turn to him his left cheek when his right one has been smitten, to give to him his coat when he has taken his cloak, to go with him two miles when he has compelled him to go with him one. This, however, does not imply that he will always or often do this. It usually means that he will act quite otherwise. True love for his enemy will prevent his suffering that enemy to wrong himself, as he would do, were he to let him assault or rob or domineer over one who, like him, had done him no injury. But, in addition, no one can act solely in his individual capacity. He sustains also divinely established relations. He is a member of the state or institute of rights for the administration of justice. That is, he ought to resist and even to arrest the wrong-doer whom he himself as an individual has forgiven, and he ought to uphold his nation against the aggressions of other nations for whose soldiers as individuals he will strive to cherish love.

Here, then, in this twofold order, the order of grace and the order of nature, we have both the refutation of the doctrine of non-resistance and the explanation of that doctrine of war which the Christian Church has always held and which we would vindicate. Let us as we close refer to this twofold order, and specially to its implications.

1. There is an order of nature. That is, before all supernatural revelation, as that in Christianity, and independent of it, there is the universe. It owes its existence to God's creative act, and its constitution and laws "declare his glory and show his handiwork." Instead of being repudiated by subsequent revelation on God's part, it must condition it. He may manifest himself in ways quite beyond it, but he can neither set it aside nor contradict it. To do either would be to dishonor the work of his own hands and so to deny himself; and just because he is God, "he cannot deny himself" (2 Tim. 2. 13).

2. The order of nature in the sphere of human society includes certain great forms of existence—the family, the nation, the church. We call them institutes to indicate that they are not conceived by us, but are found by us already instituted in the divine purpose and in the constitution of society. They are not developed out of it, but they determine its development. Thus we are born into the family and into the nation and into the church. We do not make them, but they make us. Each one of them is necessary to the perfection of one of the essential elements of our nature. The family nourishes affection; the nation maintains justice; the church fosters religion. All three together make human society possible. Without all three together, its continuance would become impossible.

3. The nation involves as one of its essential rights the right of defensive war. But for this right, the nation could not exist. It cannot be the institute of rights, unless it can and may assert and maintain rights; and as, in the last analysis, right will be and can be set aside only by physical force or by deception, and as such force can not be met except by such force, the nation must have the right to appeal to physical force in defence of rights or it must go out of commission. As Elisha Mulford has said in one of the greatest books of our political literature, "The nation is the investiture on the earth of right with might; it is constituted

as a power in the moral order of the world and for the maintenance of that order. The right to declare and make war belongs only to the nation, and to that only as the minister of righteousness, the power which in its normal being is to assert justice against violence, and law against anarchy; and freedom against oppression" ("The Nation," p. 161).

4. This position is only strengthened by the attempts to set it aside. Thus it is urged that if individuals can settle their disputes peaceably before the courts, surely nations should be able to do so. But why is it that the settlement in the case of the individual can be and must be peaceable? It is just because, as Mozley remarks in his sermon on "War", "every judgment of a court is backed by the whole force of the nation as against the force of the individual who dissents." The defeated suitor, I may add, submits ordinarily, not because he approves the verdict, but because he prefers submission to going to prison. In a word, individuals are enabled to settle their disputes peaceably by the fact of being under a government that has physical power and that stands ready to use its physical power. The case under consideration does but illustrate and confirm the truth that in the end physical force can be met only by physical force. Be this as it may, we are asked, Why can not international disputes be adjudicated in the same peaceable manner? Why may there not be "a parliament of nations, a federation of the world"? Why can not the nations now at war be forced to submit their differences to the Hague Tribunal? Because that tribunal has not the physical power or the authority to compel submission on the part of the nations to its judgment. Why, however, does it not have the power and authority? Because the supreme universal government, which alone could have this power and authority, is not a part of the order of nature. This needs only to be studied for us to see that God has, in the political sphere, distributed men in separate nations, as, in the domestic sphere he has distributed them in different families;

and that any scheme of things that ignores the essential separateness and autonomy of the nation is as unnatural and ultimately as impossible as would be the attempt to merge all the families of the nation in one great national family. Plato did have such a plan, but he could not work it. In a word, it is not more clearly involved in the order of nature that individual nations should have the right and should be under the obligation to self defense than it is that such a union of all nations as would do away with the right and the obligation is against nature.

5. As might be supposed, the Bible, which reveals the order of grace, recognizes the order of nature. The Bible is supernatural; it is not preternatural. It nowhere takes exception to the world as God made it, and as it was when he pronounced it "very good" (Gen. i. 31). On the contrary, it builds on its constitution and it reenacts its laws. It recognizes its institutes. No book ever put such emphasis and honor on the family as does the Bible. No book ever taught so clearly the divine appointment and office of the individual nation as does the Bible. God, it tells us, "made of one every nation of men to dwell on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons and the bounds of their habitation (Acts xvii. 26). "Ordained of God", it declares, are "the powers that be", and it affirms the magistrate to be "God's minister" and to "bear not the sword in vain" (Rom. xiii. 1, 4). The Bible, then, adopts the order of nature, with all that in any case it necessarily involves, even the right of appeal to the sword itself. Is not this virtually a divine assertion of the right and obligation to defensive war?

6. Christianity, as might be expected, takes over the order of nature. She establishes the order of grace on it. No one of her characteristics is more striking than this. Her charge to her first disciples was that they should abide in the same calling wherein they were called. She commanded, for Christ's sake, obedience to rulers that were wicked men

and officers in a heathen and persecuting government. Nowhere does she set herself against nature or against what is necessarily involved in it. On the contrary, she teaches that "every creature of God is good and nothing is to be rejected if it be received with thanksgiving; for it is sanctified through the word of God and prayer (1 Tim. iv. 4). We conclude, therefore, because the nation is a part of the order of nature, and because the right and duty of defensive war is involved in the very conception of the nation as the institute of rights, and because the Bible in general and Christianity in particular adopts the order of nature with all that it truly implies—because of these considerations, we conclude that, while our religion utterly repudiates all wars of aggression, and while it condemns as strongly the spirit of hate in which even defensive war may be waged, it does not forbid defensive war itself, but may even be said to enjoin and sanctify it. It cannot be, consequently, that all participation in war is unchristian.

This conclusion is confirmed by the moral effect of war when carried on as the necessary means of obtaining or of maintaining justice. As Mozley well says, "One side, indeed, of the moral character of war is in special harmony with the Christian type—I refer to the spirit of sacrifice which is inherent in the very idea of the individual encountering death for the sake of the body to whch he belongs . . . it is this serious and sacred function which consecrates war. Without it, indeed, what would war be but carnage? with it war displays, in spite of its terrible features, a solemn morality. The devotion of the individual to the community stands before us in a form which, while it overwhelms and appalls, strikes us with admiration. That the nation may rise, the individual sinks into the abyss; he vanishes as a drop that waters the earth, yet he does not murmur; it is his function, it is his appointment, it is an end to which he is ordained, the member is bound to the body, the unit exists for the good of the whole." Is there

not something Christlike in such a spirit as this? How, then, may we say of what is fitted to produce, and does produce, such a spirit as this, that it and Christianity are mutually exclusive?

Again, as does almost nothing else, defensive war emphasizes the unique worth of the spiritual. It teaches and trains us to sacrifice wealth, health, comfort, family, even life, everything, for what we conceive to be the right. It develops us to prefer war with all its miseries to peace with dishonor. Is not such a discipline salutary? May it not be called for at a time like this when nothing is more significant and alarming than the fact that the opposition to war is being based largely on economic grounds, on the waste and misery that it involves rather than on the sin whence it proceeds and which it causes? Instead of being exclusive of Christianity, may not war be one chief way in which Christ would command attention to the things of the spirit? "Nothing," says James Martineau, "can well be further from the sentiment of Scripture than the extreme horror of force as a penal and disciplinary instrument which is inculcated in modern times. The reverence for human life is carried to an immoral idolatry when it is held more sacred than justice and right, and when the spectacle of blood becomes more horrible than the sight of desolating tyrannies and triumph of hypocrisies" (*Studies of Christianity*, pp. 345, 354).

Finally, in the case of Christians, do not the extreme horrors of war, if defensive and therefore right, foster the manifestation of the grace of Christ? They do not simply become the occasion for this, as any evil may; their inherent tendency is themselves to secure it, as no evil can. In a word, the spirit which prompts to such war and which it more and more develops is not merely one which Christ can overrule with good; it is one which in itself is congruous with his grace. There has been nothing finer in religious history than the famous letter of Cardinal Mer-

cier, Archbishop of Malines, to the Belgian people. Hear but a sentence or two: "Is it not true, my brethren, that God has the supreme art of mingling his mercy with his wisdom and his justice? And shall we not acknowledge that if war is a scourge for the earthly life of ours, a scourge whereof we can not easily estimate the destructive force and extent, it is also for multitudes of souls an expiation, a purification, a force to lift them to the pure love of their country and to perfect Christian unselfishness?" Can that which itself tends to promote so gracious a spirit as this be exclusive of Christianity? Nor is there force in the objections which some make much of, the objection that both sides appeal to God and claim that he is on their side. This demonstrates that both sides are Christian, but it proves nothing as to which side is right. It shows that both sides are Christian; for neither is willing to go into battle unless they can believe that Christ goes with them: but it signifies nothing as to whether their cause is just; for the best of Christians are imperfect, and only if they had fully "the mind of Christ," could they be sure that they either knew or appreciated his will. When Abraham Lincoln was reminded by a friend that God was on his side and that he ought not to worry as to the success of the armies of the Union, he replied in substance: "That is not the point; the point is whether I am on the Lord's side." If the governments of Europe had had more of our great President's humility, the war would never have been declared; its issues would now, doubtless, be in process of arbitration. This, however, is all that the facts warrant us in even conjecturing. As Mozley says, "Christians fight each other in full spiritual communion." In the order of grace they are all one church; in the order of nature they are of many nations: and the order of grace adopts the order of nature; so far from setting aside the rights and obligations of nature and so of nations, it is to them that it applies its ethics, and it is in relation to them and largely through them that it develops its life.

This concludes our argument. Many contend that the continuance of war proves "the failure of Christian ethics" and so of Christianity, because Christianity and war are mutually exclusive: and we have tried to show that, on the contrary, Christianity makes no claim as to the cessation of war; that the powerlessness of her ethics has not been established by the war, for she affirms no power of her ethics apart from the divine Christ from whom it has been divorced; and that they misconceive the attitude of Christian ethics toward war, who teach that it is never right to go to war.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## NOTES AND NOTICES

### THE STANDING STILL OF THE SUN (Joshua x. 12-14)

The very interesting interpretation of this famous passage suggested by Professor Wilson appears highly probable from the astronomical standpoint. It is unfortunately impossible to determine at what dates total eclipses of the sun were visible in Palestine during the probable period of the Hebrew conquest, without long and laborious calculations, which can not be undertaken at present. Oppolzer's *Canon der Finsternisse*, which gives exact details concerning the times and places of visibility of all eclipses since the year 1208 B.C. is not available for earlier times. It is however of interest to note that, between this date and the Christian Era, there were seven solar eclipses which were total, or very nearly so, in southern Palestine. The earliest of them, on September 30, B.C. 1131, was total shortly after noon in almost exactly the region of Joshua's battle. It seems quite probable therefore from the scientific standpoint that there may have been an eclipse in this same region several centuries earlier, which would satisfy all the conditions. Could this be established, it would throw most welcome light upon the chronology of this early period. It is very desirable that this question should be fully investigated; but in the present strenuous times the writer has not time for the heavy computations involved.

*Princeton University Observatory.*

HENRY N. RUSSELL.

### THE FLOOD OF WATERS (Genesis vi. 17)

This phrase has occasioned the commentators considerable difficulty. The entire sentence, literally translated, reads as follows:—"And I, behold, I am bringing (or, am about to bring) the flood (*hammabbûl*), waters upon the earth (*mayim 'al hâ'âres*), to destroy all flesh, wherin is the breath of life, from under heaven." These words are rendered in the AV and RV "the flood of waters," a rendering which seems clearly to violate one of the commonest rules of Hebrew syntax, according to which the noun in the construct state may not take the

article. The German rendering a "flood with waters" is better in this respect but if correct would probably require the presence in the Hebrew of a preposition or at least of the conjunction *waw*. The Vulgate reverses the order of words and renders *aquas diluvii*. But the LXX is perfectly literal as far as the syntax is concerned, reading *τὸν κατακλυσμὸν ὕδωρ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν*.

Various attempts have been made to explain this construction. Franz Delitzsch, for example, regarded two explanations as possible; that "waters" is in opposition to "flood" and therefore not in the genitive, or that *mabbûl mayim* is practically equivalent to a compound word "water-flood."

The difficulty has been increased by the uncertainty as to the meaning and etymology of the word *mabbûl*. Gesenius connected it with a root *yābhal* "to go forth," a derivation which is suggested by the rendering *diluvium* "deluge" of the Vulgate. Buxtorf on the other hand derived it from the root *nābhēl* meaning *quod omnia fecerit concedere*, cf. Gen. ix. 11. And in this he seems to have come very near to the truth. For in the Babylonian the root *nabālu* (Hebrew *nābhāl*) is used in the transitive sense of "destroy." One of the frequently occurring phrases, which the Assyrian kings used to describe the vengeance which they took upon their enemies contains this word, *abbul[=anbul]aqqur ina ishati ashru* I destroyed, I demolished, I burned with fire (their cities). The word *mabbûl* would then mean "destruction" (using the word in the active sense of destroying agency or instrument).

This rendering of the word *mabbûl* is of prime importance to an understanding of the syntax of the passage. For it is clear that if *mabbûl* simply means "destruction" and not "flood," the phrase "waters upon the earth" is most naturally to be regarded as an explanatory apposition added for the purpose of indicating more definitely and specifically the nature of the impending destruction. The main—indeed the only serious obstacle in the way of the acceptance of this explanation has been hitherto the general belief, based primarily on the general context and confirmed by the LXX rendering that *mabbûl* means "flood." And since the word "flood" (*κατακλυσμός*) is so much narrower in its signification than *mabbûl* as actually to limit it to the exact meaning, which the accompanying phrase "waters upon the earth" is intended to give to it, these

words considered as an explanatory apposition seem in consequence superfluous and even incomprehensible. But when we find that the Hebrew word means "destruction" and that it is consequently a much wider and more general term than "flood," this difficulty disappears and the reason for the adding of the explanatory phrase becomes at once apparent.

The explanation of the word *mabbûl* as meaning "destruction," is so appropriate that it has been quite generally accepted. But the clearing up of the etymology and meaning of the word by means of the Babylonian has opened up a new subject for discussion, namely whether *mabbûl* is to be regarded as a Hebrew word or as a word of foreign and probably Babylonian origin. The fact that it contains the transitive significance of the Babylonian verb might seem to favor the view that it is a Babylonian word and its being explained by the phrase "waters upon the earth" is regarded by some scholars as a confirmation of this view. Otherwise the explanation should be they think unnecessary. There is a tendency, therefore, to regard these words, or *mayim* alone, as a gloss. And the view has even been advanced that the word *mabbûl* may itself be a later insertion. But no one of these theories seems to be well founded.

There are several good reasons for thinking that *mabbûl* may properly be accepted as a Hebrew word. If it were of foreign origin, it would of course be most natural to trace it to the Babylonian, especially as it is the Babylonian which has supplied us with the best clue to its meaning. But this word does not occur in the Babylonian Flood-Legend, where if anywhere we would expect to find it. All the words<sup>1</sup> which are there used to describe the "flood" are entirely distinct from this one. Nor is it found elsewhere in Babylonian so far as the writer is aware. The word itself is of a nominal forma-

<sup>1</sup> The chief words are *abubu*, *mehu*, and *karashu*. The only one of these, which can be connected with the Hebrew is *mêhu* "storm-wind." For although the noun itself does not occur the verb from which it is probably derived is common to the Hebrew and Babylonian. Three other words *sharu*, *shamutu* *kibati* and *kabla*, which occur in the Bab. Flood-Legend cannot of course be connected with *mabbûl* in any way. The word *mîlu* flood derived from the verb "to fill" (Heb. and Bab.) does not seem to occur in the Flood-Legend, although found elsewhere in Babylonian.

tion, the *maqtūl*,<sup>2</sup> which is not of frequent occurrence in any of the Semitic languages, when used transitively.<sup>3</sup> It occurs in a few nouns in Hebrew; but does not seem to have been identified as yet in Babylonian, a fact which would indicate at least that it was of infrequent occurrence in the latter language. Much more decisive against its Babylonian origin is the fact that Barth's law<sup>4</sup> would require that as a Babylonian word it should begin with *n* instead of with *m*. Hence the fact that it is written *mabbūl* instead of *nabbūl* is an objection to the view that it is a Babylonian word. The strongest argument in favor of the Babylonian origin of the word is found of course in the fact that it is in the Babylonian and not in the Hebrew root that we find the transitive meaning which is clearly contained in the word *mabbūl*. But even this argument is not convincing since it is highly probable that this verb had in Hebrew the transitive as well as the intransitive meaning.<sup>5</sup> From the standpoint of philology it seems proper therefore to claim this word as genuine Hebrew.

The fact that the word *mabbūl* is explained by the phrase "waters upon the earth" is not a sufficient reason for maintaining that it is not genuine Hebrew, or that it, or the phrase, which explains it, is a gloss. For it has been pointed out that *mabbūl* as is clearly shown by its etymology is a term of very

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Barth, *Nominalbildung*, S. 257.

<sup>3</sup> It is of course the regular form of the passive participle of the first stem in the Arabic.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Delitzsch *Assyrische Grammatik*, S. 179.

<sup>5</sup> There are a number of verbs in Hebrew, which are used both transitively and intransitively. Several of them are used frequently in both senses. But others are used chiefly and sometimes almost exclusively in the one or the other sense. Thus *hāzaq* is only three times used transitively; *hāphak* only a few times intransitively. And since *nābhāl* is a comparatively rare verb (it occurs only about 20 times and about half of these instances are in Isaiah), which in the majority of cases is used in a single metaphor, the figure of the withered leaf or fading flower, there is nothing inherently improbable in the view that the verb was also used transitively by the Hebrews, although no examples of such a usage seem to occur in the O.T. The fact that the Imperfect of *nābhēl* is in *o* (*yibbōl*) and that the Participle (*nōbhēl*) has the active instead of the intransitive form is certainly in accord with such a view and may be said to favor, although it cannot of course be regarded as proving it.

broad and general meaning, which might readily admit of, and even require, nearer definition. If it means merely "destruction" the words "waters upon the earth" can properly be regarded as constituting such a nearer definition and need not be looked upon as intended to interpret a foreign word of doubtful meaning. The same argument holds good against the claim that "waters upon the earth" is a gloss. For nothing could be more natural than this use of a limiting phrase in immediate connection with a general term for the purpose of more precise definition and determination. The critics are so fond of finding duplicates or glosses in every narrative that it is only to be expected that they would seek one here. But the whole sentence, when properly interpreted is phrased in a manner so appropriate to the circumstances that it is hard to see on what grounds valid objections can be made to it.

The conclusion seems warranted therefore that *mabbûl* is properly to be regarded as a Hebrew word meaning "destruction," which preserves for us the transitive force, not found elsewhere in the O.T., of the verb *nâbhal*; that it was a word of such comprehensive meaning as to require, when first used to designate the Deluge, a word of explanation; and that it then naturally became the *terminus technicus* for that "destruction" without parallel.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

## REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

---

### PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

*The Will to Freedom: or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ.* Being the Bross Lectures Delivered in Lake Forest College, Illinois. By JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, D.D., Litt.D., of the Community of the Resurrection; Honorary Fellow of S. Catharine's College Cambridge. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. xviii, 320. \$1.25 net.

To the general public the name of Nietzsche means a bitter if not blasphemous attack on Christianity and Christian morals and the ideal of a Superman who wades through slaughter to a throne—a "Blond Beast" who is really, as one critic would have it, an *infra*-man, below the level of ordinary humanity. A sober and dispassionate study of Nietzsche is peculiarly timely at the present moment when his doctrines are credited in the popular mind with a large share of responsibility for the War. He has been called "the greatest single force among the spiritual shapers of new Germany," and we are told on good authority that the educated German soldier carries "Zarathustra" along with "Faust" and the New Testament in his knapsack. It is natural in the Allied propaganda that Nietzsche should be held up to reprobation, and that the religious discussion of "Nietzsche or Christ" should easily pass into the political discussion of "Deutschum or Christian civilization."

Dr. Figgis discusses the relation of Nietzsche to the War in a spirit of singular calmness and detachment. He is not at all sure that the philosopher would approve of the present contest or of its leaders on the German side. He points out, however, that Nietzsche's historical favorites were such men as Alcibiades, Cesare Borgia and Napoleon; that he specially admired the Prussian officer-corps; that his system, as Georg Brandes said, is a translation into ethics of the Bismarckian era; and that his gospel of power, while preached in the interests of culture, would sanction and encourage all manner of atrocities. As Dr. Figgis says: "An author must be judged, not by the actions which he directly enjoins, but by the kind of spirit which will naturally come of following on his lines. Nietzsche need not be held to have wished many of the things which have happened. Yet they may be the natural outcome of his prophecies."

People are "incurably personal," Dr. Figgis points out, and the assumption that they are machines or tools is the lie upon which Nietzsche's system is founded. At almost every point Nietzsche is opposed to Christianity, and in his scorn for it he exhausts the language

of vituperation. The New Testament is the worst of books, and the only estimable character in it is Pilate, and the only expression in it of any value is Pilate's question, "What is truth?" Christianity is criminality, and we are reminded that the danger to Christianity, if Nietzsche's principles should prevail, is more than academic. "Should these elements attain predominance as an ideal, a new outbreak of persecution is certain, and it will be as much more fiendish than the old as the present war is more barbarous than those of the eighteenth century."

In spite of all this Dr. Figgis finds a peculiar charm in Nietzsche, the secret of which is his style, and the tragic-heroic element in his personality. The literary expression of Nietzsche, obeying what he calls his Categorical Imperative, "Thou must write," is that of a soul on fire. He unites the dogmatism of a prophet with the imagination of a poet. As Külpe has said, he is "the Richard Wagner of German prose," and will be remembered as a master of style long after his warfare against Christianity is forgotten. Aside from his revolutionary teaching in morals, he was the mouthpiece of an evolutionary philosophy and an anti-intellectual revolt. In his statements that there is nothing in the world but Becoming, that knowledge is the instrument of power, and that truth is only a useful illusion, he anticipated some of the characteristic features of James' pragmatism and Bergson's creative evolution.

The charm of Nietzsche is the charm of his complex personality. He exemplified courage, the one virtue which he left untouched, and in an age of mediocrity and vulgar money-seeking he kept the sense of "the tragic and tremendous greatness of life." He presented in his religion of power and of culture the "paradox of the ungodly who yet worships, of the immoralist who preaches self-control, of the Antichrist who could mount the Cross, the iconoclast who could yet set up a religion." What, then, may the Christian learn from Nietzsche? He may learn that to give up Christ is to give up God, and to give up God is to worship self. He may learn that to give up Christian doctrine is to give up Christian morality, that between the church and the world there is an irreconcilable conflict, and that if Christian influence wanes, the old cry, *Christiani ad leones*, may again be heard. But the Christian may learn another lesson from the bitter tonic of Nietzsche's religion of valor. He may learn that the "muffled," easy-going, serving-God-and-Mammon kind of Christianity will not do. The Christian may learn from this arch-enemy of Christianity that risk and pain are needful to temper the steel of the spirit, that one should indeed "live dangerously" in a true sense, for "whoso saveth his life shall lose it," and that there is heroism and power as well as humility in Christianity's great word—faith.

Dr. Figgis has given us in these lectures an exceedingly timely, well-written and instructive account of a man whose career has the interest of tragedy, and of principles whose outworking has brought tragedy to the world.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

## GENERAL THEOLOGY

*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.* Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, with the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., Professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the United Free Church College, Aberdeen, and LOUIS H. GRAY, M.A., Ph.D., Sometime Fellow in Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York. Volume IX, *Mundas-Phrygians*. Royal 8o, pp. xx. 911. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribners' Sons. 1917.

The ninth volume of the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* presents, of course, the same external appearance as its predecessors. Despite the dislocations of the great war, it is still a marvel of good mechanical workmanship. We have fancied, it is true, that we could trace here and there the effects of the war in a slightly diminished perfection, say, of the proof-reading. They are rather bad slips, for example, by which on p. 294 "negro" is printed for "white"; on p. 319 "world" for "Word"; on p. 558, "predicted" for "predicated." The standard maintained, however, is remarkably high even in the manufacture of the volume. In its contents there is no falling off whatever. The volume contains nearly three-hundred articles, the product of nearly two-hundred writers. The most of these writers are, of course, British. About thirty of them however, are Americans; and about thirty more from the continent—including three Japanese. The most of the continentals naturally are French-speaking scholars, fourteen or so from France and three or four from Belgium. We are rather surprised to find six or seven Germans in the list: Drs. Dorner of Königsberg, Garbe of Tübingen, Graf of Quedlinburg, Hahn of India, Jolly of Würzburg, Mogk of Leipsig, and Grass of Dorpat—if we can include his name in the list. Doubtless their contributions were already in hand before the war interrupted communications between the countries: but it is pleasant to think of them still coöperating with their British colleagues in such a scholarly enterprise. Of the American contributors less than half can be classified, with the utmost stretch of the category, as theological writers: G. A. Barton, A. S. Carrier, W. O. Carver, A. T. Clay, H. DeW. Griswold, R. M. Jones, H. Malter, E. E. Nourse, L. B. Paton J. B. Peters J. D. Prince, E. F. Scott, E. D. Starbuck. We may perceive from this the wide scope of the *Encyclopaedia*.

Very few distinctively dogmatic subjects are dealt with in this volume. There are articles on Original Sin, Parousia, Passibility and Impassibility, Penance, Penitence, Perseverance, Perfection. The article on Original Sin has been committed to Dr. F. R. Tennant, no doubt just because he does not believe that there is any such thing. It gives a very clear summary of what he has elsewhere urged at length against the very notion. It is partly offset by a carefully prepared and interestingly written article by Mr. R. G. Parsons, on Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism from the standpoint of a moderate Augustinianism.

In contrast with the dealing with Original Sin the article on Christian Perfection has been placed in the hands of a convinced believer in the doctrine—Professor Frederic Platt of the Wesleyan College at Handsworth, Birmingham. He has treated the subject without acrimony, but without much illumination; and with notable dependence on Dr. W. B. Pope—than whom, of course, he could have found no better Wesleyan guide. It is borne in on the reader afresh, as he reads, that the great question raised by the perfectionists is just the perfection of perfection. Anybody can be perfect, if it be agreed that in order to be perfect you do not have really to be perfect; and no advocate of perfectionism succeeds in continuing permanently to maintain that men are ever really perfect in this life. We gain an impression from the closing section of his article that Professor Platt is inclined to fall in more or less with the view much pressed of late which articulates the perfection of the individual with the consummation of the kingdom of God. That is to fall in with Paul's teaching; Paul constantly refers our perfection to "that day." But it is also fatal to "perfectionism"; which is not willing that men shall wait until "that day" for their perfecting. The doctrine of Perfection is the Arminian substitute for the doctrine of Perseverance. It is the way in which the supernaturalness of salvation—the sense of which is ineradicably fixed in the Christian heart—finds expression among Arminians. It is a very inadequate expression of Christian supernaturalism, because, among other things, it is amissible. It therefore still leaves the salvation of the sinner in his own hands, and keeps him in fear of his life all his days. Thus, fear, not faith, becomes the psychological mark of the Christian. The contrasting doctrine of Perseverance is treated here by Professor D. S. Adam of Ormond College, Melbourne. It is not a very satisfactory article. There is some lack of clarity with respect to the doctrine of the will and its function in salvation, which mars the treatment at more than one point. The mistake here is twofold. The divine initiative in salvation is not dealt with seriously enough: there is even some talk of a free yielding to "the Spirit's influence in regeneration." And the place of human effort in sanctification is not firmly enough apprehended: there is even a tendency to parcel off separate regions in the process to the divine and human wills. Full justice is done thus neither to the divine will nor to the human will in that process which Paul with beautiful adequacy speaks of as a "leading" of the Spirit. Nevertheless Professor Adam both means right, and brings out fairly in the end the essential truth about the Christian life. This is that in it we work under the Spirit's leading and not the Spirit by our permission; and therefore, since it is the Spirit that leads,—not merely directs or guides but *leads*—there can be no doubt of the issue.

We can scarcely look upon the short article on Passibility and Impossibility by Principal R. S. Franks of Bristol as wholly competent. It combines the treatment of impossibility and immutability and of the impossibility of God and of Christ in a very confusing manner, and as a consequence gives no clear exposition of any of these topics. Princi-

pal Franks ascribes the origin of the impassibility of God to Greek philosophy, entering corruptingly into the thought of the early church, whose native view was that of God is a person, and because a person the subject of passions like those of other persons. As bearers of the notion of the divine passibility in the early church he can point, however, only to its chief heretical parties—the antagonistic parties of the Patripassians and the Arians, both cited, however, we must recognize, misleadingly. "Patripassians" was a nick-name given to the Monarchians with the intention that it should rankle; and it did rankle. The Arians thought of nothing so little as to humanize the unapproachable Godhead. The whole history of theology in the Patristic age is instinct with horror of any such idea as a passible God. It is to Aquinas that Mr. Franks attributes "the classical treatment of the divine impassibility," founding, as he says, on Aristotle: and in illustration he quotes a passage from Aquinas which deals, not with the divine impassibility, but with the divine immutability. At the close of the article the modern movement towards the assertion of divine passibility is adverted to, with allusions to Weisse's and Lotze's philosophical constructions and the theological dicta of A. M. Fairbairn, Richard Rothe and Albrecht Ritschl. If one wishes to see, however, this movement at its best, he would do well to turn over to the closing paragraph of Dean W. R. Inge's admirable article on Neo-Platonism and read his eloquent call for "an incarnational philosophy of religion." Mr. Franks says nothing of the Pessimists to whom suffering is the very essence of deity.

Having mentioned Dean Inge's valuable article on Neo-Platonism we are reminded that this is the volume for the Neo-s, ancient and modern. We have articles therefore on Neo-Cynicism, and Neo-Hegelianism, and Neo-Kantism, and Neo-Platonism, and Neo-Pythagoreanism—all good and informing. Neo-Realism has apparently not yet attracted the attention of the editors. Other systems of thought are also of course dealt with. There is an article on the Peripatetics and one on Pessimism and Optimism; there are articles on Pantheism and Mysticism; on Occultism and New Thought. There are also articles on heretical movements: on the Novatians, Nicolaitans, Ophites, Paulicians; on the Nestorians, and the Nihilianists. There are very few important biographical articles: but there are informing articles on Pascal, Newman and Nietzsche.

There is a long article on Paul, but none at all on Peter, not even one on the Peter-legend. This is too notable a fact to be permitted to pass unnoticed. If to have dominated the whole Christian world for a millennium and a half assures no place among the religious forces which are worthy of mention in such a historico-descriptive *Encyclopaedia*,—what will? The glory of Peter has departed, though the church which has built itself on that Rock remains until today the largest and most powerful organized body in Christendom. Paul has taken Peter's place in the minds of our modern guides as the originator of ecclesiastical Christianity. Instead of an article on Peter we have

now one on—the Papacy. This is, by the way, a very good, and a very trenchant one; although written from a Rationalistic rather than Protestant standpoint. The article on Paul bears the joint signatures of Professor Allan Menzies and the Rev. William Edie. It is written from a standpoint which allows to Paul only nine of his extant letters and finds little in Acts trustworthy beyond the “we passages” and especially the account of the journey to Rome. The construction of a life-history of Paul from this material is carried through with a good deal of unconvincing independence; and on the whole it would be difficult to write a more useless article on Paul. There is, however, no exploitation of Paul as the real founder of Christianity.

There is a very useful series of articles on Persecution. It should be noted, however, that the writers on Persecution by Christians show a regrettable tendency to confound persecution and spiritual discipline. This is especially true of Dr. W. T. Whitley who is kindled into burning zeal by sympathy with the sufferings of his Baptist forbears. But Mr. Fawkes, writing well of Roman Catholic persecution, is not free from the same tendency. It is quite possible, however, for the strictest spiritual discipline to be exercised by men of the most complete physical tolerance: and the Baptists themselves have given many very striking examples of this possibility. It is interesting to observe Mr. Fawkes expressing at the end of his article so great a suspicion and even fear of a majority church as to lead him to advocate, for the protection of others, an Erastian arrangement to keep it in check, whenever one religious body possesses a decided preponderance in numbers or influence in a State. Secular persecution of religion does not seem, however, decidedly preferable to religious persecution of rival sects; and it seems a bad plan to make all churches suffer wrong under the secular heel for fear that some may be discriminated against by others. For ourselves, we are for a free church in a free state.

There are three outstanding articles on political philosophy. These are on Nationality, Patriotism, Neutrality. It is a sign of the times that they have all been committed to women. We are not prepossessed by the way Mrs. Sophie Bryant begins her article on Nationality. It is by a definition. The definition runs thus: “Nationality is that quality or complex of qualities in a group of persons which combines them in a nation.” As one might say, beauty is that quality or complex of qualities in an object of contemplation which makes it beautiful; or redness is that quality or complex of qualities in an object by virtue of which it is red; or, perhaps, emptiness is that quality or complex of qualities in a definition, say, which makes it empty. We can get along famously at this rate, and reel off definitions of everything in heaven and earth, whether we know what they are or not. It is only fair to add that the article, although never rising above the commonplace, does rise above this inauspicious beginning: it is a pleasant enough little talk on the national consciousness. It is a pity that the same writer was set to write also on Patriotism. She had said her say under the caption of Nationalism, and can only say it over again here, transposed

an octave higher. Patriotism, she defines, as just "the sentiment in which consciousness of nationality normally expresses itself"; or, more precisely, a "consciousness of nationality together with the will to realize such nationality further," a definition in its more precise form neither sufficiently broad, nor even within its own limits very clear. One question of more than ordinary interest is raised—the possibility of intense national consciousness, expressing itself in patriotic sentiment of great strength, without a country. The Jews and the Irish are adduced as examples. Are either really—to their own consciousness—without a country? And what would be the effect of washing thoroughly out of their minds the memories that consecrate to them Judea and Erin? Miss Campbell-Smith's article on Neutrality is of a different order. It confines itself to a brief but clear summary of the recognized law of neutrality. It is interesting to observe that such a law is a modern invention. There was a time when there was no such thing as neutrality: men with arms in their hands did precisely what seemed good in their own eyes and no one asserted rights in restraint of them. The rise of a law of neutrality is, no doubt, largely the effect of the increasing power of commerce. But it is enheartening to observe that the purely moral sentiment has entered ever more and more into consideration. To the man in the street the fundamental principle is apt to take the form of the assertion that belligerents acquire by their belligerency no rights whatever against non-belligerents; and by invading any right of a non-belligerent automatically turn it into a belligerent. If war once seemed the normal state of mankind, and peace abnormal, now that men have come to their senses and perceived the reverse to be the fact, it would seem that the first duty of neutral states is to see to it that belligerents confine their acts of war strictly to one another. This of course could be accomplished only by what would be equivalent to a defensive league of neutrals in every war. But a long step forward in conquering peace for the world would be taken if it could come to be understood that the invasion of the rights of any neutral power by a belligerent would automatically turn, not that neutral only, but all neutrals, into belligerents against the offender. Think but what would have happened, if it had been clearly understood that the invasion of Belgium's neutrality would have automatically made the whole neutral world belligerents in its defence. America is in the present world-war ultimately in defense of the rights of neutrals: but unhappily she entered it, and that only with regrettable tardiness, only in defence of her own outraged neutral rights. What is to be devoutly hoped is that the inviolability of neutral rights, as it is for us the real issue, may be also among the actual gains of the war.

The interesting article on Negroes in the United States by Professor W. O. Carver of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, is very informing, although not quite stringently scientific in its mode of treatment. Its standpoint is determined by the associations of its writer. It cheerfully contemplates the permanent residence, intermingled in Democratic America, of two races, separated from one an-

other by impassible social barriers, each possessed of an ever more intensified race-consciousness and following without regard to the other its own race-ideals. This is to look upon the negro as (according to one current theory of the nature of cancerous growth, at any rate) just a permanent cancer in the body politic. We may suspect that it is a not unaccountable feeling of race repulsion that impels Dr. Carver to repel with sharp decision the forecast that amalgamation of the races must be the ultimate issue. With continued white immigration and the large death rate of the blacks working a progressive decrease in the proportion of the black population to the white, is it not natural to look forward to its ultimate absorption? That is to say, in a half a millennium or so? That is not, however, our problem: for us and our children and children's children the two races in well-marked differentiation will form constituent but disproportionate elements in the one State. What we have to do, clearly, is to learn to live together in mutual amity and respect and helpfulness, and to work together for the achievement of our national ideals and the attainment of the goal of a truly Christian civilization. It is to this that Dr. Carver rightly exhorts us in his closing words. It is in effect an exhortation to political and social,—if not yet to racial—amalgamation. After all, we are, for better, for worse, bound up together in one bundle of life.

We shall leave in the reader's mind a very inadequate impression of the variety and value of the contents of this volume. The ethnological, anthropological, scientific, philosophical articles, on which we have not touched, constitute the major portion of its contents. We must leave it, however, at this point.

*Princeton.*

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

---

## APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

*The Gospel of Buddha*, Compiled from Ancient Records by PAUL CARUS. Illustrated by O. Kopetzky. 8vo; pp. xx, 311. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1917.

This very attractive volume should serve a good purpose in making the world acquainted with the traditions and stories concerning the founder of one of the great religions of the world. It should not, however, be compared with the Christian Gospels; not even with the fourth Gospel, though it has been the aim of the compiler and editor "to treat his material in about the same way as he thinks that John utilized the accounts of the life of Jesus of Nazareth." The two belong to entirely different categories. The Christian Gospels are narratives by eye-witnesses. As to the life of Buddha, however, not a single contemporary voice has come down to us, whether of friend or enemy, which should directly assure us of a single fact. What we probably do know on the subject is only by way of inference from authorities none of whom can be proved to have lived when he lived.

Christianity is a fact—that must be granted or all history must be repudiated. Buddhism is but a philosophy, and a most unphilosophical one at that.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*A System of Natural Theism.* By LEANDER S. KEYSER, D.D., Professor of Theism, Ethics and Christian Evidences in Wittenberg College and of Systematic Theology in Hanna Divinity School, Springfield, Ohio. Author of "A System of Christian Ethics," "The Rational Test," "A System of Christian Evidence," "Election and Conversion," "Theological Outlines and Theses," etc. 8vo; pp. 144. Burlington, Iowa: The German Literary Board, 1917.

This work has for its motive "to furnish a book for readers everywhere who may wish to have at hand the arguments by which the dangerous tendencies to agnosticism and materialism may be counteracted. The author is especially anxious that the book may find its way into the curricula of many of the colleges of our country, whether in Church or state institutions, so that our educated youth may be thoroughly grounded in theistic belief, and may be saved from plunging into the maelstrom of materialistic science. The work might also be used as a supplementary text or reference book in the department of Apologetics in theological seminaries."

This excellent motive is matched by the volume which it has called forth. Dr. Keyser has given us a book of which he has no reason to be ashamed. It is clear, concise, usually up-to-date, comprehensive and convincing. Its bibliography is restricted to treatises in English, but it is specially valuable because it both includes and is limited to the best of these. Peculiarly happy is its statement of Mr. Balfour's "Esthetic Argument." We admire, too, particularly in view of modern tendencies, our author's refutation of Idealism and his able insistence on Dualism. We could wish that he had discussed Pluralism, which Professor James made so fashionable; and we do not see why in his theodicy he has simply passed over the question of moral evil or sin. True, it cannot be answered; but that is no reason why all that can be said to help us endure its mystery should not be said.

We hope that Dr. Keyser's aim in the preparation of this volume will be fully realized.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Philosophy of Christian Being.* By WALTER E. BRANDENBURG, A.M. 8vo; pp. 148. Boston: Sherman, French & Company, 1917.

The purpose of these thoughtful papers is to evince the harmony between philosophy and Christian teaching, or to illustrate the reasonableness of Christianity. This the author would do, not by getting rid of miracles, but by attempting to show that it would be altogether against nature were we not to have the great miracles which are the foundation facts of the Christian religion. And his attempt is successful. He has constructed an argument which is as valid as it is striking.

Not that the reviewer can accept every one of his positions. For example, his doctrine as to "the baptism of the Holy Spirit," that this baptism was confined to the Apostles and that, consequently, "the Holy Spirit is to be received now through the natural processes and natural laws for the development of the kingdom." This may conform to the analogy which the author is working, but is it confirmed by Scripture? Certainly John iii gives no such teaching. According to it, no one is a Christian who has not been "born again" and "born from above," and so every Christian must be a miracle of grace. He is not an evolution of the life supernaturally communicated to the apostles: he is equally with them and as really as they "a new creature." He lacks the miraculous gifts which were restricted to the Apostles, but as truly as they he has received a supernatural baptism. It is not the case "that you and I may or may not be Christian, whereas the Apostles 'had to be so.'" We equally with the Apostles and the Apostles equally with us, are Christians, if we are so, because of irresistible grace.

The only chapter that is seriously open to adverse criticism is the first. In it the writer makes the impossible and, as it seems to the reviewer, the absurd attempt to ground Christianity in absolute idealism.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*Why I Believe the Bible.* By DAVID JAMES BURRELL. 199 pp., 12mo. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.00 net.

The reasons why Dr. Burrell believes the Bible are set forth in twenty-one brief chapters, each of which describes some characteristic of the Bible or gives some illustration of its influence in the life of the individual or the nation. And he does this with the vigor and down-rightness we would expect of him. He begins with the Antecedent Presumption of such a truthful revelation of God's nature and purpose, and then passes on to the Bible's Claim; its Unaccountable Unity, that is, unaccountable on any other theory than its divine origin; its Completeness; its Sufficiency, its Literary Value; its Up-to-date-ness: its Tone of Authority; its Trustworthiness. These are the topics of the first nine chapters. The last is on the Indestructibility of the Bible, a good terminal theme. The author is at his best in his exposition of the parable of Dives and Lazarus, which constitutes Chapter V, on the Bible's Sufficiency. The brevity of treatment reaches its climax in the chapter on the Plan of Salvation, which covers little more than three pages. Conceding the possibility of errors due to frequent transcriptions, and speaking of both the written Word and the incarnate Word, he says: "Notwithstanding all errors in transmission, the Word in both cases remains in such substantial perfection as to be effective for the accomplishment of its purpose" (p. 123). It is a terse and readable book, calculated to confirm the faith of those who believe, and giving food for thought to those who do not believe the Bible.

*Princeton.*

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

## EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

תורה נבאים וכותבים. The Holy Scriptures according to the Masoretic Text. A New Translation with the aid of Previous Versions and with Constant Consultation of Jewish Authorities. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America. 5677—1917.

This version has been prepared for the use of English-speaking Jews. Accordingly, for their convenience 1. The books are arranged in the order found in the Hebrew Bible. 2. The Pentateuch is divided not only into the customary chapters and verses, but also into fifty-four sections, in accordance with the custom of reading these parts consecutively in the synagogue Sabbath by Sabbath in order that the whole Pentateuch shall be read in public worship in the course of every recurring year. The caption of these sections, and also the Jewish designation of the several books, are printed in Hebrew letters. 3. The Masora directs that whenever the books of Isaiah, Twelve Prophets, Lamentations, and Ecclesiastes are read in the synagogue the last verse but one shall be repeated after the final verse, because the latter sounds too harsh. Accordingly at the end of each of these four books the last verse but one is reprinted as the closing words, but is distinguished as a repetition from the book itself by being set in small type.

The translation is prevailingly given in the words of the American Revised Version, as found in its text or on its margin. Of course, in accordance with Jewish custom the title *Lord* is regularly substituted for the ineffable name of God. Once, however, and appropriately the name is reproduced in Hebrew letters (Ex. vi. 3). Older forms of words have in some cases been discarded in favor of the modern form; thus *spoke* is used instead of *spake*, *hasten* instead of *haste*. The change of *sware* to *swore*, while it is consistent, is less happy, since the older form has a distinctly religious connotation acquired through its use for centuries in the English versions. "Thou shall not murder" sounds harsh; but in view of Jer. vii. 9 is not to be condemned utterly. Consistency does not require it, since the Hebrew verb is not so rendered in 1 Kin. xxi. 9, "Hast thou killed, and also taken possession?", and Hos. iv. 2, where the reference is to murder of the foulest kind, nor in Num. xxxv. 27 and Deut. iv. 42, a law concerning a man who has killed a fellow-man unintentionally. "He shot up right forth as a sapling" (Isa. liii. 2) is not English at all. As an example of infelicity in the choice of English words the translation of Gen. xv. 5, 6 may also be mentioned: "'Count the stars, if thou be able to count them'; and He said unto him: 'So shall thy seed be.' And he believed in the *Lord*; and He counted it to him for righteousness." The word *count* is used in two different senses in contiguous verses, and is made to serve for the translation of two different words in the Hebrew. The Hebrew verb used in verse 5 might well have been rendered *number*, as it is in the Revised Version, since in this Jewish version it is so rendered in a similar connection in

Jer. xxxiii. 22, and in passages like Gen. xvi. 10, xxxii. 12 and Job xxxviii. 37 and xxxix. 2; or in verse 6 the Hebrew verb there employed, instead of being translated by the English verb counted, might consistently have been rendered by a more suitable verb, such as accounted, as it is translated in Gen. xxxi. 15, Isa. xl. 17, Hos. viii. 12; or reckoned, as in Lev. xxv. 31; or imputed, as in Lev. vii. 18. xvii. 4, 2 Sam. xix. 20.

In the translation "straight paths" (Psa. xxiii. 3) rabbinical interpretation has been followed too closely. A specific thought, not in the mind of the psalmist, is suggested to the English reader. The Hebrew word translated "straight" is nowhere used in the Scriptures in the physical sense of straightness. The word expresses the idea of rightness; and in paraphrasing it by an English adjective "right" is the proper word to employ. The psalmist says, "He guideth me in right paths for his name's sake." Such is the drift of modern exegesis. In the prophecy of Immanuel (Isa. vii. 14) the rendering adopted is: "Behold, the young woman shall conceive." The word virgin is properly rejected. It is too explicit. In Zech. vi. 11 the version given is: "Take silver and gold, and make crowns, and set the one upon the head of Joshua." The two words "the one" are not in the Hebrew text, and are not marked as supplied. In the Revised Version the word "them" is supplied, but not italicized as such. The plural may be inferred from the context; the crowns being probably combined, as in the double crown worn by Pharaoh as ruler of both Upper and Lower Egypt. If the Jewish translation is intended to separate one crown and to allude to it as alone placed on the high priest's head, the procedure is violent. The 13th verse is translated: "And there shall be a priest before his throne." The preposition "before" should be "upon," as in the preceding clause. When this correction has been made, the translation is recognized as allowable on the margin of the Revised Version. Yet even this translation does not meet the exegetical demands made by the marked coördination of the verbs in this verse. The matter is important, and should not have been ignored. The omission of all mention of the alternative rendering, even in a marginal note, shows a bias from which the Revised Version is free. The translation offered for Isa. ix. 5 is: "And his name is called Pele-joez-el-gibbor-abi-sar-shalom"; and the margin states that the name means "Wonderful in counsel is God the Mighty, the Everlasting Father, the Ruler of peace." This construction of the name was advocated by the Jewish scholar Luzzatto about sixty years ago, but has been rejected by modern scholarship, by learned men of all shades of opinion. Isa. liii. 10 and 11 are translated: "Yet it pleased the LORD to crush him by disease; to see if his soul would offer itself in restitution, that he might see his seed, prolong his days, and that the purpose of the LORD might prosper by his hand: of the travail of his soul he shall see to the full, even My servant, who by his knowledge did justify the Righteous One to the many, and their iniquities he did bear." The words "to see" and "that" are not in the Hebrew text,

and their introduction into the translation alters the meaning of the prophet. The use of the past tense to translate the verbal forms in the second half of verse 11 is unwarranted, and it is inconsistent with the translation of the same forms by the future tense in the former part of verse 11 and in verse 12. And as a rendering of the Hebrew text of verse 11, what is offered, namely "even My servant, who by his knowledge did justify the Righteous One to the many," is a private interpretation, and has no recognition by exegetical scholarship.

From Psa. vii. title, "concerning Cush a Benjamite," *dibre* has been omitted in translation, doubtless accidentally.

Jews and Christians have the same Hebrew Scriptures. Why not also the same English version? Nothing has been gained by a new translation: the language of the Revised Version has usually been adopted; some words have been given a more modern form, but often in other changes the purity of the English has suffered. It is regrettable that the leaders of Judaism did not adopt the recent Revision, either in the American or in the English form, print both the text and the marginal notes which record legitimate variant translations, and, in cases which they might deem necessary, include yet other renderings, arrange the books in the order most familiar to their people, and divide the text into sections for convenience in the service of the synagogue.

*Princeton.*

JOHN D. DAVIS.

*Il Nuovo Testamento ei Salmi.* Firenze, Societa Fides et Amor Editrice, MCMXVII.

Professor Giovanni Luzzi of Florence rendered a notable service to the Church by his translation of the New Testament, which was published by the Society "Fides et Amor" in 1911. He has increased greatly the value of his labor by adding to this "Third Edition" of the Testament a new translation of the Psalms. As in the case of the New Testament the translation is prefaced by an introduction from the pen of Professor Luzzi and is accompanied by extensive footnotes, on all the pages, by the same author. The work is certain to prove of very wide helpfulness, and of abiding worth.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

---

## HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

*Protestantism in Germany.* By KERR D. MACMILLAN, President of Wells College. Princeton University Press. 1917. 8vo; pp. viii, 282.

An intended effect, as Janet in his work on Final Cause well says, is a compromise between the final cause and the efficient causes which have produced it. No finite being, under the complex conditions of time place and circumstance, ever quite actualizes his own ideal. Of this

broad truth no more striking illustration appears in European history than the development of Church order in the Protestant Churches of Germany. The idea which took possession of Martin Luther and his associates, when contemplating the organization of Evangelical congregations in Saxony, with a view to propagating the rediscovered gospel and nourishing the Christian life, was "the priesthood of all believers"; the truth, that is to say, that no Christian can offer to God a sacrifice or an intercession which every other Christian is not equally invested with the privilege of presenting with the same ground of hope in its acceptance. The enthusiasm of Luther as, under the inspiration of this great New Testament truth, he and his co-workers thought of establishing Christian congregations, can well be imagined. But it was not long before the necessity of compromise became imperative. The popular ignorance, the fanaticism of theologians, the revolt of the peasants, the demands of the feudal lords, the prerogatives of the rulers, the progressively diminishing enthusiasm of the Protestants, the sharp theological controversies and the pressure of the Counter-Reformation appeared, sometimes in succession and often simultaneously, as efficient causes compelling the great idea of the priesthood of all believers to make compromise after compromise, until today that idea in the German Protestant churches is utterly submerged, if it has not been altogether destroyed, as an organizing ecclesiastical force, beneath the iron regulations of the Territorial System. The contrast between the self-governing assemblies of Christians conceived at the Reformation and the State-bound Churches of today is so marked as to recall Shakespeare's contrast between the vessel sailing and returning; the "scarfed bark" putting forth from her native bay "hugged and embraced" by the breeze, and finally returning "lean, rent and beggared by the strumpet wind."

It is this historical movement that Dr. Macmillan presents in the volume before us, bearing the rather too large and indefinite title "Protestantism in Germany" which, we think, covers a great deal more than he undertakes to treat. He discusses his subject in eight chapters: 1. The Personal Influence of Luther. 2. The Early Views of Luther regarding Church Government. 3. The Abandonment of Self-Government. 4. The Establishment of the Territorial System. 5. Theories and Practice. 6. The Nineteenth Century. 7. The Effects of the Territorial System upon the Church. 8. Other Effects of the Territorial System.

Dr Macmillan tells us that he brought to the preparation of the volume a cordial liking for the Germans, and a sincere admiration for the qualities which have made them in many high spheres of thought and action a great and efficient people. This "liking and admiration" were awakened and increased by his life as a student among them. He has strongly pronounced views as to the influence on German character exerted by German Church order. And these views he sets forth in the preface with a frankness which leaves nothing to be desired. The

reader's interest in the discussions that follow it will, we are sure, not be diminished by the author's introductory words. As for the discussions themselves, the reader will find himself listening to a lecturer who is thoroughly in possession of the sources and literature of his subject, who is deeply interested in it, and who has been able to invest it with interest for hearers or readers, by its admirable organization and his clear, strong and incisive style.

To form an intelligent judgment as between the conclusions of Dr. Macmillan and of those German writers whose views he criticizes,—for example, Rieker, *Die rechtliche Stellung der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands*—one must have made of the subject a special study; and this the present writer has never done. In a general way, however, it may be said, that in historical discussion the affirmative and negative are not so sharply defined as they are in abstract debates. One's final judgment is quantitative rather than severely qualitative. The final answer is "less" or "more," and not quite "yes" or "no." And so it may happen that both Dr. Macmillan and Dr. Rieker have good grounds on which to rest their conclusions. For in history, as in life of which it is a transcript, "probability," as Bishop Butler tells us, "is the guide."

One thing is clear, and will be to every reader of Dr. Macmillan's volume; and that is, that he has given us a very able, scholarly, interesting and timely book, which does honor to the valuable series of Lectures on the Stone Foundation of which it formed one of the courses.

*Princeton.*

JOHN DEWITT.

*Q. Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Apologeticus.* The text of Oehler annotated, with an Introduction, by JOHN E. B. MAYOR, M. A., Professor of Latin in the University of Cambridge, Fellow and President of St. John's College, with a translation by Alex. Souter, B.A., Regius Professor of Humanity in the University of Aberdeen, Late Scholar of Gonville and Caius College. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1917. Pp. xx, 496. Price 12s. 6d.

Interest in this edition of Tertullian's *Apology* naturally centers in Mayor's notes. The text of Oehler is retained and departure from it in the translation following Mayor's preference is indicated in footnotes or in the table of variants. Souter's translation is printed on the right, the text on the left; and had the notes been printed at the bottom of each page the arrangement would have been excellent. In fact, the separation of the notes from the text is the most serious formal defect of the book. The notes would profit by further editorial revision in the interest of uniformity in printing. Souter's translation is good. It was not to be expected that it would altogether escape the obscurity of its original. In several instances a freer paraphrase would have made the sense clearer.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

## SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

*What did Jesus really teach about War?* By EDWARD LEIGH PELL, Author of "Our Troublesome Religious Questions," etc. 8vo; pp. 180. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1917.

We believe that our author answers, and answers correctly, this pertinent and pressing question. By considering what Jesus himself was and how he was situated as well as what he said, he shows conclusively that his teaching was the denial and the refutation of pacifism. Indeed, we do not know of a more convincing exposure of the folly and sin of the Pacifist position, and we doubt if one exists.

This is not to say that we accept every statement of the writer. For example, the reviewer has not found among young men that unwillingness for service at the front to which the author alludes and which, by implication at least, he scores on pages 107 and 108. On the contrary, it seems to us that the youth of the nation almost to a man can see no other place for service than the front. Again, in the admirable chapter on "The Value of Human Life," is it quite accurate to identify the desire for comfort and luxury with the love of life: the former is often the great enemy of the latter. Is it, too, altogether just to speak slurringly of the blessed discovery of ether? It is stupidity, not heroism, to bear unnecessary pain. Nor does our hearty endorsement of the book mean that it is all that it ought to be any more than that it is nothing that it ought no to be. It could be improved by addition as well as by omission. Thus the discussion would be much strengthened by a more searching consideration of why the use of physical force is wrong. According to the more intelligent Pacifist, this is not because resistance is wrong. It is rather because the use of physical force is ineffective. For example, it was claimed at the beginning of the war by Prof. Bertrand Russell that for England to allow Germany to invade her and capture London would disarm and so defeat Germany. She could not continue to fight if England would not. This might be so, but she could continue to annex. In a word, non-resistance may prevent blows, but it does not frustrate the purpose of blows.

These criticisms, however, concern only incidentals. The book as a whole is good almost beyond praise, and we bespeak for it the widest circulation and the most careful reading.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

*The Secret and Imminent Coming of Christ.* By I. M. HALDEMAN, D.D. Pastor of the First Baptist Church, New York. Charles C. Cook, New York. 1917. Pp. 71.

This pamphlet is one of a series of sermons on The Second Advent, preached in New York by Dr. Haldeman.

He seeks to prove that the Second Coming of Christ is "two fold in order." He is to come, first, secretly and suddenly for His Church

At this coming He will take the Church out of the world which will grow rapidly worse for a period. Then Christ will come again with His Church to judge the world and set up His millenial reign.

The method of dealing with the Scripture is similar to that illustrated in the sermon which was reviewed by this Review in the number for October 1917.

*Seventh Day Adventism.* By WILLIAM EDWARD BIEDERWOLF. Glad Tidings Publishing Co., Chicago. 1917. Pp. 47.

This is a small pamphlet containing a criticism of the views of the Seventh Day Adventists. The author not only points out how the predictions of the Second Advent have failed, but also shows the folly of such calculations. He criticises also other positions of some of the Seventh Day Adventists such as the doctrines of soul-sleep and the annihilations of the wicked.

*Swedenborg: and the Evidence of the Truth of His Teaching.* By JOHN HOWARD SPALDING. New-Church Book Association, Philadelphia. 1917. Pp. 45.

This pamphlet presents under eight heads what the author believes to be the evidence for the truth of the theological views of Swedenborg. The greater part of the pamphlet consists of a reprint of the first and last chapters of the author's book entitled *The Kingdom of Heaven as Seen by Swedenborg*.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

*The Christian Religion In Its Doctrinal Expression.* By EDGAR YOUNG MULLINS, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Theology in The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. Roger Williams Press, Philadelphia, Boston, St. Louis, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Toronto. 1917. Pp. 514.

Systematic treatises on Theology are quite rare at the present time. After an experience of eighteen years as a teacher of Systematic Theology, Dr. Mullins has published this volume which covers the entire range of Christian Theology. To what school of theology the author belongs, it is difficult to say. Indeed he might think that an attempt to classify him was evidence of a "mechanical" mode of treating his doctrinal views.

It would require too much space to give an outline of his system of doctrine in all its compass. We shall attempt only to bring out some of the salient features of the book.

The order and arrangement of his topics is determined by his view of the nature and task of theology. Religion is "man's relation to the divine Being." "It is a form of experience and life. It is an order of facts." Theology is defined as being "the systematic and scientific explanation of this order of facts." In another place Christian Theology is said to be the doctrinal expression of the Christian religion. Accordingly Dr. Mullins calls his method experimental. But he says that Christian experience is not the sole source of knowledge in Chris-

tian Theology. The revelation of God in Christ as recorded in the Bible is also given a fundamental place. There are, then, two principal sources of knowledge of God,—Jesus Christ and Christian experience.

Hence, after discussing religion and theology, Dr. Mullins treats of Christ as the revealer of God, and then sets forth the nature and content of Christian experience.

After showing how Christian knowledge arises out of Christian experience, the author sets forth the relation of Christian knowledge to other forms of knowledge. Since the fundamental nature of his method is experiential, Dr. Mullins says that we must begin the system of Christian doctrine with the discussion of the Deity and Person of Christ, and with the doctrine of the Trinity, as lying close to Christian experience, and then follows the doctrine of God, of Sin, of the "saving work of Christ," of the Plan of Salvation and Election, of the Application of Redemption and of Eschatology.

In all this Dr. Mullins appears to seek to set forth a modified Calvinism, which shall not lapse into Arminianism, and at the same time be free from what he terms the "mechanical" and "abstract" character of what he calls "old Calvinism," which, let it be said at once, is just Calvinism pure and simple, though Dr. Mullins has not always stated its positions with fairness and discrimination.

We can best get some idea of the author's theology by showing the points in which he modifies the doctrines of the entire Christian Church, and those of Calvinism in particular.

Before doing this, however, a word must be said concerning the author's use of Christian experience in theology, and his view of the nature of theology. His view on the former subject is not clear, and on the latter it is unsatisfactory.

To begin with the latter point—theology, we believe, cannot be defined as the science which deals with the facts of Christian experience and life. This would result in reducing theology to a branch of the science of religion. Dr. Mullins believes that theology has to do with God and His relations to the world and man; he believes that revelation has a fundamental place in theology; but it will be difficult to maintain this unless we have a more adequate definition of theology. Religion and theology are distinct products of God's self-revelation to man. Dr. Mullins does not fall into the mistake of confusing or of identifying them, but he appears to leave no room for theology as an independent science, since he makes religion and the Christian religion its object or subject matter.

This is due to want of clearness on the former point—his view of the place of Christian experience in theology. He does not follow Schleiermacher in seeking to make explicit the doctrinal element in the Christian consciousness, nor that of Frank in attempting to infer the nature of the causes of Christian experience, nor yet that of Kaftan in seeking the knowledge involved in the Christian faith. Indeed at times Dr. Mullins seems to mean only that the theologian must be a Christian and possess a Christian man's experience in order spiritually

to discern and comprehend the doctrines given by revelation. Such a view we believe to be true, but scarcely to represent what might be called an "experimental method" in theology. At other times, however, Dr. Mullins speaks as if there were two sources of knowledge in Christian theology—viz., Christian experience and revelation, and as if Christian experience were the subject matter of theology. This is quite a different position, and is an impossible one. Christian experience implicates a system of doctrine, but it does not follow that the doctrinal system can be made explicit from a study of Christian experience. Moreover, Christian experience is conditioned by a faith the doctrinal content of which is given by revelation. Hence a knowledge of this revelation comes before experience and determines it. In fact, Dr. Mullins does not succeed in clearing up this point, and fails to give any clear or adequate view of the relation of Christian experience and Christian doctrine.

Turning now to the doctrine in respect to which he modifies the position of the Christian Church, we must look at his view of the Person of Christ and of the Atonement. He cannot accept the doctrine of the Two Natures. We cannot, he thinks, believe this and at the same time maintain the unity of our Lord's Person. We must begin, he says, with the idea of one Person who unites in himself the divine and human "elements." Jesus, then, is not only one Person; He has but one nature, at once human and divine, one consciousness, and one will. But how, we ask, can one will be at once dependent and absolute, finite and infinite, omnipotent and not omnipotent? These are just plain contradictions. Must we not, by taking this course be driven into some form of the Kenotic Theory? Dr. Mullins says that he rejects the different forms of this theory. This means that he rejects its less veiled forms. He expressly rejects the idea that Jesus laid aside the "relative," and retained the "essential" attributes of Deity. Also he rejects the idea that Christ became completely human by emptying Himself of all divine attributes. Nevertheless Dr. Mullins does give as his own view a mild type of Kenosis. He says that Christ in the incarnation retained all divine attributes "under the restraints and limitations of a human life." He did not simply cease the exercise of these attributes; rather did they function under human limitations.

This we believe is as untenable a conception as the other types of the Kenotic Theory. What is omnipotence which is not omnipotent? What is omniscience which is yet a limited and growing knowledge? What is it to be God and yet have none of the powers or attributes of Deity? Dr. Mullins has shown how the New Testament represents Christ as at once both human and divine. But if this is so, the only doctrine which will harmonize all the facts is that of the Two Natures.

When we come to the author's view of the Atonement, we confess at once that we have not been able to understand it. Dr. Mullins says that the Atonement has a "vital" and a "legal" element. The "vital" element seems to be that Christ so identifies Himself with the human race that the "obedience-life principle" which he embodied overcame

the "sin-death principle" in mankind. Jesus, he says, became "organically one" with men, so that righteousness must become a power in the race. But later on in the volume we find that it is the work of the Spirit by which men are made good. The relation of this sanctification by the Spirit to this mystical element in the Atonement is not made clear. But passing this difficulty, and looking at the legal aspect of the Atonement, Dr. Mullins says that Christ so identifies Himself with sinners that He suffered death at their hands and so bore the consequences of their sin. But how? Were Christ's sufferings and death penal? Dr. Mullins says that since Christ did not personally sin, he could not bear the penalty of sin "in the ordinary sense." But "He did bear the penal consequences of sin" because of His "complete identification" with the race. Death, he says, is the penalty of sin. Christ died "at the hands of sinful man." Apparently Dr. Mullins wishes to substitute the principle of "identification" for that of imputation. But this leaves unexplained the relation of Christ's death to our deliverance from the penalty of sin. Identification with the race in all points except sin, will not explain how the death of Christ liberates us from the guilt and penalty of sin.

The modifications which the author makes in respect to the doctrines of Calvinism are seen especially in his views on Election and Perseverance. Election, he says, is not based on the foresight by God of faith, repentance, or good works, for these are all the gifts of God. Election is sovereign. But it is not a "bare" choice of certain individuals. God's *purpose* to save is universal. Election is God's means to this end. But God is limited by two things—human sin and inability, and human freedom. God, then, cannot save all men, because He cannot "coerce" men in their choices and because sinful men in the use of their freedom will inevitably reject the Gospel. If, then, men unaided by Grace will reject the Gospel, then unless God interposes no one will be saved. But if God interposes, it "must be by some form of election." But since man must be treated as a moral and personal being, God must "reduce his own action to a minimum." This God does by His Grace which is a merely persuasive action of the Spirit, and which is not irresistible. Does this make the matter depend on man? Dr. Mullins would deny this. He wishes to preserve God's sovereignty and at the same time to give man the power to resist Grace. What, then, we ask, is election? It is difficult to say. It is not God's *purpose* to save, for this is universal according to Dr. Mullins. It is said to be God's "means" of saving as many as He can under certain limitations. But what meaning has it to call an eternal decree a "means"? A decree is executed in time by means, but it is exceedingly confusing to be told that election, which is a sovereign decree, is a means to carry out as far as possible a purpose to save all. Moreover, is this election sovereign? Dr. Mullin's answer is not clear. It is not based on foresight of faith. Does it, then depend on non-resistance of a grace given to all, and efficacious when not resisted? If so, it would depend on man who shall be saved, and this Dr. Mullins apparently

would deny. He seems to be aiming at some form of the doctrine of congruous Grace. He apparently wishes to maintain at once the sovereignty of God in election, and at the same time the resistability of grace. God, then, it would seem, is only partially sovereign in salvation. All men do not receive just the grace they need to bring them to salvation. God sovereignly gives this grace only to some, and here God is sovereign. But of those who do receive this needed grace, some resist and are lost. Here it would seem as if the sovereignty of God, which Dr. Mullins wishes to maintain, were lost.

Furthermore, the doctrine of congruous grace will fail Dr. Mullins at just the points at which he supposes his view to excell. What he terms "old Calvinism," he says, is "too abstract." But in reality all that Dr. Mullins has left of Calvinism, if indeed he has any left, is just the bare abstract idea of divine sovereignty. The Grace of God in saving the soul is reduced to a minimum, and nothing remains save the idea that God discriminates among men. One cannot be a Calvinist without recognizing the Sovereignty of God, but the mere recognition of God's sovereignty is far from the fulness of Calvinism. Perhaps Dr. Mullins does not intend to teach Calvinism. We are not sure on this point. But the fact remains that this doctrine of a merely persuasive grace falls far short of the efficacious grace of the Gospel of Jesus and Paul which Calvinism emphasizes.

And falling far short of this conception of grace, it gives no warrant for the universalism of salvation which Dr. Mullins claims for it. "Old Calvinism," he thinks, cannot get enough men saved. But we should say, on the contrary, that this doctrine of congruous gives no real assurance for the salvation of any man. Whereas it is the Calvinist, *i.e.* the man who believes in God's omnipotent and efficacious grace, who alone has ground for hope in a saved world at last.

The same uncertainty and lack of consistency is seen in the author's treatment of the doctrine of Perseverance. If the process of salvation is begun in a man by God's grace, Dr. Mullins says that the result is "not uncertain." But the certainty is "not that of a mechanical law working through natural forces." Certainly not, we should agree. But the question is—is the final salvation of a regenerate man certain or uncertain? Will he be kept by God's grace or not? Dr. Mullins affirms that the final result is "not uncertain." But just a few pages before this statement he rejects what he terms the view of "extreme Calvinists" who argue that, because of what God does in saving the soul, therefore all the regenerate must ultimately be saved." But surely if this is not true, then the result is quite uncertain. We are quite unable to see what Dr. Mullins means. He apparently denies the doctrine of Perseverance on one page and affirms it on another. And what he terms "extreme Calvinism" again proves to be just Calvinism, no more, no less. If one continually speaks of pure Calvinism as "extreme Calvinism," we are led to suspect that his Calvinism is something less than Calvinism, and consequently something other than Calvinism.

It would have been a more congenial task to have dwelt upon the

points in which we agree with Dr. Mullins, and especially upon those in respect to which we think he has done his best thinking and writing in this volume, such as his criticism of undogmatic Christianity, his polemic against non-Christian philosophical theories, and some parts of his chapter on Eschatology. We have selected the above points for discussion simply because they are the ones which constitute the individual or distinctive elements in the author's system of theology.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

### PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

*The Human Element in the Making of a Christian.* By BERTHA CONDE. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 161. Price \$1.00 net.

The writer of this helpful handbook has for many years been a leader in the Christian movement among the students of America, and is serving as Senior Student Secretary for the National Board of Young Women's Christian Associations. Her wide experience, her knowledge of human nature, and her study of the Bible have qualified her for the studies in personal evangelism which this book embodies. The nineteen studies are grouped under the heads of "The Challenge to Service," "Guiding Principles" and "The Application of These Principles to Types of Religious Experience." Under the latter head, the author considers the problem of the nominal Christian, the approach to those who have intellectual difficulties, the approach to those who are fighting besetting sins, the approach to those who face problems of conduct, the approach to those who live an unbalanced life, the approach to those who are feeling after reality. Studies are also added on "Developing the Religious Life of Children," "The Sources of Growth," "The Perils of Success," and "References for Reading." To each chapter of the book is added a Bible study in which under appropriate heads passages of Scripture are designated and discussed. The volume will form a very helpful guide and an inspiring message in relation to individual work for all sincere followers of Christ.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

*An Old Fashioned Home.* By J. WILBUR CHAPMAN, D.D. Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Paper. 12mo. pp. 15. Price 3c net postpaid.

In this sermon Dr. Chapman depicts the real character of a true Christian home.

*Bring Him to Me.* By CHARLES NELSON PACE. New York. The Methodist Book Concern. Cloth. 16mo. pp. 72. Price 50c net.

The writer of this brief booklet presents in attractive manner his answer to the supreme question of how a man can be saved. He discusses the various remedies suggested by modern thought, and shows that only the power of Christ can regenerate and transform.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

*Christ and the Kingdom of God.* By PROFESSOR S. H. HOOKE. New York. George H. Doran Company. Cloth. 16mo. pp. 144. Price 60c net.

This book is intended for use in study circles and contains twenty-three chapters designed to furnish material for one or even two years of work. The controlling idea of these studies is the conception of Christ in reference to the kingdom of God and his relation to that kingdom. The first division of the book deals with the preparation of Christ and particularly with his temptation. The ministry of Christ is divided by the great crises, marked by the death of John the Baptist, the transfiguration of Christ, and the crucifixion. The entire work evinces thorough scholarship, careful preparation and clarity of thought. The purpose, however, has been to interpret the ministry of our Lord wholly from the human standpoint. The result is that while some problems are made more clear, much is taken from the glory of the person of Christ, and many views presented which will seem inadequate and unsatisfactory to such readers as hold to the authority of the Gospel narrative and the reality of the supernatural elements in the life of Christ. The author declares that miracles are never proofs of deity, but only exhibitions of the likeness of Christ to God. Even the statement of Peter "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the Living God" is interpreted as expressing merely likeness to God. The miracle of the withering of the fig-tree is regarded as a merely natural phenomenon which was in no wise related to the will or power of Christ. The temptation of our Lord and even the transfiguration are declared to be merely mental experiences and psychological phenomena. The death of Christ is associated with his parousia. The resurrection is given no place in these studies, but it is intimated that it may be considered in what is to be the second volume in a series of three. Each of these studies opens with Scripture references for daily study, followed by brief notes, and a series of incisive questions. Then follows a brief chapter in which the writer presents his views of the main theme under consideration. The book may be found helpful because of its method and clearness, but students will hardly be expected to agree with all its positions and implications.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

*The New Layman for the New Time.* By WILLIAM ALLEN HARPER, LL.D., President of Elon College. New York. Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 16mo. pp. 160. Price 65c net.

President Harper presents in these five chapters a clear call for larger service on the part of the Christian layman. After a warning against the perils of sacerdotalism and ecclesiasticism and after exalting the Scriptural position and power of the layman in the Christian Church, the author writes of the layman in history, the layman and

the minister, the layman and the church, the layman and evangelism, the layman and social service. The book is a discussion of principles but it suggests the great service which laymen have rendered in the past and are rendering in the present. The book closes with a discussion of the following topics: "A call to the Ministry," "Church Union," "Why I go to Church," "The Dignity and Joy of Christian Service." To these brief discussions is added an appendix containing a list of a hundred books useful to the layman.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*The Stuff of Manhood.* By ROBERT E. SPEER, D.D. New York. Fleming H. Revell Company. 12mo. Cloth. pp. 484. Price \$1.00 net.

These chapters comprise the Merrick Lectures for 1916-17 delivered at the Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio, April 1 to 5, 1917. In his usual, forceful and impressive style, Dr. Speer here deals with those elements of character which are specially needful to American manhood in these crucial times. Among the topics discussed are those of "The Conservation and Release of Moral Resources," "An Unfrightened Hope," "The Joy of the Minority," "The Life Invisible." Dr. Speer shows that the best service a man can render the nation is to illustrate in his own life and character the moral qualities which ought to characterize the state.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*The Intermediate Department.* By EUGENE C. FOSTER. Philadelphia. The Westminster Press. Boards. pp. 84. 16mo. Price 50c net postpaid.

This book will be found of interest and help to all teachers who are engaged in the work of the Intermediate Department of the Sunday School. It deals with the special characteristics of the boys and girls who are grouped in this Department of the Sunday School. It also suggests the proper qualifications of their teachers, the method of conducting classes, the need of personal interest in the pupil and the purpose of bringing the pupil to definite decision for Christ and membership in the Church.

*The Problems of the Intermediate and Senior Teachers.* By EUGENE C. FOSTER. Philadelphia. Westminster Press. Boards. 16mo. pp. 68. Price 50c net, postpaid.

This little volume deals with questions which are of vital importance to teachers in the Intermediate and Senior grades of the Sunday School. Among these problems are those which relate to Bible study, church attendance, Christian service, Sabbath observance, amusements, reading and sex instruction.

*Princeton.*

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*The Adult Department, Its Scope and Opportunity.* By IDA S. BLACK. Philadelphia. The Westminster Press. Boards. 12mo. pp. 92. Price 50c net postpaid.

Among the most notable features of modern Sunday School development is that of the sudden growth of the Adult Department. This book is a compendium of valuable suggestions in reference to Adult Bible class work. It forms a vital contribution to the literature of Sunday School plans and methods. It deals with the organization of Adult classes, courses of study, methods of teaching, and the relation of the class to the Sunday School, the church, the community and to the evangelization of the world.

*The Precious Truth Senior Sunday School Lesson Quarterly.* By the REV. CHARLES H. FOUNTAIN, B.A., B.D. New York. Charles C. Cook. Paper. pp. 110. Price 25c.

This brief quarterly contains a popular exposition of the Sunday School lessons of the International system.

*Game of Gospel Songs.* Chicago. Evangelical Publishing Company. Price 25c.

This game contains the portraits of fifteen famous song writers with the titles of three of the most popular pieces that each one has written.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

*A Book of Worship for Sailors and Soldiers.* Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Cloth. pp. 34. Price 15c.

This abridgment of the Book of Common Worship has been published for the National Service Commission of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. "It is believed that it will find a worthy place in camp and field and on shipboard in supplying definite spiritual needs on the part of enlisted men and in furnishing suitable material, including appropriate form of worship, to those who are engaged in special religious work for men." The book also includes a few appropriate hymns as well as some additional prayers suitable for the soldier and the sailor.

*For the Boys at the Front.* Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication. 25c net postpaid.

This series of fifteen war tracts by prominent writers deals with the spiritual problems which confront the soldiers in training at the various camps. Among the topics discussed are prayer, Bible reading, temptation. The series cannot fail to be of very great help and usefulness.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Princeton.

*Victory in Christ, A Report of the Princeton Conference, 1916.*

This brief volume of addresses contains the substance of the mes-

sages delivered at Princeton, New Jersey, by those who took part in the "Victorious Life Conference." Among the speakers were Mr. Charles G. Trumbull, the Rev. C. I. Scofield, D.D., Mr. Howard A. Banks, the Rev. W. B. Anderson, D.D., the Rev. S. W. Beach, D.D., the Rev. Griffith-Thomas, D.D., the Rev. John Alvin Orr, D.D., the Rev. Howard Agnew Johnston, D.D., Mr. and Mrs. Ralph C. Norton and Mr. Robert E. Speer. The topics discussed cover a wide range of Christian life and service, a special emphasis being laid upon victory over sin secured through faith in Christ, the general motto of the conference being "To me to live is Christ." Additional copies of the Report can be secured for fifty cents each by addressing: Princeton Conference Report, 1031 Walnut Street, Philadelphia.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*The Shorter Catechism and the Shorter Catechism in Full.* By WILLIAM H. SCOTT. Philadelphia. Allen Lane & Scott. Paper. 16mo.

This booklet is intended to make the Catechism more available as a book of instruction. Recognizing its value in the religious education of the young, Mr. Scott has abbreviated the answers of the Shorter Catechism, adding no word to any of the answers but making them easier for younger children to memorize. To this shortened form of the catechism the complete catechism is added, printed in a most attractive form with explanatory titles for each group of questions. The book also contains the "Brief statement of the Reformed Faith adopted in 1902 by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America." This little book will be of real service in the home and in the Sunday School.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A.* New Series, Volume XVII. August, 1917. Philadelphia. Witherspoon Building. Paper. 8vo. pp. 1052.

This volume contains the proceedings of the 129th General Assembly. Among its main features, in addition to the Journal of Proceedings, are the reports of the Theological Seminaries, the reports of the Boards and Committees, the financial reports and the statistical reports of the Presbyteries. The Minutes of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. are published by the General Assembly at the Witherspoon Building, 1319 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa. By order of the General Assembly, the publication is issued in August of each year. To all ministers belonging to Presbyteries who have paid their full apportionment to the Fund for publication, the August Minutes in paper cover are sent without extra charge. Cloth copies to such ministers are furnished for 25c additional to the apportionment. The price to clerks of Church Sessions is 50c for paper cover and 75c for cloth copies. To all other persons the price is \$1.00 for

paper cover and \$1.50 for cloth bound copies. The Minutes can be had at the reduced rates only by applying to the Stated Clerk at the office of the General Assembly, Witherspoon Building, Philadelphia, and at the regular rates they can be purchased from the Board of Publication in the same building, or at any one of the agencies of the Board.

*Reports of the Missionary and Benevolent Boards and Committees to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., 1917.* Philadelphia. Office of the General Assembly, Witherspoon Building.

This volume contains the reports presented to the General Assembly at Dallas, Texas, May 17, 1917. In these reports will be found a vast fund of information in reference to all the enlarging work of the Church both at home and abroad. Copies of the reports in paper are sent to pastors free of charge, but cloth copies cost 40c each. To other persons the price of the reports is 40c in paper and 65c in cloth.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*Children's Devotions.* By GERRIT VERKUYL. Philadelphia. The Westminster Press. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 59. Price 25c net.

Dr. Verkuyl has had wide experience in Sunday School work and is acquainted with the devotional needs of children. This very brief handbook contains private and united prayers for the young, together with suggestions for Bible reading and for the memorizing of Scripture. To these suggestions is appended a list of books for boys and girls, and also a list for parents.

*Prayers for Use in Home, School and Sunday School.* Selected and arranged by FREDERICA BEARD. New York. George H. Doran Company. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 81. Price 60c net.

This attractive compendium of prayers is intended to aid parents and teachers in developing the devotional life in the home, the school and the Sabbath School. The selections are intended not only for little children, but also for boys and girls, and for young people. To these classified devotional expressions is added a number of prayers for special occasions which are designed for the use of parents and teachers. Such a collection of prayers will be of true service in training the youth in a spirit of reverence and worship.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*How to Teach the Life of Christ.* By the REV. HUGH T. KERR, D.D. Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Paper. pp. 64. 12mo. Price 15c.

*The Sunday School.* By ROBERT WELLS VEAH, D.D. Westminster Press, Philadelphia. Paper. pp. 72. 12mo. Price 15c.

These two booklets form respectively Part III and Part IV of the

first year in "The New Westminster Standard Course for Teacher Training." The title given to the entire course is "Thoroughly Furnished." Parts I and II, dealing with the pupil and the teacher, have been published previously. The books of this course are based on the standard adopted by the Sunday School Council of Evangelical Denominations and approved by the International Sunday School Association. Each part of this course contains ten lessons. In the part prepared by Dr. Kerr the lessons deal with Christ and Christian character, with the sources of the life of Christ, the development of the life of Christ and with the methods of teaching this life to the different grades of students.

Dr. Veach, in Part IV which deals with the Sunday School, treats of the history, organization of the lessons and different departments, and also includes lessons on standards of efficiency, evangelism and the future development of the School.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*The Gospel of Mark, an Exposition.* By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, Professor of Practical Theology, Princeton Theological Seminary. Philadelphia. Westminster Press. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 200. Price 6c net postpaid.

The character and purpose of this brief, practical commentary on the Gospel of Mark are sufficiently indicated by the foreword, which is as follows:

"Mark is the Gospel for youth; it is so brief, so vivid, so stirring, so strong; and these same qualities adapt the story to the active, restless, vigorous spirit of the whole modern world.

"It represents our Lord as the mighty, wonder-working Son of God, and thus bears a special message to an age which needs a word of divine authority, and a new vision of the present, limitless, redeeming power of Christ.

"It is a story of service, and is in harmony with the heroism and self-sacrifice which illumine these dark years of cruel suffering, as it pictures to us the Servant of God who came 'not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.'

"The purpose of these outline studies is to aid in fixing the thought upon the successive, swiftly changing scenes of the story, in order to arouse deeper devotion to the Master and to inspire wider service in his name."

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*Heroes of the Campus.* By JOSEPH W. COCHRAN, D.D. Philadelphia. Westminster Press. Cloth. 12mo. pp. 168. Price 60c net postpaid.

These interesting biographical sketches contain a record of young men and women who were notable in college life because of their devoted Christian character, their marked leadership, and the impress

they left on the lives of their fellow students. Among the thirteen heroes to whom the author refers are Pitkin of Yale, Takahashi of Maryville, Beaver of State College, Robinson of Cambridge, Borden of Yale, and Ion Keith Falconer of Cambridge. A review of these lives will leave a definite impress on the mind of any student, and will lead to truer devotion and service.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*American Jewish Yearbook, 5678.* Edited by SAMSON D. OPPENHEIM for the American Jewish Committee. Philadelphia. The Jewish Publication Society of America. Cloth. pp. 722.

This valuable handbook for 5678 (September 17, 1917, to September 6, 1918) contains most interesting and valuable information in reference to the Jewish population and citizens of America. It contains tables of the Jewish holidays and festivals, directories of Jewish organizations, lists of Jewish periodicals and of the Jewish members of Congress, of colleges in which Hebrew is taught, and the enrolment of Jewish students in American colleges and universities, statistics as to the Jewish population of the world, Jewish immigration and the Jewish population in the United States. It also includes interesting chapters relative to the Jews of Latin America, the new English translation of the Bible, Jewish war relief work, and tabulates events of interest both in the United States and in foreign countries for the year 5677. It closes with the Report of the 29th year of the Jewish Publication Society of America.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

*Princeton.*

*Good Ministers of Jesus Christ.* By WILLIAM FRASER McDOWELL, one of the Bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church. The Abingdon Press. 1917. Pp. 307. \$1.25 net.

This is the latest volume in the long and noble series of Yale Lectures on Preaching. The opening lectures, still unsurpassed in their rare blending of wit and wisdom, were given by Henry Ward Beecher. The course so happily begun has been continued by some of the greatest preachers of the time down to Jefferson and Jowett. In this goodly company this volume takes an honorable place. Fresh evidence is given of the value of the lectureship. It is worth while to continue it even after all that has been so finely said upon this theme. Preaching has not lost its interest or its power, and cannot lose them until the preacher ceases to be a prophet, declaring to men the will of God for their salvation.

There are eight chapters, entitled: The Ministry of Revelation; The Ministry of Redemption; The Ministry of Incarnation; The Ministry of Reconciliation; The Ministry of Rescue; The Ministry of Conservation; The Ministry of Coöperation; The Ministry of Inspiration. This is an attractive program and it is well carried out. The style is clear,

vivacious, attractive; the illustrations are fresh, apt, and striking. It must be said also that there is a good deal of repetition. The thought sometimes seems to move in circles, and we feel the lack of progress, of climactic effect. At various points the lectures would gain in strength by compression.

But the book has a message, and in spite of these faults it delivers its message with power. The chapters on the Ministry of Conservation and the Ministry of Coöperation seem to us especially good. Words of wisdom are spoken upon such important themes as evangelism; the church caring for its own, especially the children; the minister learning to work with others. Good sense and sound judgment are conspicuous here, as indeed they are apparent throughout the volume.

It is the crowning excellence of these lectures that Christ is everywhere exalted. "My whole purpose in these studies is to base our ministry upon and relate our lives to the ministry and life of Jesus Christ. If we are to be good ministers of Jesus Christ, we must be like Him in the essential character, in the spirit and purpose, in the relations and quality of our ministry. This is, for us, the real imitation of Christ" (p. 167). This purpose is borne in mind throughout, and at every point the minister is called to test himself by his likeness to his Master.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Ultimate Ideals.* By MARY TAYLOR BLAUVELT. Sherman, French & Co. 1917. Pp. 110. \$1.00 net.

The book is well written, and important truth is often put in a striking way. But much that is said is in the form of half truth, and even of positive error, so that the volume constantly provokes dissent. It is not true that "the end of the Kingdom, its purpose and its only purpose, is happiness," and that "righteousness is the path, but happiness is the goal" (p. 5). The thought that sin is necessary to spiritual development (p. 14) is both unscriptural and irrational. We are told that God understands that "it is certain that in the worst actions of the worst man, there is a seed of good which, if allowed to develop, would be sufficient to save" (p. 81). If this is in the thought of God, He has been careful to give no intimation of it in His Word; and it would be interesting to know how this insight into the divine mind was obtained.

The Divine government is not a democracy (p. 69). Both reason and Scripture cry out against such a representation. The laws of God are not put to vote, nor are his purposes established upon the counsel of men. "The land of permanently satisfied desire, even when that desire is for righteousness, is indeed Hell" (p. 73). Set side by side with this the words of Omar—"Heaven but the vision of fulfilled desire." The Psalmist exclaimed, "I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with beholding thy form" (Ps. xvii. 15). Here as often our author takes a thought which contains an element of truth, and exag-

gerates and perverts it until it turns to error. What is meant by saying that "God does not supply us with rules or righteousness" (p. 72)? What shall we do with the Ten Commandments? And do not the Beatitudes, with which this book is concerned, clearly indicate the mode of life that we must pursue?

It would be hard to find a statement more at variance with Jesus' teaching about God's attitude toward sin than this—"I sometimes think that God can hardly be said to forgive us at all, he just understands us. And when we really understand, there is no room for forgiveness; love, sympathy and help take its place" (p. 80). There is, of course, no place for the atonement, if there is no need for forgiveness.

Is it true that "there are only two sins that Jesus condemned unsparely, hypocrisy and avarice" (p. 85)? Did he not warn men with equal earnestness against unbelief? And what shall we make of the statement that "when Jesus prayed I do not believe that he was asking for things at all" (p. 107), in face of his own words, "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not," and his prayer for his disciples the night before he was crucified? Nor is it true that as we enter into communion with the Infinite we cease to ask for anything except spiritual blessings (p. 107). Petition will not be eliminated from prayer, even petition for material things, so long as we use the words our Lord has taught us, "Give us this day our daily bread."

The fundamental defect of the book, which mars much that is excellent, and mingles error with important truth, is that while it is an attempt to interpret a portion of the Scripture, the Beatitudes, it does not follow the guidance of the Scripture and permit it to speak for itself. The light that might be thrown upon a passage from other portions of the Word is often neglected, and we walk uncertainly by the flickering light of the candle instead of walking confidently in the radiance of the sun. The book would gain mightily in interest and power if the Scripture were suffered to bring its own message.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*When Home is Heaven.* By J. WILBUR CHAPMAN, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1917. Pp. 296. \$1.25 net.

The well known marks of Dr. Chapman's style are here, the evangelistic tone, the direct and earnest appeal, the abundant illustration drawn mainly from Scripture and from his own experience. The Preface tells us "that much of what appears in these chapters I have preached in various parts of the world." There is a tendency to diffuseness and repetition, and we often wish that the thought were more thoroughly developed and more closely woven. It is difficult to pursue a theme of this nature through so many pages without monotony, and sermons that must have been highly impressive give the impression of sameness when they are read together.

There is an idealizing of the past which is not warranted by history. That one age, like every other, has its peculiar failings and temptations

is true; but in general the conditions that we deplore today have been the theme of the pulpit for many generations.

*Sunset by the Lakeside. Vesper Messages to Young People.* By WILLIAM HIRAM FOULKES, D.D., LL.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. Pp. 95. 60 cents net.

This delightful volume is made up of addresses to young people at Summer Conferences, addresses which well deserve the more permanent form and the larger audience of the printed page. The thought is clear and strong, the style attractive, the illustrations apt, the tone earnest, grave and tender. Some of the titles are unusually striking—"Broken and Unbroken Nets"; "Between Two Fires"; "The Badge or the Brand." The application is plainly and strongly made, and the truth is pressed home with power. The trained intellect, the ripe experience, the warm emotion, the spiritual temper, are all evident here, and give to the book a charm and force that should make its message effective and fruitful in many lives.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*The Preacher's Ideals and Inspirations. Lectures on the George Shepard Foundation, Bangor Convocation, 1916.* By WILLIAM J. HUTCHINS, Professor of Homiletics in the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1917. Pp. 187. \$1.00 net.

The lectures are bright, vivacious, interesting, inspiring. They contain nothing that is original, of course, for who can find anything new to say upon the well worn theme of Preaching? But familiar truth is presented in an attractive way. The themes considered are: The Preacher and His Times; The Preacher and His Sermon; The Preacher and His Bible; Abraham Lincoln; The Preacher's Teacher; The Preacher and His Master.

The choice of Lincoln as the Preacher's Teacher is scarcely justified by the mode of treatment. On page 137 we read with surprise, "Can you not see the Master smile as he tells of the devil who goes out of a man, wanders about in waterless places, seeking rest and finding none; who thinks of the old homestead, discovers it empty, swept and garnished, and brings trooping after him seven other devils worse than himself?" How the Master could find anything humorous in the picture of a soul possessed by evil spirits is hard for most of us to understand. Years ago I was unfortunate enough to hear a lecture on the Humor of Jesus. The impression I received from it was that if the lecturer had had a sense of humor he never would have delivered it. That Jesus as a normal man possessed a sense of humor we readily believe; but the attempts to find traces of it in the Gospels have met with scanty success.

*The Increase of True Religion. Addresses to the Clergy and Church Workers of the Archdeaconry of Ely.* By W. CUNNINGHAM, D.D., F.B.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Archdeacon of

Ely. Cambridge University Press. 1917. Pp. viii, 42. Two shillings net.

There are four addresses; Human Power of Knowing Truth; Religious Conviction; The Secret of Human Progress; The Attractive Power of Personality. They are carefully prepared and well written, though they contain little that is striking in thought or expression. The statement that "even in the Epistles we find much that has little value for us" (p. 39) should not be made. Dr. Cunningham refers to the apostolic injunctions as to "meats offered to idols" by way of justifying the remark. But it is obvious that in treating of this matter, and of other matters which have no place in the life of today, the apostle laid down principles of universal application which lie at the basis of the finest ethical teaching of our time.

Princeton.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

*Religious Education and Democracy.* By BENJAMIN S. WINCHESTER. New York: The Abingdon Press. 1917. Pp. 293. \$1.50 net.

This volume by the Assistant Professor of Religious Education in the Yale School of Religion is an interesting and helpful presentation of the place and function of Christian education in the democracy the world at large is struggling to establish, and which we in the United States trust that we have established. The book is divided into two parts, of which the first is a careful revision of a survey of week-day Religious Instruction that appeared originally as a portion of the Quadrennial Report of the Commission on Christian Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America; and the second is a selection of suggested plans and programs of week-day Religious Instruction.

The survey in Part I explains the conditions out of which the present problems of religious instruction have arisen. These conditions are the impossibility hitherto of reconciling the principles of compulsory education and religious freedom. If religious instruction be introduced as part of the required curriculum of the public schools, there would at once arise (since there seems to be no common ground in religion upon which the many sects of religious adherents in the United States can stand) the protest of those who feel that religious freedom is being violated in that children are being compelled to attend religious instruction with which the parents are not in sympathy. The state therefore educates for civic and industrial proficiency: subjects upon the necessity of which there is general agreement, and leaves religious education to the churches. But in the author's opinion the churches are meeting the needs of the situation. Real democracy consists in keeping the mean between the tendency of individualism towards selfishness and the tendency of socialism towards tyranny; an impossible task if the spiritual forces which religion alone can evoke and train are absent from character. Hence democracy, the goal of the world's strife today, constitutes a tremendous challenge to the

Churches, a challenge impossible to meet unless the work of religious education is much more efficiently done than at present.

What should the churches attempt? Before answering this question a rapid summary is given of the various ways in which the school systems of different countries provide for the teaching of religion. In Germany the instruction extends two hours per week through the three years of the preparatory grades and the nine years of what corresponds to our grammar and high school grades. Religious freedom is preserved in that the instruction is given by teachers of different faiths, Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish, although the matter of instruction is the Bible, Church History and Biographies of Church Leaders. The danger of such teaching is that it becomes perfunctory and traditional. In the French public schools there is no religious education strictly speaking, its place being taken by moral and civic instruction, one hour a week in the primary grades and one hour and a half a week in the upper grades. While positive instruction in religion is thus excluded from the school course, nevertheless, it is not repudiated as a factor in education, for Thursday afternoon is left free each week for this purpose. It is a voluntary matter, however, on the part of the pupil to attend such instruction, and its nature and scope, its content and method, are left to the church to determine. In the English public school system, religious instruction is regarded as an integral and necessary part of education, and (in the face of much opposition from the Established and Non-conformist churches) it is held that such instruction can be so imparted as not to offend denominational sensibilities. Although the situation is complicated by the lack of unity in the school system, religion is taught in all the schools. In the United States various plans of meeting the need for religious instruction in the public schools have been tried. The author describes the North Dakota Plan, the Colorado Plan, the Lakeside (Ohio) Plan, the Gary Plan, but concludes that they are all inadequate for various reasons, and that religious education is the business of the churches uniting in such service for the community. His program is as follows: religion is as necessary a thing to develop in child nature as any mental or physical trait; the American principle of the separation of church and state must not be violated; an interdenominational committee on Week-day Religious Instruction should be formed to survey the existing needs of the community with regard to the educational advantages and disadvantages; upon the basis of the facts there should be apportioned to each religious denomination or group of denominations its appropriate part in the common task. At this point the Protestant denominations may combine in the establishment of a community school of religion to be conducted co-operatively. To quote:

"For such a school there will need to be a carefully selected school committee of the participating churches, and probably a paid director or superintendent, the financial support being provided by a voluntary association, similar in type to the kindergarten associations. This school will be conducted on week days, the hours and schedules to be arranged in conference with, though not necessarily in official connec-

tion with, the school authorities. The aims of this school will be carefully formulated with reference to the work of all the other educational agencies operating in the same field. A curriculum will be constructed to be closely related with the curricula of other existing agencies. A suitable place will have to be determined upon and equipped for the work of teaching; textbooks must be selected and teachers engaged, definite requirements set for the pupils and clear statement made of conditions for credit, promotion, and graduation. Thus at length the Protestant churches may provide in the local community their own system of religious education parallel to the public school system, but independent of it, resting upon its own merits, and, by reason of its high standards, commanding the respect of the whole community" (p. 141).

Some such plan as this would doubtless meet the need if it could be satisfactorily worked out. There are indeed many obstacles in the way, but, as has been said, "Obstacles are things to be overcome," and if the Churches are once convinced of the need, they will surely find the way to satisfy it. To all who are interested in Christian Education this thoughtful volume will prove helpful.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

*A Social Theory of Religious Education.* By GEORGE ALBERT COE, Professor of the Union Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. xiii, 361. \$1.50 net.

Professor Coe belongs to those who interpret Christianity as a scheme of social improvement, and in this, his latest book, he traces the results of such interpretation for religious education. The meaning he attaches to education may be known from the following quotations: education takes place "when anything is controlled for the purpose of giving a set to young minds" (p. 13); education is "a way of getting the human energy of each new generation effectively applied to the maintenance and increase of human welfare of whatever sort" (p. 17); "Society . . . is the prime educator within all educational enterprises" (p. 14); education aims at "social adjustment and social efficiency" (p. 16), or at "progressive reconstruction of society" (p. 18). The meaning attached to religion is in no place made clear in the present volume, but in "The Psychology of Religion" published in December, 1916, we find the following statements that may help in determining Professor Coe's view of religion. He hesitates to define religion (p. 13). What is needed is "not an inclusive idea but a fruitful point of view" (p. 59). "Religious value is not distinct from ethical value or any other value, but when ethical value attempts its own ideal completion in union with all other values similarly ideal and complete, what we have is religion. . . . The sphere of religion, as of ethics, is individual-social life. In this life religion refers to the same persons, the same purposes, the same conditioning facts, as ethics. In most ethical thinking, however, a difference is recognized. For ethics commonly limits its attention to certain values only, whereas religion is interested in all values, in the whole meaning

of life" (p. 74-5). The problem, therefore, the solution of which is sought in the book before us, is to trace the implications of Christianity as a scheme of social improvement for education and religion in combination as defined in the quotations given.

The Introduction is devoted to a defence of "theorizing." It makes interesting reading for the light it throws on the extremity to which the "practice" philosophy not infrequently reduces itself by its own methods of stressing present activities as the only thing worthy of consideration. There then follows Part I, *The Social Standpoint in Modern Education*, which is a re-statement of John Dewey's opinion that in an industrial democracy education should consist in a minimum of instruction or impression of the mind by the so-called wisdom of the past or the present, and a maximum of expression secured by arranging the curriculum so that a continuous series of "situations" may be presented for the evoking of social reactions. Part II defends the assertion that "The Social Interpretation of Christianity Requires Social Reconstruction in Religious Education." Professor Coe's way of coming to know God is to contemplate developing human society, to abstract the love from the hate, the good from the evil, the uplift from the down-pull, to think of the former as personal and to worship them. "Where is God? Wherever a mature man or a little child faces the problem of the mutual adjustment of two or more human lives to each other" (p. 112), and again, the Christian must think of God "as being within human society in the democratic manner of working, helping, sacrificing, persuading, coöperating, achieving" (p. 55). Jesus Christ is eminent because he was one of the first to see clearly the "democracy of God" and to make the attempt to realize it in his own social relations. It is true that he used the expression "Kingdom of God" but this was due to the "influence of contemporary political and religious conditions upon his modes of speech and the content of his thought," for his ideas "lead on to the notion of a democratic organization of human society, and his fusion of divine with human love presents us with a divine-human democracy as a final social ideal" (p. 54), and then it must not be forgotten that "divine love cannot realize itself anywhere but in a genuine industrial democracy" (p. 55). For this reason Professor Coe, in order we presume to be thoroughly abreast of the times, prefers the expression "Democracy of God" in place of "Kingdom of God." Nevertheless, although improving Jesus in this respect, Professor Coe gives to him an honorable position. "The Redemptive mission of the Christ is nothing less than that of transforming the social order into a brotherhood or family of God" (p. 6). "Jesus is the great servant who has revealed in his own person the great God" (p. 315). He is in a maximal sense the bearer of God's sociality, for "God's revelation of himself is always in the form of flesh; . . . it is in Jesus, and in every human will that follows him" (p. 75), and "God's goodness, so outgoing, self-giving, all-encompassing, . . . has unfolded itself to us particularly upon Jesus" (p. 213). The Church is a "fellowship of older and younger persons to promote good-will"

(p. 88). This raises the question as to wherein the church thus defined differs from any other organization to promote good-will. Professor Coe avails himself of the same formula by which after involving himself in difficulty by equating religion and ethics, he tried to differentiate them, the distinction between the partial and the universal, and answers that the church contemplates man in his totality; whereas all the other institutions, state, state-schools, political parties, reform organizations, institutions for research, for teaching, for aesthetic and social enjoyment, refuse to view man as man, and limit the view to some partial interest or activity. Again the church "differs from other organizations of the good-will because in spite of shortcomings, . . . it, and it only of all our social institutions, undertakes to accept the radical consequences of Jesus' social idealism" (p. 92). The church must embrace in its program educational activities, but these must not take the form of instruction (for Professor Coe has a very poor opinion of "mere" instruction) but of providing "situations" that will call out those social actions that embody "the love that is justice." In Part III is sketched "The Psychological Background of a Socialized Religious Education." Much that is here stated is the psychological common-place of the day, but much also represents the extreme positions of a few years past, when "child-psychology" was in its infancy, which the more cautious investigators have abandoned as unsupported by the facts of experimentation. For example, the following quotation will illustrate the author's tendency to assert what would happen if conditions (humanly impossible) were laid down. "Granted favorable nervous conditions, plus constant and abundant opportunity for mutual pleasures . . . , plus steady, unrelaxing arrangements whereby individualistic reactions are prevented from bringing pleasure—granted these things, any child will acquire an amiable disposition" (p. 134). It is hardly likely that any psychologist today who had really reflected on the matter would make a statement that would so utterly ignore phylogeny as this. Again when it is said "it is plain that whatever capacity a child has for responding to the Christian evangel of the fatherhood of God is at least parallel to filial attitudes towards one's earthly parents. We are now ready, in view of the last section, to say that it is not parallel, but identical" (p. 42), it seems to the reviewer a plain ignoring of the facts of many religious experiences. These and a mass of similar statements in this section seem to rest on the uncritical acceptance of rationalizing views of the religion of childhood worked out by adults who had no religious sense whatsoever. Surely if Ritschl was justified in his assertion that no one has the right to interpret Christianity who does not consciously and intentionally reckon himself a member of the community which Christ founded, we are justified in accepting with reserve the results of investigations of phenomena made by those who have had no personal experience of them when for their correct interpretation such personal experience is necessary. Yet such is the origin of many of the statements that Professor Coe asks us to accept as facts. Part IV discusses "The Organization

of a Socialized Religious Education" and follows the familiar outline of the Family, the Church School, the State School, the denominational Board of Religious Education, and finally beyond the Denominations. In each department suggestions are made as to how social reactions may be made to follow by the wise use of existing equipment. Part V concludes the book by a historical survey in which the "social" mirror is held up to each of the main types of Christian Education: the Roman Catholic, Dogmatic Protestant, Ritualistic Protestant, Evangelicalism, and Liberalism. A classified bibliography is added.

The merit of the book consists in its clear and attractive presentation of a popular point of view. Its defect is inseparable from any attempt to ignore the historical meaning of any system and make such the basis of a reconstructed practice. No one attempts to do this in the treatment of philosophy, why should it be attempted in religion? Of course one is always at liberty to construct his own system, but not to give it an old name and pass it off as the system that that name covers. But this is exactly what Professor Coe and many of his followers do. His God is a personification of what he terms the upward movement of the present social order, and as he works out the implications the result is a socialized pantheism. His Jesus Christ is merely the first to see clearly the industrial democracy. The Bible is of little more than historical interest, for our attention is centered on the absorbing present social revelation of the divine. Education is merely training in socially advantageous reaction, but how the socially advantageous is to be distinguished from the disadvantageous is not stated. We are told that this is the social interpretation of Christianity? But is it? If we are to pay any attention to the historical view-point, can any man hesitate for a moment in denying that this is Christianity. A substitute may be just as valuable as the real article, but it is nevertheless a substitute and has no right to the old name. But again reflection will convince the thoughtful that the system that Professor Coe puts forward labors under severe difficulties. It has no standard of value. The Deweyesque brand of pragmatism that forms the philosophical background of the volume has been laboring for years to overcome this defect and the longer it labors the more apparent do its difficulties become. It uses the old formulas: the "all-inclusive" vs. the "partial," the "social" vs. the "individual," etc., but the only result has been to put the *ignotius* for the *ignotum*. Professor Coe is just as fluent as any of the tribe to which he belongs; he can speak of adjustment and efficiency, justice, welfare, social reconstruction and improvement, and all the other things so dear to the social pragmatism of the time, in such a winning way as even to lead astray the very elect, but his philosophical background makes it impossible to put any concrete content into the terms. For the man who confines himself to the present situation and interprets it by his own reason apart from history, makes himself his own absolute and commits the pragmatist's fallacy. Christianity in the historical meaning of the word may not speak so assuredly as Professor Coe does but at least it is able to put some concrete meaning into its

general terms. Nevertheless the book is of service in that the best mode of clearing away overstatement and mistake is to clear them up, but it also shows that if the whole scheme of social Christianity and religious education is not to pass into unworkable vaporization it must be rescued and restored to its place by evangelical Christianity.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

GEORGE JOHNSON.

---

## GENERAL LITERATURE

*The Bible in English Literature.* By EDGAR WHITAKER WORK, D.D. Pp. 287, 12mo. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. \$1.25 net.

This is an interesting and reminding book; a welcome companion to the author's "The Fascination of the Book." It is a commonplace that the Bible is largely the *fons et origo* of English literature, and Dr. Work has made the justification of this trite expression quite plain. He traces the history of the influence of the Bible upon the life and thought of England from the coming of Augustine to the publishing of the King James or Authorized Version, in a thoroughly enjoyable manner, especially in the earlier chapters. These are headed, "The Coming of the Book"; "Early Risers of Literature, including King Edwin, Paulinus, Columba, Cuthbert and Aldhelm"; "Scholar and Peasant", including Theodore, Biscop, Hadrian, Wilfrid and Caedmon; "An Early Biblical Poet," Cynewulf; "The Father of English Literature," the Venerable Bede, and "The Teacher of Europe," Alcuin. As Dr. Work says, the early English writers were Bible saturated. The monasteries were the home and refuge of letters. They were "the centers of an intensive culture that fed upon the Scriptures." There are other chapters on King Alfred and the Bible, The Holy Grail, The Religious Drama, Men of the Threshold—Chaucer, Langland and Wyyclif, and on English Versions. The later part of the book shows how the Bible has influenced and pervaded the works of the later great English writers of prose and poetry from Shakespeare down. It is an old tale retold and well told, and so worth while. Every lover of the Bible and of English literature might read this book with pleasure and profit.

*Princeton.*

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

*The First Year of Greek.* By JAMES TURNEY ALLEN, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Greek, University of California. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1917. Pp. x, 375. \$1.00.

The teacher of the Classics now finds it necessary to put his best foot forward, and he will welcome with eagerness any presentation of his subject which will lessen its drudgery and provide a maximum of interest and attractiveness. Instead of making his first year Greek book a gateway to the *Anabasis* and adapting it to the needs of students of fourteen or fifteen years old, Professor Allen has kept in mind the

four thousand students who each year begin the study of Greek in college, many of them intending to continue it for only a year or two. To such students he aims to give the opportunity of reading in their original form choice portions of Greek literature—"the finest flower and revealing of the Hellenic mind." It is a pleasant surprise to find in lesson one the opening verses of the Gospel of John, in lesson two brief quotations from Aristotle and Meander, in lesson five the axioms of Euclid in the original, and in other lessons an abundance of wise sayings from the philosophers and dramatists, with select portions from Plato, From Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, and several longer passages in Atticised form from the prince of story tellers, Herodotus.

Professor Allen has done a service to classical learning in his admirable *First Year of Greek*, and his book will be popular not only with mature students who wish to take their Greek in a compact form but with younger students of the brighter order as well.

*Lincoln University, Pa.*

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

*Patriotism and Radicalism.* Addresses and Letters. By MERCER GREEN JOHNSTON, Author of "Plain American Talks in the Philippines." 8vo; pp. 218. Boston: Sherman, French and Company. 1917.

*Faith, War and Policy.* Addresses and Essays on the European War. By GILBERT MURRAY. 8vo, pp. 14, 255. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company; Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1917.

These two books may properly be classed together, inasmuch as their addresses, letters and essays all, more or less directly, have their occasion in "the great war," are all strongly from the standpoint of the Entente Allies, and all breathe and would inspire the purest and highest patriotism. Of the second of them it should further be said that its interest will be in large part "historical." It sets forth the changes which have been wrought in the minds of all thoughtful people throughout Europe by the experiences of the last three shattering years, and it does this so well that it must have permanent value. We are glad to see that, through the kindness of Professor W. MacNeile Dixon of the University of Glasgow, it is being widely distributed.

*Princeton.*

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

## PERIODICAL LITERATURE

*American Church Monthly*, New York, October: CHARLES D. FAIRMAN, "Problems" at Saint Hilary's; THOMAS BURGESS, Pastoral Neglect of the Immigrant; GEORGE HARRISON, Spiritual Economy; CLARENCE A. MANNING, Orthodox Church in Greece since the Greek Revolution. *The Same*, November: CHAUNCEY B. TINKER, Necessity of Atheism; FRANCIS J. HALL, Eucharistic Doctrine and the Reservation; WILLIAM C. RODGERS. The College and the Christian; WILLIAM H. A.

HALL, When Does Probation End? *The Same*, December: J. H. BARRY, Variations on an Old Theme; BRIAN HOOKER, Law of Mystery; HENRY S. WHITEHEAD, Stopping the Leaks; ARTHUR B. JENKS, Use and Abuse of Church History: v, Foundation of Facts versus Favorite Fallacies.

*American Journal of Theology*, Chicago, October: JOHN W. BUCKHAM, Luther's Place in Modern Theology; W. H. T. DAU, Luther's Relation to Lutheranism and the American Lutheran Church; W. J. McGLOTHLIN, Luther's Doctrine of Good Works; E. ALBERT COOK, Ritschl's Use of Value-Judgments; FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE, Unitarianism; GEORGE A. BARTON, New Babylonian Material concerning Creation and Paradise; T. HERBERT BINDLEY, On Some Points, Doctrinal and Practical, in the Catechetical Lectures of St. Cyril of Jerusalem.

*Bibliotheca Sacra*, Oberlin, October: FRANCES H. JOHNSON, Logic of the Entente Cordiale; LOUIS M. SEARS, The Puritan and his Anglican Allegiance; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, A Lacuna in Scholarship (iv); HAROLD M. WIENER, The Date of Exodus and the Chronology of Judges; E. S. BUCHANAN, New Light on the Passion of Our Lord; ERNEST W. BURCH, Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews; ALFRED C. LANE AND JAMES H. LEUBA, Belief of Scientific Men and Immortality.

*Catholic Historical Review*, Washington, October: HERBERT F. WRIGHT, Origin of American Aborigines—A Famous Controversy; GAILLARD HUNT, Virginia Declaration of Rights and Cardinal Bellarmine; JULIUS KLEIN, The Church in Spanish American History; WILLIAM S. MERRILL, Catholic Authorship in the American Colonies before 1784; WILLIAM KEUENHOF, Catholic Church Annals of Kansas City.

*Church Quarterly Review*, London, October: H. M. BURGE, Our Use of the Reserved Sacrament; ROPER LETHBRIDGE, The Tithe in the Ancient British Church of Wales; H. LOWTHER CLARKE, Church of England in Australia; C. H. TURNER, Church Order of St. Hippolytus; Cardinal Mercier's Philosophy; F. H. CHASE, Henry Barclay Swete; W. A. SPOONER, Two Permanent Causes of Unrest.

*Constructive Quarterly*, New York, December: JAMES COOPER, The Church of Scotland and the Whole Church Catholic; T. P. KILPATRICK, A Response to Father Kelly; H. L. GOUDGE, Reality and Limitations of the Authority of the Church in Relation to the Gift of the Holy Spirit; W. P. DUBOSE, Christ the Revelation of God; A. T. ROBERTSON, The Fourth Gospel in the Light of Modern Scholarship; W. B. SELBIE, Prospects of Free Church Federation in England; HERBERT SYMONDS, Protestantism and the Development of the Church; NEWMAN SMYTH, Preparation for the World Conference; J. D. LLWYD, Mysticism and Unity; R. WINTERBOTHAM, Sacramental and Non-Sacramental Christianity; A. VAN VELDHUIZEN, Ethical Element in St. Matthew; HENRI BREMOND, Tillemont the Mystic.

*East & West*, London, October: CONSTANCE L. MAYNARD, A Lesson in the Progress of Ethics; E. R. MCNEILE, Theosophy and Gnosticism; DR. BOUTFLOWER, The Bad Habit of Translating the Prayer Book;

R. KEABLE, An African Ministry; A. E. BLACKBURN, Native Races and the Liquor Traffic; DR. DURRANT, A Visit to the Sabeans at Amara; DR. FYFFE, Mr. Gokhale's Testament and the Indian Church; P. M. SCOTT, Society of Religious Liberty in China; The Conversion of Europe.

*Expositor*, London, October: MAURICE JONES, The Style of St. Paul's Preaching; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALE, Fermented or Unfermented Wine in the Lord's Supper; B. W. BACON, The "Other" Comforter; EDWARD SHILLITO, Winning the Creeds; EMERY BARNES, Ezekiel's Vision of a Resurrection; VACHER BURCH, Exegetical Basis of Paul's Thought; F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK, The "Servant" in Isaiah and the New Testament. *The Same*, November: RENDEL HARRIS, Christ the Firstborn; MAURICE JONES, The Style of Paul's Preaching; H. T. ANDREWS, Philosophical Background of Epistle to Hebrews; LIEUT. COL. MACKINLAY, Date of Nativity was 8 B. C.; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, The Eucharistic Cup; A. T. ROBERTSON, Versatility of Paul; ARTHUR WRIGHT, Primacy of Judas Iscariot. *The Same*, December: WILLIAM S. BISHOP, High Priesthood of Christ as set forth in the Epistle to the Hebrews; W. R. WHATELY, Christ as the Object of Faith in the Synoptic Gospels; D. W. FORREST, The "Modern Religion" of H. G. Wells; HERBERT G. WOOD, The Attitude of H. G. Wells towards Jesus Christ; E. W. WINSTANLEY, Ethical Nature of Our Lord's Eschatology.

*Expository Times*, Edinburgh, October: Notes of Recent Exposition; RAYNOR WINTERBOTHAM, Was, then, Our Lord Mistaken?; HENRY COWAN, Conflict of Faith and Unbelief in France, 1670-1802; JAMES MOFFATT, Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews. *The Same*, November: Notes of Recent Exposition; A. G. HOGG, "If God be For Us"; G. A. FRANK KNIGHT, A New Setting for the Teleological Argument; A. H. SAYCE, Archaeology of the Book of Genesis. *The Same*, December: Notes of Recent Exposition; H. A. A. KENNEDY, Irenaeus and the Fourth Gospel; C. RYDER SMITH, Religious Value of the Bible Story of Creation; W. E. P. COTTER, Was our Lord Mistaken?; A. H. SAYCE, Archaeology of Book of Genesis.

*Harvard Theological Review*, Cambridge, October: KEMPER FULLERTON, Zionism; KIRSOPP LAKE, American, Dutch, and English Theological Education; F. J. FOAKES-JACKSON, Professor C. C. Torrey and Acts; HENRY W. FOOTE, Anonymous Hymns of Samuel Longfellow.

*Hibbert Journal*, Boston, October: L. P. JACKS, The War-Made Empires and the Martial Races of the Western World; COUNTESS OF WARWICK, Peace—and What Then?; W. J. PERRY, The Peaceable Habits of Primitive Communities; G. F. BRIDGE, War as Medicine; PRINCIPAL SELBIE, Reconstruction of Theology; F. CUTHBERT, The Incarnation and Modern Thought; NICOL MACNICOL, Indian Poetry of Devotion; C. F. THWING, Public Opinion in United States in Last Three Years; HAMILTON BAYNES, Doctors, Lawyers, and Parsons; PERCY GARDNER, Are the Anglican Modernists Honest?; OLIVER LODGE, The Scientific World and Dr. Mercier; J. H. SKRINE, Telepathy as Interpreting Christ.

*International Journal of Ethics*, Concord, October: HORACE MIL-

BORNE, Hammer of Thor; HAROLD C. BROWN, Social Psychology and the Problem of a Higher Nationality; MARGARET JOURDAIN, Some Recent Literature on a League to Enforce Peace; VICTOR S. YARROS, German and Anglo-American Views of the State; ELSIE C. PARSONS, Feminism and the Family; EMILE BOUTROUX, Liberty of Conscience; MARY W. CALKINS, Militant Pacifism; DONALD W. FISHER, War and the Christian Religion.

*Irish Theological Quarterly*, Dublin, October: M. J. O'DONNELL, Some of the More Practical Points in the New Canon Law Code; J. M. O'SULLIVAN, Luther and Freedom of Thought; E. MAGUIRE, Facts and Theories of Life; J. KELLEHER, Distributive Justice.

*Jewish Quarterly Review*, Philadelphia, October: HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD, Early Karaite Critics of the Mishnah; EUGENE KOHN, Books on Jewish Education; I. M. CASANOWICZ, Recent Books on Comparative Religions and Sociology; ISAAC HUSIK, Studies in Gersonides.

*Journal of Negro History*, Lancaster, October: JOHN R. LYNCH, Some Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes; CHARLES H. WESLEY, The Struggle in Haiti and Liberia for Recognition; BENJAMIN BRAWLEY, Three Negro Poets—Horton, Mrs. Harper and Whitman; JOSEPH BUTSCH, Catholics and the Negro.

*London Quarterly Review*, London, October: P. T. FORSYTH, The Moralization of Religion; GEORGE JACKSON, A Gossip about Clerical Biography; EMILE BOUTROUX, Liberty of Conscience; W. ERNEST BEET, The False Decretals; H. MALDWYN HUGHES, Wesley's Standards in the Light of To-Day; E. E. KELLETT, The War in Paraguay; R. C. HAWKIN, The Prosecution of Our Lord; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Prayers for the Dead.

*Lutheran Church Review*, Philadelphia, October: R. MORRIS SMITH, Luther and the Liturgy; Liturgical Development Within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States; JOHN C. MATTES, True Liberty and How the Reformation Gave It; GEORGE W. SANDT, Lutheran Leaders as I Knew Them; Julius W. Mann. L. FRANKLIN GRUBER, Documentary Sketch of the Reformation, ii; LEANDER S. KEYSER, God and Immortality.

*Lutheran Quarterly*, Gettysburg, October: J. A. SINGMASTER, Luther and the Reformers Before the Reformation; JOHN A. FAULKNER, Was there Need of a Reformation?; LEANDER S. KEYSER, Is There Need of a Restatement of Doctrine?; ABDEL R. WENTZ, The Message of the Lutheran Church to America; J. M. HANTZ, Anticipations of Christian Theology in the Writings of Heathen and Jewish Philosophers; J. A. SINGMASTER, Current Theological Thought.

*Methodist Review*, New York, November-December: CHARLES M. STUART, Naphtali Luccock; J. A. FAULKNER, The Methodist Review: the First Century; E. F. TITTLE, Use and Abuse of Creeds; O. L. JOSEPH, Thinking Through; JAMES MUDGE, The Last Twenty-five Years of the Methodist Review; LEVI GILBERT, "There'll Be No Dark Valley;" EDWIN LEWIS, Erasmus and Luther: Their Relations During the Early Years of the Reformation; W. A. ROBINSON, Rev. Frederick

W. Robertson; DANIEL DORCHESTER, *The Struggle for Bread and Humanity*.

*Methodist Review Quarterly*, Nashville, October: W. W. SWEET, The First Circuit Riders of the West; W. W. MARTIN, Light upon the Earliest History of Genesis; HORACE M. DuBOSE, *Have We a Constitution?*; R. G. SMITH, *Constitutions of the Two Great American Methodist Churches*; J. H. MICHAEL, James Hope Moulton and John Shaw Banks; S. A. WEBER, *A Great Pastor-Evangelist*; C. A. WATERFIELD, *The Book of Books*; W. F. WARREN, *The Priest I Might Have Been*; J. W. SMITH, *The Acts of the Apostles*; C. T. TALLY, *My Christology*; J. A. FAULKNER, *The Real St. Patrick*.

*Monist*, Chicago, October: EDOUARD LE ROY, *What is Dogma?*; KARL I. GERHARDT, Leibniz in London; ERNST L. BACON, *Our Musical Idiom*; JAMES H. LEUBA, *The Primitive and the Modern Conceptions of Personal Immortality*.

*Moslem World*, Concord, October: PERCY SMITH, *A Plea for Literature in Vernacular Arabic*; W. H. T. GAIRDNER, *The National Commission and Mohammedanism*; ROBERT STEVEN, *The Bible in Morocco*; MINNEHAHA FINNEY, *Amulets in Egypt*; STEPHEN TROWBRIDGE, *Beyond Khartum*; EVAN E. SHORT, *Kairouan as a Moslem Center*; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALE, *London School for Oriental Studies*; ALPHONSE MINGANA, *Transmission of the Koran*, ii.

*Reformed Church Review*, Lancaster, October: J. SPANGLER KIEFFER, *Recollections of Dr. Harbaugh*; GEORGE W. RICHARDS, *Anglicanism and Puritanism*; JOHN A. W. HAAS, *Present Task of the Gospel Ministry*; A. M. GLUCK, *Worship in the Church*; ERNEST N. EVANS, *Restoration of the Heroic in Home Missions*; GEO. S. BUTZ, *The Pre-Reformation Popes*; E. WILBUR KRIESEL, *The Political Results of the Reformation*; RAY H. DOTTERER, *The Argument for a Finitist Theology*.

*Review and Expositor*, Louisville, October: W. W. BARNES, *Luther's View of the Church*; GEORGE CROSS, *Luther's Doctrine of the Sacraments*; E. C. DARGAN, *Luther as a Preacher*; GEO. B. EAGER, *Luther as a Social Influence*; W. O. CARVER, *Luther and Missions*; T. P. STAFFORD, *Relation of the Ethical Teaching of Jesus to the Old Testament*; A. J. DICKINSON, *Genetic History of Titus*.

*Union Seminary Review*, Richmond, October: C. ALPHONSO SMITH, *The Keynote Method*; ANDREW W. BLACKWOOD, *The Young Minister in His Study*; JAMES I. GOOD, *Books and Articles on the Reformation and the Reformers*; WILLIS THOMPSON, *Making Presbyterians*; W. HOGE MARQUESS, *A Missionary Sermon*; EUGENE C. CALDWELL, *Through Judgment to Glory—A Book Study of Isaiah*.

*Yale Review*, New Haven, October: SIMEON STRUNSKY, *The Fourth Year of War*; EMILE CAMMAERTS, *Méditation sur la Nuit du Trois Août*; BRUNO LASKER, *The Way to Durable Peace*; HENRY O. TAYLOR, *The Wisdom of the Ages*; LAZARE MARCOVITCH, *Serbia, the Buffer State*; KENNETH S. LATOURETTE, *The Question of China*; A. G. KELLER, *Birth Control*; ANNE C. E. ALLINSON, *Virgil and the New Patriotism*.

*Bilychnis*, Roma, Settembre: ANTONINO DE STEFANO, *Delle origini*

dei "Poveri Lombardi" e di alcuni gruppi Valdesi: LUISA G. BENSO, Lamennais e Mazzini—ii, Lamennais; GIOVANNI PIOLI, La fede e l'immortalità nel "Mors et Vita" di Alfredo Loisy, ii; FERUCCIO MUTINELLI, Il profilo intellettuale di s. Agostino. *The Same*, Ottobre: GIOVANNI PIOLI, Germanesimo spirituale e materiale; ANTONINO DE STEFANO, Delle origine dei "Poveri Lombardi" e di alcuni gruppi Valdesi: Speronisti-Runcarii-Tortolani; ERNESTO RUTILI, La "Storia interna" della Compagnia di Gesù; EMMANUEL, "La Chiesa e i nuovi tempi"; CAMILLO TRIVERO, La ragione e la guerra.

*La Ciencia Tomista*, Madrid, Septiembre-Octubre: JOSÉ NOVAL, El Código del Derecho canónico compuesto por mandado del Sumo Pontífice Pío X, promulgado por autoridad de Su Santidad Benedicto XV; ALBERTO COLUNGA, La predicación y la Escritura; ALONSO GETINO, El "Syllabus" tomista; J. G. ARINTERO, Alteraciones y reconstitución de una personalidad. *The Same*, Noviembre-Diciembre; ALONSO GETINO, El "Syllabus" tomista; JOSÉ DE LA MANO, Fray Felipe de Meneses; ALBERTO COLUNGA, Suárez, escriturario; V. BELTRÁN DE HEREDIA, Cisneros fundador de la Universidad de Alcalá; Evolucionismo y transformismo según la ciencia.

*Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift*, Nijverdal, September: A. G. HONIG, De moderne positieve Theologie in Duitschland: ED. KOENIG, Die Bedeutung von Ex. 6: 2 für die Pentateuchkritik; G. CH. AALDERS, Ex. 6:2 en de Pentateuchkritik; H. W. SMITT, Beginselen der Ethiek; J. C. RULLMANN, Kroniek.

*Recherches de Science Religieuse*, Paris, Mai-Septembre: HENRI LAMMENS, Une adaptation arabe du monothéisme biblique; RAOUL DE SCORRAILLE, Jansénius en Espagne; Appendice, Texte original du discours de Jansénius à Salamanque; MARC DEBRUEL, Un épisode de l'histoire de l'Église de France au xvii<sup>e</sup> siècle: Nicholas Pavillon, évêque de Pamiers; PAUL DUDON, Le livre du P. Pichon sur la communion fréquente.

*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, Lausanne, Août-Octobre: HENRI VUILLEUMIER, Professeurs et étudiants de Lausanne au temps de la Réformation; PIERRE BOVET, Le respect. Essai de psychologie morale; LOUIS MONASTER-SCHROEDER, Les cantiques de Luther; JULES AMIGUET, Questions de liturgie; Auguste Gampert, Les "480 ans" de 1 Rois 6:1.

*Theologische Studien*, Utrecht, xxxv, 3: G. J. A. JONKER, Henri Bergson: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, God en Mensch in Babel en Bijbel, ii.



Princeton Theological Seminary Libraries



1 1012 01446 0390

*For use in Library only*

For use in Library only

